...breast of any subsequent judge to alter or swerve from according to his private sentiments : he being not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one, ius dicere, et non ius dare' (Broom's Legal Maxims, p. 109). " I venture to cite these Civil Law maxims,...

...to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land ; not delegated to pronounce a new law,...exception, where the former determination is most evidently [*70] contrary to reason; *much more if it be clearly contrary to the divine law. But even in such...

...to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land ; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one." 2 In regard to the presumption of correctness attaching to a judicial decision, it may be remarked...

...to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land — not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one — jus dicere et non jus dare. I might say, since there is a warning to new judges here, that this...

...to determine, not according to hia own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land ; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one. But to this general rule he makes exceptions, limitations, and modifications, as follows: If the decision...

...to determine not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to i Seld. Review of Tith. c. 8. . • reasonably claim on the ground of his equality with the rest. Even...

...to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one." But he does not leave the courts in chains. He states that this rule admits of exceptions, particularly...

...upon the conception which English jurists hold of the relation between custom and judicial decision: "Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former...determination is most evidently contrary to reason; and much more if it be contrary to the divine law. But even in such case the subsequent judges do not...

...In no jurisdiction has judicial practice entirely conformed with the orthodox view that judges are "not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.'" Judges are compelled to decide many cases for which no exact precedent exists. I11 the exercise of...

...to similar cases." And Blackstone says in 1 Com., 69, 70: "Yet this rule," stare iIecisis, "ad mits of exception where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason," which reason is not every man's natural reason, but the reason, method, and science of the law, as...