...to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and cuftoms of the land ; not delegated to pronounce a new law,...admits of exception, where the former determination is moft evidently contrary to reafon * • caf. 8. • Seld. review of Tith. c. 8. much much more if it...

...be applied to similar cases." And Blackstone says in 1 Com., 69, 70: "Yet this rule," stare decisis, "admits of exception where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason," which reason is not every man's natural reason, but the reason, method, and science of the law, as...

...to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one. (1, "Intro.," sec. 3, *69) The theme here is not judicial self-restraint, as if judges can freely decide...

...established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in litigation; . . . Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former...determination is most evidently contrary to reason. . . . For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not...

...Alschuler notes, however, that the Court omitted the sequel to Blackstone's statement that judges are not to "pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one," thereby missing the dialectal, complex character of his analysis: Yet this rule admits of exception,...

...determine, not according to his own private judgement, but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.4 If a prior judicial decision is "most evidently contrary to reason" or "clearly contrary to the...

...there are two theories. According to the old English view, as stated by Blackstone, the judges are 'not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one22.' They *58 are the depositaries of a body of *customary principles which have only to be applied...

...with reason Blackstone writes that the rule of precedent may be violated if the precedent is a bad one. Yet this rule admits of exception, where the...most evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be contrary to divine law. But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law,...

...to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one." According to this theory, when a new question is presented by the development of inventions and changes...

...full retroactive application derived from the Blackstonian notion "that the duty of the court was not to 'pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.'" Linkletter v. Walker, 381 US 618, 622-623 (1965), citing 1 W. Blacks' one, Commentaries 69 (15th ed....