From the information of Mr. Crawford, it should seem, that a circulation of one hundred and ten millions in 1816, had been reduced to forty-five millions in 1819; and the chairman calculates, that the average circulation within the last ten years, has been fifty-five millions. But if, commodities in the market remaining as before, the circulation is doubled, the money-price will be doubled also; and the Government had actually to borrow, under these circumstances of depreciation, to the amount of eighty millions of dollars. This they received in sixty-eight millions of paper money, worth only fifty per cent, making a loss of thirty-four millions; but the treasury notes received by the lenders as stock, were sold by Government at twenty per cent. discount; producing a loss of twelve millions of dollars, which, added to the thirty-four, occasioned a total loss of fortysix millions of dollars in borrowing eighty millions.

This prodigious loss, it is taken for granted, would have been totally saved, had such an institution as the Bank of the United States been in full operation at that time. The reader will take as much of this for granted as he may think the facts will warrant. The assumption is somewhat too extravagant for us.

But, on turning to the first tabular exhibit annexed to the report, containing the discount on paper money at various places in the United States in the year 1816, and taking an average from that table, we cannot find the depreciation extended beyond eleven and a half per cent. At Pittsburgh, indeed, it was from eighteen to twenty-five, and, at Baltimore, dollars were eighteen in advance; but if, from that table, you take the cities most likely to contain the money-lenders, the notes of those cities will not furnish a depreciation, reaching ten per cent. on the average, even including Philadelphia. Thus, take the depreciation of notes at Boston, nothing; but Boston notes which were cash, were only seven per cent. advance in NewYork; New-York notes at Philadelphia, nine and a half per cent.; Philadelphia notes at New-York, seventeen per cent.; South-Carolina notes at New-York, eleven per cent.; Georgia notes, the same.

As to Baltimore, or Pittsburgh, or the interior towns, they have little or nothing to do with the question; for the loan would be chiefly, if not entirely, taken up by the wealthy part of Massachusetts, New-York, Pennsylvania, South-Carolina and Georgia. We cannot, therefore, accept, as approximating to accuracy, the sweeping statement of the Committee, that the loss to Government, out of eighty millions, was forty-six millions; the first table of exhibits does not warrant more than one-fifth of that sum; nor can we believe, that if there had

been at that time in full operation, a Bank of the United States, that the whole of this loss would have been saved. Who can believe that the Bank would not have speculated on the exigency? We notice this, that the reader may be more upon his guard, than the Committee seem to have been, against the admission of arguments on the favoured side of the question, not strong enough to sustain the weight they are required to support. We have already acknowledged, that the present greatly improved state of our currency is owing to the prudent management of the United States' Bank, under the administrations of Mr. Cheves and Mr. Biddle, without meaning to acknowledge, that Congress had a right to incorporate a Bank to regulate the general currency, Mr. McDuffie's report notwithstanding. But the means employed by them to produce this effect, are too simple to warrant a patent for the invention. Whether individuals set up a Bank for their own emolument, or whether Government shall issue any description of paper on the cash actually paid into the treasury, and not a cent beyond it-adopt as the inexorable rule, pay cash on demand for your own paper, and accept in payment no paper that cannot be converted into cash on demand. The same energy on the part of Government, as is exercised by the present Bank, will have the same salutary effect.

At the close of the war, the business of stock-jobbing, bankery, brokerage, and all the minor distributions of financial knowledge, were well understood, so far as their own interest was concerned, by the jobbers, and bankers, and brokers of that day. It was not perfectly understood by the statesmen of that day, wise and honest as we know most of them were. All this is much better apprehended now than it was then; the maxims are few and simple; we have bought our experience dearly, but we have obtained it; even forty-six millions of dollars was not an extravagant price for the commodity purchased. Let us take care not to throw away, but to make use of our experience; and not repurchase it at a price not to be calculated in dollars at the price of the Constitution of our country, and the republicanism of these confederated States.

The next point of inquiry is, whether the United States' Bank, with its present powers, be an institution dangerous to the community. In making this inquiry, it will be sufficient to shew, that it possesses the power of doing great mischief, without proving that it has actually done it. The character of tyranny does not depend on the personal character of the ty

rant.

Let us then see what the powers and privileges of the present Bank are; making some additions to the summary in Mr. Benton's statement before the Senate, pp. 6-8.

1st. It is empowered to hold real and personal property to the amount of fifty-five millions of dollars, and to issue notes to the amount of thirty-five millions more; also, as many more notes as, on application to Congress, that body may permit.

2dly. It has the keeping of the public moneys to the amount of twenty-five millions of dollars per annum; and usually has a surplus to trade upon, of about three and a half, or four millions in account with the treasurer, and at least one and a half millions in account with the disbursing officers. These two kinds of public deposits furnishing a running surplus of more than five millions of dollars a year, for which no interest is paid to Go

vernment.

3dly. With these surpluses and other private deposits, it is enabled to advance loans on mortgage and personal security, and almost to monopolize the lucrative dealing in bills of exchange.

4thly. Having, at its option, to take in payment the notes of State and other Banks, and to demand, or delay demanding cash for such notes, it is enabled to carry on a great part of its business, not with its own notes, but with the notes of other Banks; which it can collect easily, and send them in to be cashed in accumulated abundance. Hence, every Bank throughout the United States is, in fact, at the mercy, and under the control of this great institution.

The Chairman of the Committee of the Senate, General Smith, puts this question to Mr. Nicholas Biddle, the President of the Bank:

"Has the Bank, at any time, oppressed any of the State Banks?” To this sapient inquiry Mr. Biddle answers, of course,

66

No, never. But there are very few Banks that might not have been destroyed by an exertion of the power of the Bank.

No further fact or argument is necessary, to shew the dangerous character of this institution. Who can promise that this overwhelming power will not be exerted during twenty years from 1836?

Let it be remembered, that this enormous power and control extends directly over every debtor of the United States' Bank, and, indirectly, over the officers, and, indirectly, also over the debtors of every Bank under the influence or the rod of that mammoth institution.

Such a power as this may buy up the States by loans of millions may lay legislators under pecuniary obligations; may

influence the decision of political questions; may forbid any debtor to be a patriot; and may quietly and secretly distribute its loans and discounts so as, in fact, to govern the Government, and perpetuate its own power.

Connected with this enormous money control, it may be stated that, even at this day, it is enabled to set the Government at defiance, and to say, in effect, “disband us if you dare." The following is an extract from Mr. McDuffie's report, p. 23:

"But the great injury which would result from the refusal of Congress to renew the charter of the present Bank, would, beyond all question, be that which would result to the community at large. It would be difficult to estimate the extent of the distress which would naturally and necessarily follow, from the sudden withdrawal of more than forty millions of credit which the community now enjoys from the Bank. But this would not be the full extent of the operation. The Bank of the United States, in winding up its concerns, would not only withdraw its own paper from circulation and call in its debts, but would unavoidably make such heavy draughts on the local institutions for specie, as very greatly to curtail their discounts. The pressure upon the active, industrious, and enterprizing classes would be tremendous. A vast amount of property would change hands at half value, passing under the hammer, from the merchants, manufacturers, and farmers, to the large moneyed capitalists, who always stand ready to avail themselves of the pecuniary embarrassments of the community. The large stockholders of the present Bank, the very persons whose present lawful gains it would be the object of some to cut off, would be the very first to speculate on the distresses of the community, and build up princely fortunes on the ruins of the industrious and active classes. On the other hand, the females and minors, and persons in moderate circumstances, who hold stock in the institution, would sustain an injury in no degree mitigated by the general distress of the cominunity."

Such is the appalling picture drawn by the sombre pencil of the Chairman of the Committee. We do not believe in the prophecy to a third of its extent. The numerous Banks in existence will, in our opinion, afford facilities enough to lessen the expected evils to a very tolerable amount. But let us take for granted, the fidelity of Mr. McDuffie's pencil in thus depicting the results of abolishing the Bank charter. If this be a true account of the miseries that will ensue upon closing the concerns of the present Bank, if, therefore, it becomes necessary that the charter should be renewed to avoid them, how far greater will the amount of evil be at the expiration of the succeeding twenty years, when the operations of the new Bank will probably be double those of the present? Is it not clear as day light, that however mischievous, however wantonly meddling and despotic the next Bank may prove itself-however

disposed to tyrannize with its tremendous means of tyrannizing over every other Bank throughout the Union, and even over the State Governments and the General Government itselfstill, it is an institution fixed on us, not during its twenty years charter, BUT FOREVER. If the dangers of abolishing the present Bank are such, that we are obliged to shrink from the attempt, the danger of abolishing the next Bank will be incalculably greater-the viper is in your bosom and you dare not disturb it.

If there were no other argument for prostrating this most dangerous institution-if Mr. Madison had not spoken, or Mr. Jefferson written one syllable in its disfavour-if the unanswerable arguments of Judge Clayton and Mr. Benton, had never been penned this, this single argument of the Committee of the House of Representatives, is of itself conclusive of the question. An institution so powerful, that however dangerous or obnoxious, you cannot control, and dare not remove it, ought never to be tolerated in a Republican Government. Whatever may be the evils attending its prostration, we must meet them, and bear them, before they are so enormously increased by our own acquiescence, as to enable the institution that produces them, to laugh us to scorn. The sooner the evil is met, the

better.

The advice of Mr. Daniel Webster, in his speech against the tariff of protecting duties, in the Committee of the Whole in 1824, is well worthy of being borne in memory.

"And, Sir, I imagine nothing would strike the public men of England more singularly, than to find gentlemen of real information and much weight in the councils of this country, expressing sentiments like these in regard to the existing state of these English laws. I have never said, indeed, that prohibitory laws did not exist in England; we all know they do; but the question is, does she owe her prosperity and greatness to the laws? I venture to say, such is not the opinion of the public men now in England; and the continuance of the laws, even without alteration, would not be evidence that their opinion is different from what I have represented it; because the laws having existed long, and great interests having been built up on the faith of them, they cannot now be repealed without great and overwhelming inconvenience. Because a thing has been wrongly done, it does not, therefore, follow that it can now be undone; and this is the reason, if I understand it, upon which exclusion, prohibition and monopoly, are suffered to remain, in any degree, in the English system; and for the same reason, it will be wise in us to take our measures on all subjects of this kind with great caution. We may not be able, but at the hazard of much injury to individuals, hereafter to retrace our steps. Yet, whatever is immoderate