Such is the actual status of this Atlantic fisheries dispute at the present moment, setting out the respective relations of the several parties thereto. But the question has a diplomatic aspect also, regarding the foregoing as its industrial phase. Where it enters the sphere of diplomacy and intrigue is as follows:

Canada is desirous of including Newfoundland in the Dominion. But this colony is opposed to union, holding that it would not serve her fishery interests. Canada's eagerness to bring about the federation is due to the fact that upon merging Newfoundland in the confederation the fisheries would pass under the control of the Dominion Cabinet at Ottawa. There would no longer be any division of authority as between the two; Newfoundland's special identity would be extinguished, and the fisheries would be administered as a whole and with one definite policy. The securing of this advantage would enable Canada to close the whole of the territorial waters of British North America, with all the fishery rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, against United States' subjects, and thereby jeopardise the very existence of the New England fishery enterprise. This would provoke a furious outcry from Maine and Massachusetts, in the prosperity of which States the fishery plays a prominent part, and also from the United States Navy Department, which relies in a great measure on the New England ports for sailors to man the warships. Consequently Canada would be able to obtain excellent terms if she would then agree to reopen these waters to the American trawlers.

The concession might be general fisheries reciprocity, or perhaps an abatement of American contentions as regards the Alaskan Boundary. At any rate, the leverage would be most important for Canada, and therefore she will leave nothing undone to prevent the Bond-Hay convention from being ratified. As Canada views it, there is no doubt much to commend this policy, but Newfoundland, which is to be the victim of the scheme, cannot be blamed if she resents it as unfair to her. Sacrificed on the one side to promote Imperial interests with France, she sees no reason why she should be sacrificed on the other side to enable Canada to checkmate the United States. In this crisis Newfoundland awaits the outcome of the Alaskan Boundary Arbitration now in progress in London, which must have an important bearing upon Anglo-American relations generally, and those between the United States and Canada in particular. Should the Bond-Hay Treaty be ratified when next Congress meets, the oldest Colony looks for the Imperial Government to fulfil the promise made by Lord Knutsford eleven years ago.

P. T. MCGRATH, St. John's, Newfoundland.

CONQUEST BY BANK AND RAILWAYS

WITH EXAMPLES FROM RUSSIA IN MANCHURIA

THE well-known phrase of the famous American leader War is hell' must nowadays be qualified by the intensely appalling adjectives of profitless' and 'ineffectual.' The recent war in South Africa has demonstrated, not only to what ruinous and colossal figures the bill of expenses can run, but that, as a means of acquiring or forcing one's interests in new territory, it is, at this stage of civilisation, out of date and unsatisfactory. All the expenditures of a so-called successful war produce nothing but the necessity and obligation of undertaking still greater expenses to make the first step of the march of progress possible in a reduced and devastated country. So that, notwithstanding what a nation may pay for the carrying-out of a successful war, the millions spent in this way count for nothing, or less than nothing, as a profitable investment. The truth must be admitted that the time has passed when it was worth while going to war to acquire territory, whether from savages or weaker nations. The costly war produces countless and bleeding sores in the conquered peoples; sores requiring a thick coating of gilt before any hope may be obtained of establishing the foundations there among them for any progress or mutual benefit.

If, then, war is out of date for the purpose of conquest, what is there to replace it?

In Egypt, England has unconsciously touched upon a great principle of conquest by absorption, slow, but as permanent in its effects and as unchangeable as the Fates. In Egypt, England has gained control of the Nile and the finances, and she has become so intermingled with the government that the destinies of the two countries are now inextricably intertwined. The acquisition of the Soudan has reduced the question of Egypt to a secondary place, since the control of the Upper Nile carries with it the power of life and death over the Delta.

But it is to Russia one must look for the conscious and intelligent and consecutive development of this principle as applied to the gaining or acquiring of new possessions. From the very earliest

days the Russians have realised that commerce and finance were the easiest and most sure methods of absorbing new territory. They saw clearly that it was infinitely better to divert the stream of everyday life little by little toward a new channel without in any way checking its force, than to boldly throw across it a dam of war, diverting and scattering all its forces without having any new channel for it to follow.

The whole story of the acquisition of Siberia is a wonderful testimony to this idea, although it must be confessed that in its earlier stages its execution was crude and lacking in that subtlety that has characterised their later efforts. Undoubtedly there has never been so great a tract of country acquired by a nation with so little bloodshed. This is admitted even by the bitterest opponents of the Russian advance towards the Pacific. Bloodshed has occurred, but that it has done so has been a detail in the carrying-out of the idea it was no part of the original plan. Generally it arose from the necessity of protecting traders in the new territories. Of course, in the more southern regions of Central Asia, where Russia came into contact with warlike races, conflicts naturally occurred more frequently, and on a greater scale. But even here the policy was, in the words of General Skobeleff, 'to strike hard, and keep on hitting till resistance is completely over, then at once to form ranks, cease slaughter, and be kind and humane to the prostrate enemy.' Another great advantage which Russia possessed was the faculty of suiting her diplomacy and methods to the methods of the people with whom she had to deal. If it was possible to obtain the desired and necessary treaties from a country by conducting the negotiations along the lines customary in that country, Russia was never one to insist upon the red tape of St. Petersburg. And so there was never a feeling of a great and impossible breach between the conquerors and the conquered, such as one finds in India or Africa.

From the time when Yermak first entered into Siberia to discover new fields for the exercise of his powers, to the present time, Russia's progress in Asia has never ceased. To-day she can look at the 4,833,500 square miles of Siberia, and reflect upon the soundness of her policy, and the excellent method in which it has been carried out. To quote from a writer who is not at all a RussophilMr. Alexis Krausse-in his book Russia in Asia:

The doings of Yermak and of Chabaroff in Siberia aimed rather at the obtaining of fresh markets for Russian produce than at the increase of Muscovite dominion; and the subsequent invasion of Central Asia was brought about not by any political designs on the part of Russia, but by the necessity of teaching a lesson to the Kirghiz marauders who made the limits of the Orenberg steppe unsafe to the caravans which traversed it in the direction of Khiva.

Interesting as has been Russia's work in Siberia, she had there no competition to fear from other nations, and was, therefore, able

to choose her own time for her operations, without dread of outside complications.

It is, therefore, of more value to study closely Russia's presentday system of annexation, and to see in what manner it has been brought up to date and improved to meet the competition of foreign nations. This field of her operations lies, of course, in Northern China. The first noteworthy difference of system we see is that whereas in its earlier stages Russia was content to allow separate persons or bodies to control her commercial policy in Manchuria, it has been deemed necessary now to consolidate the various interests into a strong and serviceable weapon, ever ready to the hand of the Government. This weapon of consolidated power is the RussoChinese Bank-a joint-stock corporation supported by Russian and Chinese capital. It is this bank that is gaining for Russia the rich province of Manchuria, the Garden of China,' and gaining it so completely that even if Russia withdraws politically from the territory, the Russianising influence will still go on.

In the Russo-Chinese Bank the Russian Government possesses a means of doing everything that is impossible for it to do as a Government. It is the Mr. Hyde to Russia's Dr. Jekyll; no other description will give so good an idea of the situation. That the Bank, though outwardly a private business, is absolutely under the control of the Minister of Finance, is evident from a perusal of the articles of association.

While every care was taken to preserve the idea that the Bank was as much Chinese as Russian, every care was also taken to prevent this being so in reality. Except for the name, the flying together of the two flags on Bank property, and its appearance as a Chinese authority in financial matters, the Bank is entirely and wholly Russian.

Once this mighty organisation was established and in working order, it obtained the concession to construct the railway through Manchuria, the district assigned to Russia by the secret Cassini Treaty of 1897.

For the construction of this road, the Bank formed the Chinese Eastern Railway Company'-again observe the skill with which the name has been chosen, suggesting that everything is Chinese, nothing Russian. This company has a capital of 5,000,000 roubles (500,000l.), the greater part controlled by the Bank. The funds for the actual construction were raised by bonds, guaranteed by the Russian Government, which doubtless held a large number of them. While this is ostensibly a plain business transaction, proof is not lacking that the railway has been built by the Government, acting through the diplomatic screen of the Bank. In M. de Witte's financial report for 1900 there appears the following significant item: 85,000,000 roubles for loans to private railways, on security of

bonds guaranteed by the Government.' Besides this, in the Budget estimates for the same year appears a sum of 82,000,000 roubles for the same purpose.

The following points from the published railway construction agreement will show how close is the connection of the Russian Government with the undertaking:

The bonds of the railway company shall be issued as required, and only with the special sanction of the Russian Minister of Finance. The face value and real price of each issue of bonds, and all the conditions of the issue, shall be directed by the Russian Minister of Finance.

The payment of interest on and amortisation of the bonds of the Manchurian Railway shall be guaranteed by the Russian Government when issued.

The railway company must secure advances upon these bonds through the Russo-Chinese Bank, and not otherwise; but the Government may itself directly, if it choose, take up the bond issue as a Government investment or upon loan, advancing upon the bonds the ready money needed by the company from time to time.

Money received by the company for these bonds, no matter whether it is received through the agency of the Russo-Chinese Bank or directly from the Government, or in any other manner, must be kept at such places as are designated by the Russian Minister of Finance, and absolutely under his supervision and control.

The ready money thus realised may be expended by the company in payment of various items of construction and on interest on bonds as the same come due.

Other points of interest in the agreement as published, deal with the exemptions from taxation according to the regular tariff of goods brought into China by this railway, and with the extension of the Russian postal service over the Manchuria system, whereby the Russian letter and parcel post shall be carried by the railway free of charge. All these items would seem to prove beyond a doubt that, save for diplomatic purposes, the railway is a Russian line-one of the arms of that silent octopus, Russian conquest.

The Chinese Eastern Railway is to Manchuria what the Nile is to Egypt; the Russians have, in fact, constructed through this valuable Chinese province a Nile of steel, capable of being extended in any direction desired. In this respect the petrified Nile has a distinct advantage over its watery prototype. And so subtly and carefully have the Russian authorities moved in stretching out this forerunner of an enforced civilisation, so perfectly have they understood that a Chinaman who is allowed to save his face' will accept subjugation when he would not take it—at least quietly-were he forced to open confession of his defeat, so graciously have they paid market value for the land occupied by the railway, that this steel girdle has been put around their world without a murmur. In nothing is this shown more clearly than in the original railway convention, wherein it was expressly stated that the line should avoid as much as possible graveyards and the great towns. This has been done, the only result naturally being that now the towns are either growing out