you to your aide-de-camp, Captain Loring, and From Commodore Macdonough to the American the bearer of this dispatch. I have, &c. J. MURRAY, Lieut.-col To Major-gen. Sir R. H. Sheaffe, SIR, &c., &c., &c. From captain Everard to Sir George Prevost. SIR, Major-general Glasgow has apprised your excellency of my repairing, with a party of officers and seamen, to man the sloops and gun-boats at Isle aux Noix, in consequence of your letter of the 4th ultimo, addressed to the senior officer of His Majesty's ship at Quebec, stating it to be of great importance to the public service, that an attempt should be made to alarm the enemy on the Montreal frontier, &c.; and agreeably to your wish that I should communicate any thing interesting that might occur, I have the honor to acquaint you, that the object for which the corps under the command of lieutenant colonel Murray had been detached, having been fully accomplished, by the destruction of the enemy's block-house, arsenal, barracks, and public store-houses remaining on the west side of the lake beyond Plattsburg, I stood over to Burlington with the Shannon and the gun-boat, to observe the state of the enemy's force there, and to afford him an opportunity of deciding the naval superiority of the lake. We were close in, on the forenoon of the 2nd, and found two sloops of about 100 tons burthen, one armed with 11 guns, the other 13, ready for sea, a third sloop, (somewhat larger,) lying under the protection of 10 guns, mounted on a bank of 100 feet high, without a breast-work, two scows, mounting one gun each as floating batteries, and several field pieces on the shore. Having captured and destroyed four vessels, without any attempt on the part of the enemy's armed vessels to prevent it, and seeing no prospect of inducing him to quit his position, where it was impossible for us to attack him, I am now returning to execute my original orders. I have the honor to be, &c., Secretary of the Navy. I have the honor to inform you, that I arrived here yesterday from near the lines, having sailed from Burlington on the 6th instant, with an intention to fall in with the enemy, who were then near this place. Having proceeded to within a short distance of the lines, I received information that the enemy were at anchor; soon after, they weighed and stood to the northward out of the lake-thus, if not acknowledging our ascendancy on the lake, evincing an unwillingness (although they had the advantage of situation, owing to the narrowness of the channel in which their galleys could work, when we should want room) to determine it. I have the honor to be, &c. THOS. MACDONOUGH. Hon. W. Jones, sec. of the navy. Lest we should be suspected of exaggeration, and, in truth, it is difficult to comprehend how a superior force should tamely submit to have their arsenals and public store-houses destroyed before their eyes, without even an attempt at resistance—we give an extract from the Washington official organ, which fully corroborates our statements as to the American force :-" From Lake Champlain. Our naval force sailed down the lake towards the enemy's line, and returned to Burlington, at which place there were then collected five thousand regular troops under General Hampton. Two thousand more were on their march, immediately expected from the Western States. The Plattsburg paper confirms all the accounts of the wanton barbarities of theenemy in that place, and adds considerably to the amount of depredations." It is neither the custom of the Americans to overstate their force, nor to allow the damage to them to be overrated; we contend, therefore that the above extract fully confirms all our statements relative to the affairs on Lake Champlain. With respect to depredations, we have only to remind the reader of the occurrences that took place at York; and, as we proceed in our narration, it will be shown that, whatever apparent acts of severity were committed by the British, they were strictly retaliatory; and we will further prove for supposition we must call it, as his state There is a very great discrepancy between Christie and Veritas, on the point of supplies for the troops. Veritas writes, "In my last number, I stated, that at one time, in autumn, 1813, our troops at Kingston had not seven days' subsistence. Those at Prescott and Fort Wellington were nearly in a similar situation. ment is unsupported by any proof that is satisfactory to us. We cannot help ascribing this charge of Veritas to a desire to make an attack even by a side wind, on Sir Geo. Prevost; and we think that the extract we now give will bear us out in the assertion. To counteract this nefarious plot, it became indispensably necessary to proclaim a modified Martial Law; and in consequence, provisions and forage were taken from the farmers, without their consent; but at very liberal and indeed very "This was in a great measure owing to a half of which they would now be happy to get. high prices, fixed by the Magistrates; the one combination of persons, either in the pay of Many who were duped by the arts of the disaffectMadison or gratuitously promoting his ser-ed, now feel compunction and sorrow at their vice. They effected their own purpose, partly by their own example, or by operating on the avarice of the well-affected, by persuading them to withhold supplies so as to get excessive prices. This was the ostensible pretext; but the real motive was to disconcert our military operations, by starving the troops, at the time of the expected invasion, by the forces collecting at Sackett's Harbour." "The What says Christie on the same subject, and in reference to the same date. army acting upon the extensive line of operations along the frontiers of Upper and Lower Canada, (at the lowest computation one thousand miles from Lake Champlain to Michilimacinac), was, by the able arrangements of Commissary General Sir W. H. Robinson, and the unwearied exertions of the department under his directions, copiously supplied at every point with provisions and commissariat stores of all descriptions." Now, which of these statements is the correct one? We are inclined to adopt neither. With regard to the statement of Veritas, that interested parties were disposed to hold their stores, in hopes of commanding higher prices, we think it extremely probable; but we are disposed to reject his assumption that it was done to embarrass the movements of our troops and to assist the enemy. The spirit that prevailed throughout the country, and which enabled our militia to sustain hardships of every description, was too patent, too rife, to permit such a course of action. Had Canadians exhibited a discontented spirit, had the slightest evidences of disaffection been apparent, then there might have been grounds for Veritas's supposition, folly. This measure created complaints, which were artifully laid hold of by a Junto of disaffected persons, but self styled patriots, who seeing their object likely to be defeated by this prompt and decided measure, became furious in their denunciations against the military in general, but especially General De Rottenburgh and Lieutenant Colonel Pearson, who then commanded at Prescot. The Chief of this Junto, was a man who had quitted Prescot the moment he heard of war being declared, and resided at Montreal, either from cowardice, or as considering it to afford a wider field for exertions favorable to the views of the enemy. He began his career by libelling every class in this community, and afterwards attacked the officers aforesaid, for doing their duty, in a periodical essay, under the signature of the "Anti-Jacobin," which was at first published in the Courant, but the Editor getting alarmed, at the abusive matter it contained; the work was taken up by a wretched paper called the Spectateur, that had commenced operations upon a congenial plan. This paper yet continues, but is dwindling into deserved insignificance. The Anti Jacobin has for some time dropped his signature, but occasionally deigns to enlighten his fellow subjects with the fruits of his brain, under anonymous signatures, or under the mask of editorial remarks. It would occupy too large a space, too enter into a formal discussion of the question about the right of declaring Martial Law, and therefore I shall content myself with observing, that to argue that such a power can in no case be exercised without a previous Legislative Act, is as absurd as to say, that an individual has not the right of selfpreservation if attacked, but must, instead of defending himself apply to the civil magistrate for protection, and consequently risk being destroyed this extract any proof of Veritas' assumption, before he can obtain that protection. and we repeat that we can see little more in it than a desire to attach some odium to Sir George Prevost. "General laws apply to ordinary cases, but there are cases that require extraordinary and prompt remedies. Rebellion or invasion assuredly come within the latter class, and during the existence of either of them, or absolute danger thereof, martial-law may be constitutionally proclaimed by the Sovereign or his Representative; and to do so, may be as indispensable to the safety of the state, as the instant application of personal force to the preservation of an individual when attack ed. "That the application of the power aforesaid was not made upon trivial occasion, is manifest; for the question was reduced to this.-Shall the army be starved at the time the enemy is known to be prepared for, and determined upon immediate invasion or shall an authority be exercised to defeat the plots of the disaffected, and thereby save the province against that invasion? So certainly will every honest and loyal man say yes to the second part of the question, that I venture to assert, that in such a predicament had the officer at the head of the Government, been so neglectful of his duty, as to be dismayed into inaction, by democratic clamour or threats, he would have deserved condign punishment. "General De Rottenburg, I conceive, was perfectly justified in what he did, from the necessity of the case, and Lieutenant Colonel Pearson in obeying his orders, was also so; and I have been astonished to learn, that Sir George Prevost, upon finding that the Lieut. Colonel was daily abused and threatened with prosecutions and persecutions by the disaffected Junto, for his zeal in executing his orders about subsisting the troops, cooly observed, that if he had got into a scrape, let him get out of it the best way he can. Sir George's duty was to have enquired whether the Lieut. Colonel had acted from corrupt motives or from zeal in a necessary measure, and if the latter, it was incumbent upon the commander of the Forces to have supported him. "I have a right to ascribe the conduct of the Junto to disaffection; for what good subject, when the enemy was at the door, would have taken measures to palsy our means of defence. To give aid to the enemy, is treaon, and what more efficient aid could be given, than, what I have mentioned. It only wanted proof, of a correspondence with the enemy, respecting those proceedings, to have made those concerned therein, punishable for High Treason." We will admit that cases did exist of shortcommons for the troops. General Proctor's force, for instance, was at this very time suffering for want of provisions; but this, when we come to inquire into the cause, was owing to the great numbers of Indians who, having forsaken their hunting grounds and usual occupations, looked for subsistence for themselves and families to the English commissariat. Had there been no Indians to feed, Proctor would not have required more provisions than could have been easily supplied to him. But, allowing that this and other cases did exist, we still ask for the proof of the animus which caused the deficiency. Man is naturally selfish, and it would be difficult to find any family, not to speak of nations, where some member or members of it Is it to be wondered at, then, that instances were not actuated by selfish or interested views. occurred, during the war, of parties desiring to drive a bargain with government for their individual benefit? And if there were such, does it necessarily follow that their proceedings were influenced by treasonable motives? Instances are daily occurring at the present day, and complaints are constantly made, especially on foreign service, of the bad quality of beef supplied to the troops; but does it follow that because the contractors wish to make as much as they can out of their contract, that they are in league with Louis Napoleon or the Czar, to reduce the stamina of the British soldier, so as to render him discontented, or, from sheer weakness, unfitted to resist any future invasion that may be meditated, by either of these Potentates, at some future period? Without adopting all Christie's statement, we are yet inclined to attach much more value to it, than to that of Veritas, especially as far as relates to the victualling department. Hardships the men had to suffer from want of tents, blankets, clothing, &c.; but the privations were borne with a cheerful spirit, which did honor to the Canadian soldier, and enabled him to repulse an enemy overwhelmingly su We think the reader will fail to discover in perior in point of numbers. Before leaving, for busier scenes in the too late, when the British discovered the Capture of British west, these waters, we enemy, to attack them that day (17th or 18th stores, and affair of must not omit to men- of July); the attack was accordingly postboats at Gananoque. tion a trivial event, poned, and early on the next morning the which, like many others of like importance, British, who had been, in the meantime, reinhas been not a little magnified by American forced by another gun-boat, and a detachhistorians. Two boats belonging to Commo- ment of the 41st under Major Frend, ascended dore Chauncey's squadron, mounting one gun Goose Creek in pursuit. The passage up the each, and manned by about seventy men, Creek was, however, obstructed by trees that captured a British one gun boat, along with had been felled and laid across, and the her convoy,consisting of fifteen batteaux, laden swampy nature of the ground rendered the with two hundred and thirty barrels of pork, landing of the troops very difficult; the conand three hundred bags of bread, bound from sequence was, that the expedition returned Montreal to Kingston, for the relief, we pre- without success, having lost, principally in sume, of the troops whom Veritas has de- their endeavours to land, five men, besides scribed as suffering so much from the machi- having seventeen wounded. Amongst the nations of unpatriotic and designing men. killed was Captain Milne, one of Sir George The number of prisoners, nine of them sail- Prevost's aides-de-camp, who had just arrived ors, amounted to sixty-seven. from head quarters to gain intelligence of the expedition. The American loss is nowhere to be found; but, as might be expected, the British loss is set forth by the veracious American historians, as amounting to sixty or seventy killed, with a commensurate number of wounded. No sooner was intelligence conveyed to Kingston than three gun-boats, under the command of Lieutenant Scott, R.N., with a detachment of the 100th regiment under Capt. Martin, were despatched to intercept the Americans, as well as to recapture the convoy. This turned out an unfortunate affair; it was CHAPTER XIV. CONTENTS. Situation of General Proctor in the west.-Consequences of Perry's victory.-Discussion relative to the affair at the Moravian town. Detroit was, however, launched, the forts were dismantled to meet the emergency, and these lumbering guns were fitted in the best manner possible to suit the ports of the For some time before the expedition against Detroit, or as we should rather have said the Fort Meigs and Fort ports were fitted to receive the guns. To Situation of General Stephenson, of which complete still farther this botching business. Proctor in the west. the result was so dis- the other four vessels were stripped of part of astrous, General Proctor had found himself their armament to complete the equipment seriously embarrassed by the difficulty of of the Detroit. Fifty seamen had arrived finding food for the large number of Indians from Ontario to man the five vessels, with an intimation that no further assistance could be who had flocked to his standard. The stores afforded, consequently, General Proctor was compelled to complete the manning of the fleet by a detachment of the 41st regiment. of provisions along the Detroit, which would have amply sufficed for the demand of his own troops, and even of the Indian warriors, were soon exhausted by the necessity of providing With a fleet manned and armed in this food, as well for these claimants, as for the manner, Captain Barclay found himself comfamilies of the Indians. Other circumstances, pelled by the pressure of circumstances too, conspired to increase the difficulty: the to sally forth upon the lake on the 9th absence of the militia from their homes had September, to meet a well-provided and materially diminished the supply to be ex- almost doubly superior force. The result pected from the spring crops, as these had, may be easily anticipated, on the morning of in a great measure been neglected. The the 10th, the fleets met, and after a bloody American command of the lake precluded all and hard struggle, during which, in spite of hope of supplies by water, and transportation of all advantages, victory seemed to declare of stores by land, adequate to meet the demand, herself on the side of the British, the whole was altogether out of the question. The only British squadron was captured-Captain Barhope, then, lay in the arrival of such reinforce- clay's letter gives a truthful account of the affair. His Majesty's late Ship Detroit, Put-in Bay, Lake Erie, Sept. 22d. SIR-The last letter I had the honor of ments from the Lake Ontario fleet as would enable Captain Barclay to open the navigation of the lake to the British. The expectation of all was directed to this point, but neither guns nor men appeared, meanwhile the ext-writing to you, dated the 6th instant, I ingence became hourly more pressing. The formed you, that unless certain intimation |