Md. 102; Hawthorne v. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 59; Memphis v. Laski, 9 Heisk. 511 (1877); s. c. 21 Am. Rep. 327. So in Georgia, McLellan v. Young, 54 Ga. 399; s. c. 21 Am. Rep. 276. So in Indiana, Wallace v. Lawyer, 54 Ind. 501; s. c. 23 Am. Rep. 661. In Kentucky a city may be garnished in respect of salary due to officers. Rodman v. Musselman, 12 Bush, 354 (1876); s. c. 23 Am. Rep. 724. In Connecticut, public officers having money in their hands, to which an individual is entitled, are not subject to garnishment at the suit of the creditors of such individual. Stillman v. Isham, 11 Conn. 123 (1835), and cases cited; Ward v. County of Hartford, 12 Conn. 404, 408. And in that State a county, not having power to contract a debt for which an action will lie against it, is not subject to garnishment in such a case. Ward v. County of Hartford, 12 Conn. 404. But under a statute enabling towns and cities to contract debts, and which provides that debts due from "any person" to a debtor may be attached, these corporations may be factorized or garnished. Bray v. Wallingford, 20 Conn. 416 (1850). In New Jersey a municipal corporation may be garnished. Davis v. Graves, 9 Vroom (38 N. J. L.), 104; see Jersey City v. Horton, 9 Vroom (38 N. J. L.) 88. Alabama: In Underhill v. Calhoun, 63 Ala. 216 (overruling Smoot v. Hart, 33 Ala. 69), it was held that on grounds of public policy a judgment creditor of a municipal corporation cannot reach by garnishment funds accruing to it by taxation whether in course of collection or after being paid into the treasury. Mayor v. Rowland, 26 Ala. 498, holds that a municipal corporation cannot be garnished as respects accruing salaries to its officers. See also Clark v. School Comm'rs, 36 Ala. 621. But by act of the legislature (1866), process of garnishment lies against a municipal corporation to subject the wages or salary of a policeman to the satisfaction of a judgment obtained against him. City Council v. Van Dorn, 41 Ala. 505, overruling Mobile v. Rowland, and Clark v. Mobile S. C., 36 Ala. 621. In Massachusetts a county is not chargeable as a garnishee for jurors' fees. Williams v. Boardman, 9 Allen, 570. In Maryland, notwithstanding a general statute of the State authorized the garnishment of any "person or persons whatever, corporate or sole," it was held that municipalities were not included, and that, upon general grounds of public policy and convenience, the city could not be garnished in respect of money due from the salaries of its officers, although the officer whose salary was attached could have sued the city therefor. Baltimore v. Root, 8 Md. 95 (1855). The city, in this case, was garnished in respect of money due from it to a police officer. a But in New Hampshire, under a statute making "any corporation possessed of any money" of the debtor subject to garnishment, a town was held to be included. Whidden v. Drake, 5 N. H. 13. See Brown v. Heath, 45 N. H. 168. In Iowa it was held that the words "debtor or person holding property," in the attachment act, extended to municipal corporations, and that they were subject to garnishment with respect to ordinary debts which they owed the main debtor. Wales v. Muscatine, 4 Iowa, 302 (1856). The decision of the court asserts the liability to garnishment on general principles; but subsequently the legislature enacted that " municipal or political corporation should not be garnished." Rev. 1860, sec. 3196. Under the legislation of Iowa, the exemption from garnishment is complete and universal. Jenks v. Township, 45 Iowa, 554. Requisites of notice to corporation, Claflin v. Iowa City, 12 Iowa, 284; Williams v. Kenney, 98 Mass. 142. In Ohio, under a statute which provides that "any claims or choses in action, due or to become due" to the judgment debtor, or "money which he may have in the hands of any person, body politic or corporate," are subject to execution, salaries of officers of incorporated cities, due and unpaid, may be subjected by the judgment creditors of such officers to the payment of their judgments, and municipal corporations may be garnished with respect to such salaries. The court admits the conflict in the decisions of other States upon similar statutes, but regards the construction above given as being in accordance with public policy and the meaning of the statute. Newark v. Funk, 15 Ohio St. 462 (1864). In Illinois, municipal corporations are not subject to garnishment in any case, no matter what may be the character of the indebtedness. This position is maintained by Lawrence, J., with great force. Merwin v. Chicago, 45 Ill. 133; Burns v. Harper (money in hands of school directors), 59 Ill. 21 (1871); Millison v. Fisk, 43 Ill. 112. So in Iowa, Jenks v. Township, supra. Waiver. Clapp v. Walker, 25 Iowa, 315. In Minnesota a judgment debtor may be ordered to assign to his creditor a debt due him from a municipal corporation. Knight v. Nash, 22 Minn. 452 (1876). In Texas the view suggested in the text is adopted, and, in the absence of a statute, î city is subject to garnishment for an ordinary debt due by it to a third person. City of Laredo v. Nalle, 65 Tex. 359 (quoting text). In Kansas a city cannot be garnished and made liable to pay a creditor of its creditor without express statutory provision. Switzer v. Wellington (Sup. Ct. Kansas, 1889), 28 Am. Law Reg. 281, and note citing and reviewing the cases. Holt, C., said: "Cities are a part of the government, and should not be required to become involved in litigation in which they have no interest. This exemption from garnishment process is based entirely upon the ground of public policy." Special Powers and Special Limitations upon ordinary Municipal Powers. § 102 (66). Outline of Subject. While municipal corporations are everywhere instituted for the same general purposes, heretofore explained, and while there is a striking resemblance in the authority with which they are clothed, yet, except when organized under general acts, the powers given to them in their single and separate charters are various, both in character and extent.2 True policy, indeed, requires, as before suggested, that the powers of these bodies should, in general, be confined to subjects connected with civil government and local administration; but legislatures are usually liberal in grants of this character, and there is no limit to the faculties and capacities with which municipal creations may be endowed, except as that limit is contained in the State or Federal Constitution. The leading powers ordinarily granted to municipalities, such as those relating to contracts, eminent domain, streets, taxation, ordinances, corporate officers, actions, and the like, will be hereafter separately treated. But it will be convenient to notice in this place certain special powers usually or often conferred upon municipalities, and some special limitations upon ordinary municipal powers, and the construction which such provisions have judicially received. We shall here consider the following subjects as they relate to municipal corporations: 1. Wharves, §§ 103-113. 2. Ferries, §§ 114-116. 3. Borrowing Money, §§ 117-129. 4. Limitations on the Power to create Debts, §§ 130–138. 5. Rewards for Offenders, § 139. 6. Public Buildings, § 140. 7. Police Powers and Regulations, §§ 141, 142. 8. Prevention of Fires, § 143. 1 Ante, chaps. i. ii. ; supra, secs. 99, 100. 2 Ante, sec. 39, where the general model of an ordinary municipal corporation is given. 8 Ante, secs. 12, 14, 73, and chap. iv. passim. Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74 (1857). 9. Quarantine and Health, §§ 144-146. 10. Indemnifying Officers, §§ 147, 148. 11. Furnishing Entertainments, § 149. 12. Impounding Animals, § 150. 13. Party Walls, § 151. 14. Public Defence, § 152. 15. Aid to Railway Companies, § 153. -- § 103 (67). Wharves and Wharfage. Among the special powers often conferred by the legislature upon municipal corporations bordering upon the high seas or navigable waters is the authority to erect wharves, and charge wharfage as a compensation for making and keeping the same and their approaches in a proper and safe condition for the landing, loading, and unloading of vessels.1 The 1 Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 82 (1851); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. (U. S.) 212; Municipality v. Pease, 2 La. An. 538 (1847); Worsley v. Municipality, 9 Rob. (La.) 324; New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 737; The Wharf Case, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 383; Ill. &c. Co. v. St. Louis, 2 Dillon C. C. R. 70 (1872); Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80 (1877); distinguished, Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 688; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324 (1876); Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs, 18 Wall. 57 (1873); Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423 (1879); Vicksburg v. Tobin, 100 U. S. 430 (1879); Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166 (1881); note to 18 Am. and Eng. Corp. Cas. 511; Mayor of St. Martinsville v. Steamer Mary Lewis, 32 La. An. 1293; The Geneva, 16 Fed. Rep. 874; Leathers v. Aiken, 9 Fed. Rep. 679. Such a power does not violate the Constitution of the United States, Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559. The right of a municipality to collect wharfage is in compensation for actual use of structures provided by the municipality. Railroad v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; New Orleans v. Wilmot, 31 La. An. 65. An incorporated town cannot charge wharfage for the use of an unimproved river bank in front of it. Christie v. Malden, 23 W. Va. 667 (1884). See infra, sec. 112, note. For rights and powers of City of New York, in respect to wharves, see Kingsland v. New York, 110 N. Y. 569 (1888); Williams v. New York, 105 N. Y. 419; Langdon v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 93 N. Y. 129, and cases cited; Turner v. People's Ferry Co., 21 Fed. Rep. 90. Brooklyn: Brooklyn v. New York Ferry Co., 87 N. Y. 204. New Orleans: The Lizzie E., 30 Fed. Rep. 876; Silver v. Tobin, 28 Fed. Rep. 545; Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; New Orleans v. Wilmot, 31 La. An. 65. Wharfage charges must be reasonable (see infra, sec. 112), and may be graduated by the tonnage of vessels using a wharf; and this is not a duty of tonnage within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444 (1886); Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691 ("wharfage" and "duty of tonnage " defined and distinguished); N. W. Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 4 Dillon, 10 (1876); Keokuk v. Packet Co., 45 Iowa, 196 (1876); s. c. affirmed, 95 U. S. 80 (1877); Ellerman v. McMains, 30 La. An. 190. See, also, United States v. Duluth, 1 Dillon C. C. 469; Packet Co. v. Atlee, 2 Dillon, 479 (1873); s. c. 21 Wall. 389. In McMurray v. Baltimore, 54 Md. 103, it was held that the "dedication of a street to public use as a street extending to the water carried with it by necessary implication the right of the city to extend it into a harbor by the construction of a wharf at the end authority of the State over navigable waters and the shores is, of course, subject to the Constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof regulating commerce, and to the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Although the power to erect wharves and charge wharfage is not strictly one relating to municipalities in their private or local character, it is, nevertheless, competent for the legislature to make them, in such measure as it deems expedient, the repository of it.2 Such power may be modi thereof." To same effect, Backus v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 110. Infra, sec. 109 and note; sec. 110. 1 State and authorized municipal pilot and harbor regulations, when not in conflict with the Federal Constitution or Federal legislation, are valid. Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 296; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken (wharfage charges), 121 U. S. 444 (1886); Cisco v. Roberts, 36 N. Y. 292; Port Wardens v. Ship, &c., 14 La. An. 289 (1859); Same v. Pratt, 10 Rob. (La.) 459; Chapman v. Miller (pilotage fee), 2 Speers (S. C.) Law, 769; Alexander v. Railroad Co. (duty on tonnage), 3 Strob. (S. C.) Law, 594(1847); State v. City Council, 4 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 286; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 82 (1850); Worsley v. Municipality, above cited; Jeffersonville v. Ferry Boat, 35 Ind. 19 (1870); Harbor-master v. Southerland, 47 Ala. 511 (1872). But State enactments, which amount to a regulation of commerce or impose a duty on tonnage, are of course void. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577 (1874); Packet Co. v. St. Paul, 3 Dillon, 454; Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581 (1873); Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31 (1867). The collection of wharfage dues does not violate any provision of the United States Constitu tion. Where a municipal corporation under express legislative authority is clothed with the exclusive right to collect wharfage rates from all vessels that make use of its wharves, it is a vested right that cannot be impaired by the legislature. Ellerman v. McMains, 30 La. An. pt. 1, 190. But this is denied and overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States. Railroad Co. v. Eller man, 105 U. S. 166. A city has no vested right to wharfage. “Whatever powers the municipal body rightfully enjoys over the subject are derived from the legislature, and may be revoked at any time, not touching, of course, any property of the city actually acquired in the course of administration." Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166, 172 (1881), per Matthews, J. 2 Fuller v. Edings, 11 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 239 (1858); Waddington v. St. Louis, 14 Mo. 190 (1851); Baltimore v. White, 2 Gill (Md.), 444 (1845); Wilson v. Inloes, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 351; Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs, 18 Wall. 57 (1873); Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166 (1881); Town of Ravenswood v. Flemings, 22 W. Va. 52, where an act conferring upon a town the exclusive right to erect wharves within its limits between ordinary high-water mark and low-water mark without compensation to the adjacent lot-owners, was held constitutional, and an adjacent owner enjoined from constructing a wharf within those limits without the consent of the town. The owner of a private wharf, whose land is compulsorily taken for a public wharf, is not necessarily entitled to be compensated for loss of income from his private wharf, resulting from the establishment of the public wharf near to the private one. Fuller v. Edings, supra. The grant of an exclusive right to keep a wharf, in order to secure its erection, does not violate the provision of a State Constitution, declaring "that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." Such an improvement is beneficial to the public, and, in order to secure it, the exclusive profits for a given period may be granted to the contractor. Martin v. O'Brien, 34 |