were reduced so as to become moderate duties, for the sole object of ob taining revenue, the increased consumption of foreign goods, which would be the result, would yield a very considerable revenue, not, perhaps, less than 1,000,0001. a-year.

There is not the slightest foundation for the common-place argument, that, if British manufactures were not protected, the low price of labour in foreign countries would enable them to supply our markets. For it is not necessarily true, that because labour is dear in England, as compared with other countries in Europe, those countries would be able to compete with us in manufactures. The argument is built on a wrong notion of what determines us to export. Exportation takes place from England rather than from France, not because wages are lower (for in fact they are higher), but because the whole cost of production of the exported commodities in England, is less than the whole cost in France. Of the cost of production, wages are only a part; but they seem to be considered the whole by those who insist upon the argument in question.

The support that is still too generally given to the protecting system, can only be accounted for by the habit of indolence with which the strongest minds sometimes receive, without examination, those opinions which have been long established. But it is satisfactory to observe, that there have been appearances of late years of a great progressive knowledge on this subject, and of a great change in the public mind.'-pp. 79-84.

To the common-place clamours of those who say, why should we relax our restrictive laws until other nations have adopted a similar policy, we shall answer in the language of our author.

One point only remains to be noticed belonging to the protecting system, namely, the opinion which some persons hold, that we should not remove the restrictions on the importation of foreign goods, unless foreign countries agree to allow our goods to be imported. But the grounds on which it is expedient for us to remove these restrictions, are the numerous injuries we suffer from them in the several ways already described; if, therefore, we postpone the removal of them till we can persuade other countries to make an arrangement for a reciprocal removal, we postpone taking advantage of the power that is in our own hands of relieving ourselves.

The petition of the merchants of London, before referred to, contains the following paragraph on this point:

"That although, as a matter of mere diplomacy, it may sometimes answer to hold out the removal of particular prohibitions or high duties, as depending upon corresponding concessions by other states in our favour, it does not follow that we should maintain our restrictions in cases where the desired concessions on their part cannot be obtained. Our restrictions would not be less prejudicial to our own capital and industry, because other governments persisted in preserving impolitic regulations."

As the progress of industry and the increase of capital are greatly promoted by every thing that adds to the annual amount of imports, the right policy is to remove all obstructions in the way of importation, without the slightest reference to what course foreign governments may think proper to adopt.

Every thing has now been stated that seems necessary to be urged at

the present moment in favour of a revision of the existing taxes; for though much might be said against several others that have not been noticed, there are none which do the same injury to industry and national prosperity as those which have been under examination.

'The effort which was made in 1825 to obtain a repeal of the assessed taxes, was founded on a total misconception of the comparative effects of different kinds of taxes on the interests of the people-no advantage would have arisen from the repeal of those taxes beyond the mere relief from so much taxation; while, on the other hand, the repeal of the taxes on raw materials and manufactures, and the reduction of the enormously high duties on tobacco and foreign spirits, would be productive of considerable benefit to the consumer, would put an end to smuggling, and would increase the -employment of capital, and labour, and foreign commerce. Lord Gode

rich is entitled to the greatest praise, for having had the firmness, in 1825, to resist the temptation of sacrificing a sound principle to the acquisition of temporary popularity; he has the merit of being the first Chancellor of the Exchequer who reduced to practice those principles, which are the only secure basis of national prosperity.

The inquiry, which is the subject in the preceding pages, into the effects of those taxes which have been particularly mentioned, leaves no doubt as to how much the industry and wealth of the nation would be increased, if it were practicable to modify or wholly to repeal them; and at the same time secure, by other means, a sufficient revenue for the public service. A powerful inducement is, therefore, established to endeavour to ascertain, whether means cannot be found for making good the revenue that would be lost by giving the public the benefit of the proposed reform of taxation.

'Although a general notion prevails, that no such means can be found out, it is a mere conjecture, and not deserving of any weight; because no proper efforts have as yet been made to trace out, in sufficient detail, the sources from which new revenue might be derived, or, what is the same thing, the present scale of expenditure diminished. If, on the one hand, the country has been going on, as would appear to be the case from what has already been said, in a progressive course of accumulating new wealth, and thus adding to the resources of new taxation; and if, on the other, a system of great profusion has been engrafted in the administration of the public expenditure, there is a strong prima facie case to justify the conclusion, that, if proper measures were taken, there would be no great difficulty in providing, by new methods, a sufficient revenue for the public service.'-pp. 91-95.

These arguments, supported as they are by facts and by principles that cannot, we apprehend, be effectually contradicted, are quite conclusive in favour of the free-trade system. The enlightened author then goes on to shew, what indeed must be obvious to every reflecting mind, that the repeal of the taxes on industry, and the reduction of the high duties on articles of luxury, would have the effect of rendering the remaining taxes more productive.

Sir Henry next proceeds to a very important part of his task,that of pointing out the various items of the public expenditure which are susceptible of retrenchment. And here we cannot but think that he is rather severe in the language which he applies to the public departments in general.

'Each public department stands prepared to give the most confident reasons why it is absolutely necessary to keep up the scale of its expenditure to the exact point at which it now is. Every kind of sophism, insinuation, and assertion is worked up with vast ingenuity into a case to resist any attempt at effective retrenchment; and not only Government and Parliament, but also the public, suffer themselves, in this way, to have their judgment influenced rather by the personal authority of official men, who are always endeavouring to keep their respective services in the highest possible state of equipment and show, than by those principles of a sound system of finance, which require that that portion of the public expense which is incurred for military preparation and protection, should be regulated by the quantity and measure of the danger to be guarded against.

It is almost impossible for persons, not themselves in office, to have sufficient knowledge of details, to be able to expose the fallacies on which the pleas for expense are enforced; and the absence of such an exposure produces too often a belief, that the expense is necessary. The only mode, therefore, that is left for making out a case to establish the practicability of retrenchment is, by reasoning on probabilities, founded on those facts which are within the observation of every one. Although this is necessarily an imperfect kind of proof, the facts of profusion which can be adduced, when combined together and patiently examined, will be quite sufficient to lead to conclusions that will leave no doubt on any unprejudiced and disinterested mind.'-pp. 105, 106.

That in the public departments there are many abuses which ought to be corrected, is a position that admits of no dispute; that there is amongst them an anxiety to have their establishments effective, can as little be doubted. But the retrenchments lately made by the prime minister, founded upon reports of the departments themselves, shew that the latter are not altogether so reluctant to meet the call for reform, as Sir Henry would represent them to be. The quantity of business despatched in our public offices, particularly, we would instance, those of the treasury, the home, the foreign, and colonial departments, is much greater than is generally known or imagined. Nor is it altogether clear to us, that the efficiency of those establishments ought to be materially tampered with. If the salaries of those who are employed in them undergo much further reductions, and particularly if, as our author recommends, the superannuation system be done away with, the civil appointments which they furnish will cease to be objects of ambition with men of liberal education and gentlemanly manners, Certainly few men of talent who belong to any of the professions, and are likely to obtain even moderate success in their pursuits, would, under such circumstances, exchange their destinies for those of any gentleman engaged in the service of the public. But it would be a very serious misfortune, much more serious than the expenditure of some eighty or a hundred thousand pounds per annum, if the service of the country were ever to be looked upon as degraded below the professions in point of respectability, and below a common counting-house in point of emolument.

Upon one topic, however, relating to the departments, we quite agree with Sir Henry Parnell. We think that in most, if not in all of them, the methods of keeping accounts are complicated beyond any possible necessity, and without any sort of reason. Let them be simplified by all means, and made so intelligible that a child may understand them. We further agree with our author, that the Treasury ought to have the entire and undivided supreme controul over the public income and expenditure; and that the idea of having all the payments which are now made upon the responsibility of individual clerks in public offices, subjected beforehand to the inspection and approbation of a small Board of Commissioners constituted for that sole purpose, is one that ought forthwith to be carried into effect.

When it is stated, that in 1806 a revenue of more than fiftyeight millions was collected at a less charge by 1,232,6157. than a revenue of not quite fifty-five millions in 1826, we apprehend that a case is made out at once for retrenchment in the system by which the public income is brought into the exchequer. The system of giving bounties for the encouragement of fisheries, and for the exportation of particular manufactures, savours of the dark ages of legislation, and ought to be abandoned. The reductions proposed under the heads of military and naval expenditure, are, perhaps, too sweeping, when we consider the state of Europe, the large armies that are kept up every where on the continent, and the increasing fleets of Russia and France. But we go the whole length with Sir Henry Parnell in his reasoning with respect to the enormous expense, and the real inutility to us of the greater number of our colonies. It is generally estimated,' he observes, 'that from two to three millions are paid for their army, navy, and various civil charges; but in addition to this, the public pay full two millions more for sugar and timber than they ought to pay, in consequence of the increased prices occasioned by the protection given to the colonists by the higher duties imposed on these articles, when imported from foreign countries. Sir Henry Parnell would first give a fair trial to the question,-how far are colonies of use to England ?-by removing all restrictions and monopolies from their trade, and by endeavouring to put them into a situation that would enable them to meet their own expenditure.

The prevailing opinion, that large profits are obtained through the mo. nopoly, has always confused the question. This opinion has been held to be so completely beyond all doubt, that the great value of colonies has been considered as not admitting of dispute; and no pains have been taken to trace by facts in what way they are valuable. Had such an examination been properly gone into, it would have shown that neither the British public nor the colonies have ever been benefited by the monopoly ; and it would also have shown that the possession of the colonies affords no advantages which could not be obtained by commercial intercourse with independent states.

There are only three ways that the colonies can be of any advantage, 1. In furnishing a military force; 2. In supplying the parent state with a revenue; 3. In affording commercial advantages.

1. Instead of furnishing a military force, the colonies are always a great drain upon the military resources of the country, particularly in war, when they occupy a large portion of the army and fleet in their defence. In the last war, while our own shores were threatened with invasion from Boulogne and Brest, our means of defence were greatly crippled by the number of troops and ships we were obliged to keep in the colonies.

2. With respect to revenue, we have declared by the Act of the 18th Geo. III., that we will not levy any taxes or duties in the colonies, except for their use.

3. As to commercial advantages, if the colonial trade were quite free, our commercial relations with the colonies would resemble the intercourse between ourselves and independent countries; and, therefore, whatever advantages we shall derive from them will be embraced in two questions— 1st. Whether our commerce with them will be more beneficial than with independent countries? 2nd. Whether the capital employed in them will be more beneficially employed than it would be, if employed in the United Kingdom?

With respect to the first question, it is one easily solved, because, where the employment of capital is free, the net profit that may be obtained by the employment of it in commerce with independent countries, will always be as great as if it were employed in the colonial trade. The trade we carry on with the United States proves this.

With respect to the second question, it is necessary to trace the operations of capital when employed in the colonies, and when employed at home. In the West India islands it goes to feed and clothe slaves; to pay British agents, clerks, and managers; to employ ships and sailors; and although the gross profit upon it seems very high when all the charges and risks are considered, and also the effects of competition, the net profit cannot be greater than it is on capital employed at home.

When capital is employed in the United Kingdom,-for instance, on manufactures, it pays wages to English workmen, instead of buying clothes and food for slaves; it employs agents, clerks, and managers; it employs ships and sailors to import raw materials, and to export the finished goods, and the rate of net profit on it is full as high as that on capital employed in the colonies. The incomes derived by West India proprietors from their profits are spent like incomes derived from rent, and add nothing to the national wealth; but the profits made on capital employed at home are added to capital, and thus promote the constant accumulation of it. It is clear, therefore, that, on the whole, the public derives no commercial advantage from the colonies, which it might not have without them.

They do not even afford any advantage, as some persons suppose, by enlarging the field for the employment of capital; for there are still means enough for employing capital with profit at home; and if new means were wanting, they would be more effectually obtained by removing restrictions on trade and revising the taxes, than by increased trade in the colonies.

This general reasoning, which the principles of trade suggest, in refutation of the imaginary advantages of colonies, is completely borne out by