fortune was as necessary as light is for the exercise of the faculty of sight. The utmost length, accordingly, which they went was to say, that the virtuous man in adversity was not miserable; whereas the vicious and foolish were miserable in all situations of fortune. In another passage they say, that the difference between God and man is, that God is perfect in himself, and needs nothing from without; whereas the nature of man is imperfect and defective, and dependent on external circumstances. Although, therefore, we possess virtue, that is but the perfection of one part, namely, the mind; but as we consist both of body and mind, the body also must be perfect of its kind. Nor is that alone sufficient; but the prosperous exercise of virtue requires certain externals; such as wealth, reputation, friends, and, above all, a well constituted state; for without that the rational and social animal is imperfect, and unable to fulfil the purposes of its nature.

The difference between the Peripatetics and Stoics in these opinions is beautifully stated by Cicero, in a passage strongly expressive of the elevation of his own. character, as well as highly honorable to the two sects, whose doctrines, while he contrasts them with each other, he plainly considered as both originating in the same pure and ardent zeal for the interests of morality. "Pugnant Stoici cum Peripateticis; alteri negant quidquam bonum esse nisi quod honestum sit; alteri longe longeque plurimum se attribuere honestati; sed tamen et in corpore et extra esse quædam bona. Certamen honestum, et disputatio splendida.”

On a general review of the preceding articles in this section, it appears (to use the words of Dr. Ferguson) that all these sects acknowledged the necessity of virtue, or allowed, that, in every well directed pursuit of happiness, the strictest regard to morality was required. The Stoics alone maintained that this regard itself was happiness; or that to run the course of an active, strenuous, wise, and beneficent mind, was itself the very good which we ought to pursue.

SECTION III.

Additional Remarks on Happiness.

FROM the slight view now given of the systems of philosophers with respect to the Sovereign Good, it may be assumed as an acknowledged and indisputable fact, that happiness arises chiefly from the mind. The Stoics undoubtedly expressed this too strongly when they said, that to a wise man external circumstances are indifferent. Yet it must be confessed, that happiness depends much less on these than is commonly imagined; and that, as there is no situation so prosperous as to exclude the torments of malice, cowardice, and remorse, so there is none so adverse as to withhold the enjoyments of a benevolent, resolute, and upright heart.

If, from the sublime idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, we descend to such characters as the world presents to us, some important limitations of the Stoical conclusions become necessary. Mr. Hume has justly remarked, that, "as in the bodily system, a toothach produces more violent convulsions of pain than phthisis or a dropsy, so, in the economy of the mind, although all vice be pernicious, yet the disturbance or pain is not measured out by nature with exact proportion to the degree of vice; nor is the man of highest virtue, even abstracting from external accidents, always the most hapA gloomy and melancholy disposition is certainly to our sentiments a vice or imperfection; but as it may be accompanied with a great sense of honor and great integrity, it may be found in very worthy characters; though it is sufficient alone to embitter life, and render the person afflicted with it completely miserable. On the other hand, a selfish villain may possess a spring and alacrity of temper, a certain gayety of heart, which is rewarded much beyond its merit; and when attended with good fortune, will compensate for the uneasiness and remorse arising from all the other vices."

py.

Abstracting even from these considerations, and supposing a character as perfect as the frailty of human na

ture admits of, various mental qualities, which have no immediate connexion with moral desert, are necessary to ensure happiness. In proof of this remark, it is sufficient to consider, how much our tranquillity is liable to be affected,

1. By our temper;

2. By our imagination; 3. By our opinions; and 4. By our habits.

In all these respects the mind may be influenced to a great degree by original constitution or by early education; and when this influence happens to be unfavorable, it is not to be corrected at once by the precepts of philosophy. Much, however, may be done undoubtedly, in such instances, by our own persevering efforts; and, therefore, the particulars now enumerated deserve our attention, not only from their connexion with the speculative question concerning the essentials of happiness, but on account of the practical conclusions to which the consideration of them may lead.

I.

Influence of the Temper on Happiness.

The word Temper is used in different senses. Sometimes we apply to it the epithets gay, lively, melancholy, gloomy; on other occasions, the epithets fretful, passionate, sullen, cool, equable, gentle. It is in the last sense we use it at present, to denote the habitual state of a man's mind in point of irascibility; or, in other words, to mark the habitual predominance of the benevolent or malevolent affections in his intercourse with his fellow creatures.

The connexion between this part of the character of an individual, and the habitual state of his mind in point of happiness, is obvious from what was formerly observed concerning the pleasures and pains attached respectively to the exercise of our benevolent and malevolent affections. As nature has strengthened the social

ties among mankind, by annexing a secret charm to every exercise of good will and of kindness, so she has provided a check on all the discordant passions, by that agitation and disquiet which are their inseparable concomitants. This is true even with respect to resentment, how justly soever it may be provoked by the injurious conduct of others. It is always accompanied with an unpleasant feeling, which warns us, as soon as we have taken the necessary measures for our own security, to banish every sentiment of malice from the heart. On the due regulation of this part of our constitution, our happiness in life materially depends; and there is no part of it whatever where it is in our power, by our persevering efforts, to do more to cure our constitutional or our acquired infirmities.

Resentment was formerly distinguished into instinctive and deliberate, the latter of which (it was observed) has always a reference to the motives of the person against whom it is directed, and implies a sense of justice or of moral good or evil.

In some men the animal or instinctive impulse is stronger than in others. Where this is the case, or where proper care has not been taken in early education to bring it under restraint, a quick or irascible temper is the consequence. This fault is frequently observable in affectionate and generous characters, and impairs their happiness, not so much by the effects it produces on their minds, as by the eventual misfortunes to which it exposes them.* The sentiments of ill will which such men feel are only momentary, and the habitual state of their mind is benevolent and happy; but as their reason is the sport of every accident, the best dispositions of the heart can at no time give any security that they shall not, before they sleep, experience some paroxysm of insanity, which shall close all their prospects of hap

* "Irascible men," says Aristotle, "though moved to passion too suddenly, in immoderate degrees, and on improper occasions, are yet easily pacified; if they be soon angry they are also soon pleased, which is the best circumstance attending them."(Ethic. Nic. B. 4. c. 5.) Cicero states this still more strongly in a letter to Atticus. "Irritabiles animos esse optimorum sæpe hominum, et eosdem placabiles; et esse hanc agilitatem, ut ita dicam, mollitiamque naturæ plerumque bonitatis."-Epist. ad Atticum, Lib. i. epist. xvii.

piness for ever. A frequent and serious consideration of the fatal consequences which may arise from sudden and ungoverned passion cannot fail to have some tendency to check its excesses. It is an infirmity which is often produced by some fault in early education; by allowing children to exercise authority over their dependents, and not providing for them, in the opposition of their equals, a sufficient discipline and preparation for the conflicts they may expect to struggle with in future life.

When the animal resentment does not immediately subside, it must be supported by an opinion of bad intention in its object; and, consequently, when this happens to an individual so habitually as to be characteristic of his temper, it indicates a disposition on his part to put unfavorable constructions on the actions of others, or (as we commonly express it) to take things by the wrong handle. In some instances this may proceed from a settled conviction of the worthlessness of mankind; but in general it originates in self-dissatisfaction, occasioned by the consciousness of vice or folly, which leads the person who feels it to withdraw his attention from himself, by referring the causes of his ill humor to the imaginary faults of his neighbours. Such men do not wait till provocation is given them, but look out anxiously for occasions of quarrel, creating to themselves, by the help of imagination, an object suited to that particular humor they wish to indulge; and, when their resentment is once excited, they obstinately refuse to listen to any thing that may be offered in the way of extenuation or apology. In feeble minds this displays itself in peevishness, which vents itself languidly upon any object it meets. In more vigorous and determined minds it produces violent and boisterous passion. For, as Butler has well remarked, both of these seem to be the operation of the same principle, appearing in different forms, according to the constitution of the individual. "In the one case the humor discharges itself at once; in the other it is continually discharging."

There is, too, a species of misanthropy which is sometimes grafted on a worthy and benevolent heart. When