over the inferior animals,-the sufferings of the animal, in such cases, either entirely escaping his notice, or being overlooked in that state of pleasurable triumph which the wanton abuse of power communicates to a weak and unreflecting judgment. The active sports of the youth captivate his fancy by suggesting similar ideas,-of strength of body, or force of mind, of contempt of hardship and of danger. And accordingly such are the occupations in which Virgil, with a characteristical propriety, employs his young Ascanius. "At puer Ascanius mediis in vallibus acri Gaudet equo; jamque hos cursu, jam præterit illos; Optat aprum, aut fulvum descendere monte leonem." As we advance in years, and as our animal powers lose their activity and vigor, we gradually aim at extending our influence over others by the superiority of fortune and station, or by the still more flattering superiority of intellectual endowments, by the force of our understanding, by the extent of our information, by the arts of persuasion, or the accomplishments of address. What but the idea of power pleases the orator in managing the reins of an assembled multitude, when he silences the reason of others by superior ingenuity, bends to his purposes their desires and passions, and, without the aid of force, or the splendor of rank, becomes the arbiter of the fate of nations! To the same principle we may trace, in part, the pleasure arising from the discovery of general theorems in the sciences. Every such discovery puts us in possession of innumerable particular truths or particular facts, and gives us a ready command of a great stock of knowledge, of which we could not, with equal ease, avail ourselves before. It increases, in a word, our intellectual power in a way very analogous to that in which a machine or engine increases the mechanical power of the human body. The discoveries we make in natural philosophy have, beside this effect, a tendency to enlarge the sphere of our power over the material universe; first, by enabling us to accommodate our conduct to the established course of physical events; and secondly, by enabling us to call to our aid many natural powers or agents as instruments for the accomplishment of our purposes. In general every discovery we make with respect to the laws of nature, either in the material or moral worlds, is an accession of power to the human mind, inasmuch as it lays the foundation of prudent and effectual conduct in circumstances where, without the same means of information, the success of our proceedings must have depended on chance alone. The desire of power, therefore, comes in the progress of reason and experience, to act as an auxiliary to our instinctive desire of knowledge; and it is with a view to strengthen and confirm this alliance that Bacon so often repeats his favorite maxim, that knowledge and power are synonymous or identical terms. The idea of power is, partly at least, the foundation of our attachment to property. It is not enough for us to have the use of an object. We desire to have it completely at our own disposal, without being responsible to any person whatsoever for the purposes to which we may choose to turn it. "There is an unspeakable pleasure," says Addison, "in calling any thing one's own. A freehold, though it be but in ice and snow, will make the owner pleased in the possession, and stout in the defence of it." Avarice is a particular modification of the desire of power, arising from the various functions of money in a commercial country. Its influence as an active principle is greatly strengthened by habit and association, insomuch that the original desire of power is frequently lost in the acquired propensities to which it gives birth; the possession of money becoming, in process of time, an ultimate object of pursuit, and continuing to stimulate the activity of the mind after it has lost a relish for every other species of exertion.* The love of liberty proceeds in part, if not wholly, Berkeley in his Querist has started the same idea. "Whether the real end and aim of men be not power? and whether he who could have every thing else at his wish or will would value money?” To this query the good bishop has subjoined another, which one would hardly from the same source; from a desire of being able to do whatever is agreeable to our own inclination. Slavery mortifies us because it limits our power. Even the love of tranquillity and retirement has been resolved by Cicero into the desire of power. "Multi autem et sunt et fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes, a negotiis publicis se removerint, ad otiumque perfugerint. His idem propositum fuit quod regibus, ut ne quâ re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur; cujus proprium est sic vivere ut velis. Quare, cum hoc commune sit potentiæ cupidorum cum iis quos dixi otiosis; alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas habeant, alteri, si contenti sint et suo, et parvo."* The idea of power is also, in some degree, the foundation of the pleasure of virtue. We love to be at liberty to follow our own inclinations, without being subject to the control of a superior; but even this is not sufficient to our happiness. When we are led by vicious habits, or by the force of passion, to do what reason disapproves, we are sensible of a mortifying subjection to the inferior principles of our nature, and feel our own littleness and weakness. On the other hand, he that ruleth his spirit feels himself greater than he that taketh a city. "It is pleasant," says Dr. Tillotson, "to be virtuous and good, because that is to excel many others. It is pleasant to grow better, because that is to excel ourselves. It is pleasant to mortify and subdue our appetites, because that is victory. It is pleasant to command our passions, and keep them within the bounds of reason, because this is empire." From the observations now made, it appears that the desire of power is subservient to important purposes in our constitution, and is one of the principal sources both of our intellectual and moral improvements. An examination of the effects which it produces on society would have expected from a writer so zealously attached to tory and high church principles. "Whether the public aim in every well governed state be not, that each member, according to his just pretensions and industry, should have POWER?" "Naturam expellas furcâ, tamen usque recurret." *De Off. Lib. I. Cap. 20 et 21. open views very strikingly illustrative of benevolent intention in the Author of our frame. I shall content myself, however, with remarking, that the general aspect of the fact affords a very favorable view of human nature. When we consider how much more every man has it in his power to injure others than to promote their interests, it must appear manifest that society could not possibly subsist unless the benevolent affections had a very decided predominance over those principles which give rise to competition and enmity. Whoever reflects duly on this consideration, will, if I do not deceive myself, be inclined to form conclusions concerning the dispositions of his fellow creatures very different from the representations of them to be found in the writings of some gloomy and misanthropical moralists. SECTION V. Emulation, or the Desire of Superiority. This principle of action is classed by Dr. Reid with the affections, and is considered by him as a malevolent affection.* He tells us, however, that he does not mean by this epithet to insinuate that there is any thing criminal in emulation any more than in resentment when excited by an injury; but he thinks that it involves a sentiment of ill will to our rival, and makes use of the word malevolent to express this sentiment, as the language affords no softer epithet to convey the idea. I own it appears to me that emulation, considered as a principle of action, ought to be classed with the desires, and not with the affections. It is indeed frequently accompanied with a malevolent affection; but it is the desire of superiority which is the active principle, and the affection is only a concomitant circumstance. I do not even think that this malevolent affection is a necessary concomitant of the desire of superiority. It is possible, surely, to conceive (although the case may happen but rarely) that emulation may take place be * Essays on the Active Powers, pp. 166, 167. 4to Ed. tween men who are united by the most cordial friendship, and without a single sentiment of ill will disturbing their harmony. When emulation is accompanied with malevolent affection it assumes the name of envy. The distinction between these two principles of action is accurately stated by Dr. Butler. "Emulation is merely the desire of superiority over others, with whom we compare ourselves. To desire the attainment of this superiority by the particular means of others being brought down below our own level is the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see, that the real end which the natural passion emulation, and which the unlawful one envy, aims at is exactly the same; and consequently, that to do mischief is not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end."* Dr. Reid himself seems to have clearly perceived the distinction, although in other parts of the same section he has lost sight of it again. "He who runs a race," says he, "feels uneasiness at seeing another outstrip him. This is uncorrupted nature, and the work of God within him. But this uneasiness may produce either of two very different effects. It may incite him to make more vigorous exertions, and to strain every nerve to get before his rival. This is fair and honest emulation. This is the effect it is intended to produce. But if he has not fairness and candor of heart, he will look with an evil eye on his competitor, and will endeavour to trip him, or to throw a stumbling block in his way. This is pure envy, the most malignant passion that can lodge in the human breast, which devours, as its natural food, the fame and the happiness of those who are most deserving of our esteem." † * Sermon I. on Human Nature. † Reid on the Active Powers, p. 170. Dr. Beattie, in his Elements of Moral Science, after stating very correctly the speculative distinction between emulation and envy, observes with great truth, that it is extremely difficult to preserve the former wholly unmixed with the latter, and that emulation, though entirely different from envy, is very apt, through the weakness of our nature, to degenerate into it. To this remark he subjoins the following very striking practical reflection. "Let the man," says he, "who thinks he is actuated by generous emulation only, and wishes to know whether there be any thing of envy in the case, examine his own heart, and ask himself whether his friends on becoming, though in an honorable way, his competitors, have less of his affection than they had before; whether he be gratified by hearing |