order of society, has led a few philosophers into an opposite extreme, less dangerous, undoubtedly, in its practical tendency, but less calculated perhaps to recommend ethical disquisitions to the notice of those who are engrossed with the active concerns of life.

All the foregoing inquiries concerning the moral constitution of man proceed on the supposition that he has a freedom of choice between good and evil; and that, when he deliberately performs an action which he knows to be wrong, he renders himself justly obnoxious to punishment. That this supposition is agreeable to the common apprehensions of mankind will not be disputed. From very early times, indeed, the truth of the supposition has been called in question by a few speculative men, who have contended that the actions we perform are the necessary result of the constitutions of our minds operated on by the circumstances of our external situation, and that what we call moral delinquencies are as much a part of our destiny as the corporeal or intellectual qualities we have received from nature. The argument in support of this doctrine has been proposed in various forms, and has been frequently urged with the confidence of demonstration.

With the consideration of these metaphysical subtilties, it seems to me improper to interrupt at present the train of our ethical inquiries. And, although I do not by any means go so far as Lord Bolingbroke when he pronounces, that "no one can deny the free will of man without lying," I trust that I may fairly assume in what follows, the fact of man's free agency as sufficiently established by the evidence of consciousness; referring those who wish to enter more deeply into the controversy to the Appendix at the end of this work.

*"The free will of man, which no one can deny without lying or denying his instinctive knowledge." Bolingbroke's Philosophical Works, Vol. V. p. 85. The same assertion in substance occurs in various other parts of his writings.

BOOK THIRD.

OF THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF OUR DUTY.

THE different theories which have been proposed concerning the nature and essence of virtue have arisen chiefly from attempts to trace all the branches of our duty to one principle of action, such as a rational selflove, benevolence, justice, or a disposition to obey the will of God.

In order to avoid those partial views of the subject, which naturally take their rise from an undue love of system, the following inquiries proceed on an arrangement which has, in all ages, recommended itself to the good sense of mankind. This arrangement is founded. on the different objects to which our duties relate. 1. The Deity. 2. Our Fellow Creatures. And 3. Ourselves.

CHAPTER FIRST.

OF THE DUTIES WHICH RESPECT THE DEITY.

As our duties to God (so far as they are discoverable by the light of nature) must be inferred from the relation in which we stand to him as the Author and the Governor of the universe, an examination of the principles of natural religion forms a necessary introduction to this section. Such an examination, besides, being the reasonable consequence of those impressions which his works produce on every attentive and well disposed mind, may be itself regarded both as one of the duties we owe to HIM, and as the expression of a moral temper sincerely devoted to truth, and alive to the sublimest emotions of gratitude and of benevolence.

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL RELIGION.

Of the Existence of the Deity.

The

It is scarcely possible to conceive a man capable of reflection, who has not, at times, proposed to himself the following questions: Whence am I? and whence. the innumerable tribes of plants and of animals which I see, in constant succession, rising into existence? Whence the beautiful fabric of this universe? and by what wise and powerful Being were the principles of my constitution so wonderfully adapted to the various objects around me? To whom am I indebted for the distinguished rank which I hold in the creation, and for the numberless blessings which have fallen to my lot? And what return shall I make for this profusion of goodness?—The only return I can make is by accommodating my conduct to the will of my Creator, and by fulfilling, as far as I am able, the purposes of my being. But how are these purposes to be be discovered? analogy of the lower animals gives me here no information. They too, as well as I, are endowed with various instincts and appetites; but their nature, on the whole, exhibits a striking contrast to mine. They are impelled by a blind determination towards their proper objects, and seem to obey the law of their nature in yielding to every principle which excites them to action. In my own species alone the case is different. Every individual chooses for himself the ends of his pursuit, and chooses the means which he is to employ for attaining them. Are all these elections equally good? and is there no law prescribed to man? I feel the reverse. am able to distinguish what is right from what is wrong; what is honorable and becoming from what is unworthy and base; what is laudable and meritorious from what is shameful and criminal. Here, then, are plain indications of the conduct I ought to pursue. There is a law prescribed to man as well as to the brutes. The only difference is, that it depends on my own will whether I obey or disobey it. And shall I alone counteract the

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intentions of my maker, by abusing that freedom of choice which he has been pleased to bestow on me by raising me to the rank of a rational and moral being.

This is surely the language of nature; and which could not fail to occur to every man capable of serious thought, were not the understanding and the moral feelings in some instances miserably perverted by religious and political prejudices, and in others by the false refinements of metaphysical theories. How callous must be that heart which does not echo back the reflections which Milton puts into the mouth of our first parent!

"Thou sun, said I, fair light,

And thou enlightened earth, so fresh and gay,
Ye hills and dales, ye rivers, woods, and plains,
And ye, that live and move, fair creatures, tell,
Tell, if you saw, how came I thus, how here;
Not of myself; by some great Maker then,
In goodness, as in power preeminent;
Tell me how I may know him, how adore,
From whom I have, that thus I move and live,
And feel that I am happier than I know."

In this manner, a consideration of the relation in which we stand to God must satisfy us that it is our duty, or (to vary our language) that it is morally right we should obey his will, as manifested by that inward monitor, established by himself as his vicegerent in our breast. Our moral powers give rise to religious sentiments, and these become, in their turn, the most powerful inducements to the practice of morality.

In the course of our argument concerning the moral attributes of God we shall find reason to conclude that our hopes are not limited to this life, and that there is solid ground to expect a further interposition of Divine power for the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice, a conclusion which will furnish another very powerful sanction to the laws of morality. I shall treat of the presumptions for a future state under the article of Natural Religion, because the moral attributes of the Deity furnish the strongest arguments in support of it. At the same time, the subjects are not necessarily connected. Even absolute atheism cannot destroy entirely

the anticipations which bad men have of future punishment, nor would they reason consequentially if it did; for the same blind necessity which brought them into this world may carry them into another. Whether it be owing to an overruling intelligence or not, it is a fact which nobody can deny, that there are general laws which regulate the course of human affairs, and that even here we see manifest indications of a connexion between virtue and happiness. Why may not necessity continue that existence it at first gave birth to; and why may not the connexion between virtue and happiness continue for ever?

Before entering on the following discussions, it is proper for me to take notice, in the first place, of the insuperable difficulties we may expect to encounter in the course of our inquiries; and, secondly, of the illegitimacy of any inference drawn from this consideration against the certainty of the truths which it is our leading aim to establish. Of the justness of both remarks, no illustration so striking can be produced as the difficulties we have already experienced in our researches concerning the powers of the human understanding; that part of the universe which of all others would seem to lie the most completely within the reach of our examination and, accordingly, an argument has been drawn. by Locke from this acknowledged ignorance of man concerning his own nature, to moderate the arrogance of his pretensions when he presumes to speculate concerning the attributes of God. "If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind, that thinking thing within you, do not think it strange that you cannot comprehend the operations of that Eternal Infinite Mind who made and governs all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain." *

In proof of the existence of the Deity two modes of reasoning have been employed, which are commonly

* Locke's Essay, Book iv. Chap. 10, § 19. The same thought occurs in Pascal. "L'homme sait si peu ce que c'est que Dieu, qu'il ne sait pas ce qu'il est luimême; mais autant l'essence d'un Dieu est incompréhensible pour moi, autant son existence m'est intimément évidente. La preuve en est en moi; et comme moi, tout homme porte cette preuve en lui-même."