the vulgar to expect that good or bad fortune is, even in this world, to be the immediate consequence of good or bad actions,-a prejudice of which we may trace the influence in all ages and nations, but more particularly in times of superstition and ignorance. From this error arose the practices of judicial combat, and of trial by ordeal, both of which formerly prevailed in this part of the world, and of which the latter (as appears from the Asiatic Researches) kept its ground in Hindostan as late as 1784,* and probably keeps its ground at this day. Absurd as these ideas are, they show strongly how natural to the human mind are the sentiments now under consideration; for this belief of the connexion between virtue and good fortune has plainly taken its rise from the natural connexion between the ideas of virtue and merit, a connexion which, we may rest assured, is agreeable to the general laws by which the universe is governed, but which the slightest reflection may satisfy us cannot always correspond with the order of events in such a world as we inhabit at present.

I am not certain but we may trace something of the same kind in the sports of children, who have all a notion that good fortune in their games of chance depends upon perfect fairness towards their adversaries, and that those are certain to lose who attempt to take secretly any undue advantage.

"Pueri ludentes, 'Rex eris,' aiunt, 'Si rectà facies" "+

Indeed the moral perceptions (although frequently mis applied in consequence of the weakness of reason and the want of experience) may be as distinctly traced in the mind at that time of life as ever afterwards, when

"In the code of the Gentoo laws mention is made of the trial by ordeal, which was one of the first laws instituted by Moses among the Jews. See Numbers, chap. v. from the 12th to the 31st verse.) Fire or water were usually employed; but in India the mode varies, and is often determined by the choice of the parties. I remember a letter from a man of rank, who was accused of corresponding in time of war with the enemy, in which he says, Let my accuser be produced; let me see him face to face; let the most venomous snakes be put into a pot; let us put our hands into it together; let it be covered for a certain time; and he who remaineth unhurt shall be innocent." "

"This trial is always accompanied with the solemnities of a religious ceremony." -(Crawford's Sketches of the Hindoos, p. 298. Ed. of 1790.)

Horat. Epist. Lib. i. Ep. 1. 1. 59.

surely it cannot be supposed that they are the result, as some authors have held, of a conviction, founded on actual observation, of the utility of virtue.

I shall conclude this subject with again recalling to the attention of the reader a very remarkable fact formerly stated, that our moral emotions seem to be stronger with respect to the conduct of others than our own. A man who can be guilty, apparently without remorse, of the most flagrant injustice, will yet feel the warmest indignation against a similar act of injustice in another; and the best of men know it to be in many cases an useful rule, before they determine on any particular conduct, to consider how they would judge of the conduct of another in the same circumstances. "Do to others as ye would that they should do unto you." This is owing to the influence of self-partiality and selfdeceit. Mr. Smith has been so much struck with the difference of our moral judgments in our own case and in that of another, that he has concluded conscience to be only an application to ourselves of those rules which we have collected, from observing our feelings in cases in which we are not personally concerned. I shall afterwards state some objections to which this opinion is liable.

Were it not for the influence of self-deceit, it could hardly happen that a man should habitually act in direct opposition to his moral principles. We know, however,. that this is but too frequently the case. The most per

fect conviction of the obligation of virtue, and the strongest moral feelings, will be of little use in regulating our conduct, unless we are at pains to attend constantly to the state of our own character, and to scrutinize with the most suspicious care the motives of our actions. Hence the importance of the precept so much recommended by the moralists of all ages,-" Know yourself."

These observations may convince us still more of the truth of what I have elsewhere remarked with respect to sentimental reading, and of its total insufficiency for forming a virtuous character without many other precautions.* Where its effects are corrected by habits

Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. i. Sixth Edit. p. 524. et seq.

of business, and every instance of conduct is brought home by the reader to himself, it may be a source of solid improvement; for although strong moral feelings do by no means alone constitute virtue, yet they add to the satisfaction we derive from the discharge of our duty, and they increase the interest we take in the prosperity of virtue in the world.

CHAPTER SIXTH.

OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

ACCORDING to some systems, moral obligation is founded entirely on our belief that virtue is enjoined by the command of God. But how, it may be asked, does this belief impose an obligation? Only one of two answers can be given. Either that there is a moral fitness that we should conform our will to that of the Author and the Governor of the universe; or that a rational selflove should induce us, from motives of prudence, to study every means of rendering ourselves acceptable to the Almighty Arbiter of happiness and misery. On the first supposition we reason in a circle. We resolve our sense of moral obligation into our sense of religion, and the sense of religion into that of moral obligation.

The other system, which makes virtue a mere matter of prudence, although not so obviously unsatisfactory, leads to consequences which sufficiently invalidate every argument in its favor. Among others it leads us to conclude, 1. That the disbelief of a future state absolves from all moral obligation, excepting in so far as we find virtue to be conducive to our present interest: 2. That a being independently and completely happy cannot have any moral perceptions or any moral attributes.

But further, the notions of reward and punishment presuppose the notions of right and wrong. They are sanctions of virtue, or additional motives to the practice of it, but they suppose the existence of some previous obligation.

In the last place, if moral obligation be constituted by a regard to our situation in another life, how shall the existence of a future state be proved, or even rendered probable by the light of nature? or how shall we discover what conduct is acceptable to the Deity? The truth is, that the strongest presumption for such a state is deduced from our natural notions of right and wrong;

of merit and demerit; and from a comparison between these and the general course of human affairs.

It is absurd, therefore, to ask why we are bound to practise virtue. The very notion of virtue implies the notion of obligation. Every being who is conscious of the distinction between right and wrong carries about with him a law which he is bound to observe, notwithstanding he may be in total ignorance of a future state. "What renders obnoxious to punishment," as Dr. Butler has well remarked, " is not the foreknowledge of it, but merely the violating a known obligation." Or (as Plato has expressed the same idea,) τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν νομός ἐστι βασιλικός.*

From what has been stated, it follows that the moral faculty, considered as an active power of the mind, differs essentially from all the others hitherto enumerated. The least violation of its authority fills us with remorse. On the contrary, the greater the sacrifices we make in obedience to its suggestions, the greater are our satisfaction and triumph.

The supreme authority of conscience, although beautifully described by many of the ancient moralists, was not sufficiently attended to by modern writers as a fundamental principle in the science of ethics till the time of Dr. Butler. Too little stress is laid on it by Lord Shaftesbury; and the omission is the chief defect in his system of morals. Shaftesbury's opinion, however, although he does not state it explicitly in his Enquiry, seems to have been precisely the same at bottom with that of Butler.†

With respect to Dr. Butler, I shall take this opportunity of remarking, that in his Sermons on Human Nature, in the Preface to his Sermons, and in a short Dissertation on Virtue annexed to his Analogy, he has, in my humble opinion, gone further towards a just explanation of our moral constitution than any other modern philosopher. Without aiming at the praise of novelty or of refinement, he has displayed singular penetration

* Minos.

† See his Advice to an Author, Part i. Sect 2, paragraph 1st and 2d.