And if the means be juft, the conduct true, COMMENTARY. VER. 263. Moft Critics fond of fome fubfervient art, etc.] II. The fecond way in which a narrow capacity, as it relates to the matter, fhews itfelf, is judging by a favorite Part. The author has placed this [from 262 to 285) after the other of judging by parts, with great propriety, it being indeed a natural confequence of it. For when men have once left the whole to turn their attention to the feparate parts,that regard and reverence due only to a whole is fondly transferred to one or other of its parts. And thus we fee that Heroes themfelves as well as Heromakers, even Kings as well as Poets and Critics, when they chance never to have had, or long to have loft the idea of that which is the only legitimate object of their office, the care and confervation of the whole, are wont to devote themselves to the fervice of fome favourite part, whether it be love of money, military glory, defpotic power, etc. And all, as our Author fays on this occafion, to one lov'd Folly facrifice. NOTES. which this Mafter-piece of Art was conftructed. But it is not fo. The Poet tells us, The Whole at once is BOLD and regular. Once on a time, La Mancha's Knight, they fay, A certain Bard encount'ring on the way, Difcours'd in terms as just, with looks as fage, As e'er could Dennis, of the Grecian ftage; 270 Concluding all were defp'rate fots and fools, Who durft depart from Aristotle's rules. Our Author happy in a judge fo nice, Produc'd his Play, and begg'd the Knight's advice; COMMENTARY. This general mifconduct much recommends that maxim in good Poetry and Politics, to give a principal attention to the whole; a maxim which our author has elsewhere shewn to be equally true likewife in Morals and Religion; as being founded in the order of things: For, if we examine, we fhall find the misconduct to arife from this imbecillity of our nature, that the mind must always have something to rest upon, to which the paffions and affections may be interestingly directed. Nature prompts us to feek it in the moft worthy object; and common sense points out to a Whole or Syftem: But Ignorance, and the false lights of the Paffions, confound and dazzle us; we stop short, and before we get to a Whole, take up with fome Part; which from thence becomes our Favourite. NOTES. VER. 267. Once on a time, etc.] This tale is fo very appofite, that one would naturally take it to be of the Poet's own invention; and fo much in the spirit of Cervantes, that we might eafily mistake it for one of the chief strokes of that incomparable Satire. Yet, in truth, it is neither; but a story taken by our Author from the Spurious Don Quixote; which fhews how proper an ufe may be made of General reading, when if there is but one good thing in a book (as in that wretched performance there fcarce was more) it may be pick'd out, and Made him obferve the fubject, and the plot, 275 The manners, paffions, unities; what not? All which, exact to rule, were brought about, Were but a combat in the lifts left out. "What! leave the Combat out?" exclaims the Knight; Yes, or we muft renounce the Stagirite. "Not fo by Heav'n" (he anfwers in a rage) 280 "Knights, fquires, and fteeds, must enter on the So vaft a throng the stage can ne'er contain. COMMENTARY. VER. 285. Thus Critics of lefs judgment than caprice, 2. He concludes his obfervation on thofe two forts of judges by parts, with this general reflexion.-The curious not knowing are the first fort, who judge by parts, and with a microfcopic fight (as he fays elsewhere) examine bit by bit: The not exact but nice, are the fecond, who judge by a favourite part, and talk of a whole to cover their fondnefs for a part; as Philofophers do of principles, in order to obtrude notions and opinions in their stead. NOTES. VER. 285. Thus Critics of lefs judgment than caprice, Curious not knowing, not exact but nice.] In thefe two lines the poet finely defcribes the way in which bad writers are wont to imitate the qualities of good ones. As true Judgment Form fhort Ideas; and offend in arts COMMENTARY. But the fate common to both is, to be governed by caprice and not by Judgment, and confequently, to form fhort ideas, or to have ideas fhort of truth: Tho' the latter fort, thro' a fondness to their favourite part, imagine that it comprehends the whole in epitome: As the famous Hero of La Mancha, mentioned just before, used to maintain, that Knight Errantry comprised within itfelf the quinteffence of all Science, civil, military, and religious. VER. 289. Some to conceit alone, etc.] We come now to that fecond fort of bounded capacity, which betrays itself in it's judgment on the manner of the work criticifed. And this our Author profecutes from 288 to 384. These are again fubdivided into divers claffes. Ibid. Some to conceit alone, etc.] The first [from 288 to 305.] are thofe who confine their attention folely to Conceit or Wit. And here again the Critic by parts, offends doubly in the manner, juft as he did in the matter: For he not only confines his atten NOTES. generally draws men out of popular opinions, fo he who cannot get from the croud by the affiftance of this guide, willingly follows Caprice, which will be fure to lead him into fingularities.. Again, true Knowledge is the art of treafuring up only that which, from its ufe in life, is worthy of being lodged in the memory. But Curiofity confifts in a vain attention to every thing out of the way, and which, for its ufeleffness the world. leaft regards. Laftly, Exactnefs is the juft proportion of parts. to one another, and their harmony in a whole : But he who has not extent of capacity for the exercife of this quality, contents. himfelf with Nicety, which is a bufying one's felf about points Poets like painters, thus, unskill'd to trace 295 And hide with ornaments their want of art. COMMENTAR Y. tion to a part, when it fhould be extended to the whole; but he likewife judges falfely of that part. And this, as the other, is unavoidable, the parts in the manner bearing the fame clofe relation to the whole, that the parts in the matter do; to which whole the ideas of this Critic have never yet extended. Hence it is, that our author, fpeaking here of thofe who confine their attention folely to Conceit or Wit, defcribes the two fpecies of true and false Wit: because they not only mistake a wrong difpofition of true Wit for a right, but likewife falfe Wit for true: He defcribes falfe Wit firft, from 288 to 297. Some to Conceit alone, etc. Where the reader may obferve our Author's skill in representing, in a defcription of falfe Wit, the falfe disposition of the true, as the Critic by parts is apt to fall into both these errors. He next defcribes true Wit, from 296 to 305. True Wit is Nature to advantage drefs'd, etc. And here again the reader may observe the same beauty, not only an explanation of true Wit, but likwife of the right dif pofition of it; which the poet illuftrates, as he did the wrong, by ideas taken from the art of Painting. NOTES. VER. 297. True Wit is Nature to advantage drefs'd, etc.] This definition is very exact. Mr. Locke had defined Wit to confift" in the affemblage of ideas, and putting those together, "with quickness and variety, wherein can be found "femblance or congruity, whereby to make up pleasant pictures "and agreeable vifions in the fancy." But that great Philofo any re |