In fearch of wit thefe lofe their common sense, There are, who judge still worse than he can write. COMMENTARY. -And thus, at the fame time, our author proves the truth of his introductory obfervation, that the number of bad Critics is vaftly fuperior to that of bad Poets. VER. 36. Some have at firft for Wits, etc.] The poet having enumerated, in this account of the nature of Judgment and its various depravations, the feveral forts of bad Critics, and ranked NOTES. VER. 28. In fearch of wit thefe lofe their common fenfe,] This obfervation is extremely juft. Search of wit is not only the occafion, but the efficient caufe of lofs of common fenfe. For wit confifting in chufing out, and fetting together, fuch ideas from whofe likeneffes pleasant pictures may be made in the fancy; the Judgment, thro' an habitual search of Wit, lofes by degrees its faculty of feeing the true relations of things; in which confifts the exercise of common fenfe. VER. 32. All fools have ftill an itching to deride, And fain would be upon the laughing fide.] The fentiment is juft. And if Hobbes's account of Laughter be true, that it arifes from pride, we fee the reafon of it. The expreffion too is fine, it alludes to the condition of Idiots and natural-fools, who are always on the grin. Some neither can for Wits nor Critics pafs, COMMENTARY. them into two general Claffes; as the firft fort, namely the men fpoiled by falfe learning, are but few in comparison of the other, and likewife come lefs within his main view (which is poetical Criticifm) but keep groveling at the bottom amongit words and letters, he thought it here fufficient juft to have mentioned them, propofing to do them right hereafter. But the men spoiled by falfe tafte are innumerable; and These are his proper concern: He therefore, from y 35 to 46. fub-divides them again into the two claffes of the volatile and heavy: He defcribes in few words the quick progrefs of the One thro' Criticism, from false wit to plain folly, where they end; and the fixed station of the Other between the confines of both; who under the name of Witlings, have neither end nor measure. A kind of half formed. creature from the equivocal generation of vivacity and dulnefs, like those on the banks of Nile, from heat and mud. NOTES. VER. 43. Their generation's fo equivocal :] It is fufficient that a principle of philofophy has been generally received, whether it be true or falfe, to juftify a poet's ufe of it to fet off his wit. But to recommend his argument he should be cautious how he ufes any but the true. For falfehood, when it is fet too near, will tarnish the truth he would recommend. Befides the analogy between natural and moral truth makes the principles of true Philofophy the fitteft for his ufe. Our Poet has been careful in obferving this rule. To tell 'em, would a hundred tongues require, Be sure yourself and your own reach to know, COMMENTARY. VER. 46. But you who feek, etc.] Our Author having thus far, by way of INTRODUCTION, explained the nature, ufe, and abufe of Criticifm, in a figurative defcription of the qualities and characters of Critics, proceeds now to deliver the precepts of the Art. The firft of which, from 47 to 68. is, that he who fets up for a Critic fhould previously examine his own ftrength, and fee how far he is qualified for the exercise of his profeffion. He puts him in a way to make this discovery, in that admirable direction given ✯ 51. AND MARK THAT POINT WHERE SENSE AND DULNESS MEET. He had fhewn above, that Judgment, without Taste or Genius, is equally incapable of making a Critic or a Poet: In whatsoever fubject then the Critic's Tafte no longer accompanies his Judgment, there he may be affured he is going out of his depth. This our Author finely calls, that point where fenfe and dulness meet. And immediately adds the REASON of his precept; the Author of Nature having fo conftituted the mental faculties, that one of them can never excel but at the expence of another. NOTES. VER. 51. And mark that point where fenfe and dulnefs meet.] Befides the peculiar fenfe explained above in the comment, the words have ftill a more general meaning, and caution us against going on, when our Ideas begin to grow obfcure: as we are 55 Nature to all things fix'd the limits fit, And wifely curb'd proud man's pretending wit. As on the land while here the ocean gains, In other parts it leaves wide fandy plains; Thus in the foul while memory prevails, The folid pow'r of understanding fails; Where beams of warm imagination play, The memory's foft figures melt away. One science only will one genius fit; So vaft is art, fo narrow human wit: COMMENTARY. 60 From this ftate and ordination of the mental faculties, and the influence and effects they have one on another, our Poet draws this CONSEQUENCE, that no one genius can excell in more than one Art or Science. The confequence fhews the neceffity of the precept, just as the premises, from which the confequence is drawn, fhew the reafonableness of it. NOTES. apt to do, tho' that obfcurity is a monition that we should leave off; for it arifes either thro' our fmall acquaintance with the fubject, or the incomprehenfibility of its nature. In which circumftances a genius will always write as heavily as a dunce. An obfervation well worth the attention of all profound writers. VER. 56. Thus in the foul while memory prevails, The folid pow'r of understanding fails : Where beams of warm imagination play, Thefe obfervations are collected from an intimate knowledge of human nature. The caufe of that languor and heavinefs in the understanding, which is almoft infeparable from a very strong and tenacious memory, seems to be a want of the proper exercise and activity of that power; the understanding being rather passive while the memory is cultivating. As to the other ap Not only bounded to peculiar arts, But oft' in those confin'd to fingle parts. 65 Like Kings we lose the conquests gain'd before, By vain ambition still to make them more: Each might his fev'ral province well command, Would all but stoop to what they understand. First follow Nature, and your judgment frame By her just standard, which is ftill the fame: COMMENTARY. VER. 68. Firft follow Nature, etc.] The Critic obferving the directions here given, and finding himself qualified for his office, is fhewn next how to exercise it. And as he was to attend to Nature for a Call, fo he is firft and principally to follow her when called. And here again in this, as in the foregoing precept, the poet [from y 67 to 88.] fhews both the fitness and the neceffity of it. It's fitness, 1. Because Nature is the fource of poetic Art; that Art being only a representation of Nature, who is its great exemplar and original. 2. Because Nature is the end of Art; the defign of poetry being to convey the knowledge of NOTES. pearance, the decay of memory by the vigorous exercife of Fancy, the poet himfelf feems to have intimated the caufe of it in the epithet he has given to the Imagination. For if, according to the Atomic Philofophy, the memory of things be preferved in a chain of ideas, produced by the animal fpirits moving in continued trains; the force and rapidity of the Imagination perpetually breaking and diffipating the links of this chain by forming new affociations, muft neceffarily weaken and diforder the recollective faculty. VER. 67. Would all but stoop to what they understand.] The expreffion is delicate, and implies what is very true, that most men think it a degradation of their genius to employ it in cultivating what lies level to their comprehenfion, but had rather exercise their talents in the ambition of fubduing what is placed above it. |