of the functions of government was to form and to control opinion. And it was owing to the influence of this idea that the coercive policy of 1817 met with that sympathy from the public the existence of which even Sir G. C. Lewis does not openly deny. But this conception of government cuts two ways. If it gave the Administration a firmer locus standi in the repression of popular demonstrations, it likewise placed popular demonstrations on a more logical and intelligible footing. The government of the country was then like the government of a regiment of soldiers or a public school; a system of strict discipline tempered by the possibility of mutiny. And in proportion to the difficulty of making their wants known through Parliament was the justification of the people in seeking other channels of publicity. These two opposing forces were correlatives of each other. Government still remained invested, in the public eye, with the And while imperial attributes aforesaid, the use of public meetings was not likely to be in excess of the popular necessities. The difference between that state of things and that in which the present generation has grown up, is that, while Government has tacitly abandoned those regulative or directorial functions which it exercised in the Ministry of Lord Liverpool, the people have pushed still further than before the practice of external agitation. This is surely a very great mistake. Between 1832 and 1868 we have had rebellions, riots, and seditious meetings to a most aggravated extent, all intended to intimidate a House of Commons which had recently been placed on a distinctly democratic basis. Are we to expect that a similar extension of the representation will be followed by a similar development of this lawless and aggressive spirit? The very contrary effect is the one that we have a right to anticipate. As Parliament becomes more popular, public meetings should become less frequent. The people should learn to acquiesce at least in the decision of the people's House. If they do not, if they only see in the relaxed authority of the executive an incitement to further interference, instead of a reason for abstaining from it; if they resent the jurisdiction of an assembly returned by household suffrage; most sensible men will come to the conclusion that they would rather have been governed by Lord Liverpool than administered by Mr. Gladstone.

Of all the English Ministers who have occupied the foremost place in Government since the Constitution was finally settled, Lord Liverpool resembles most in his position and career one whom he resembled least in his manners and his character, the late Lord Palmerston. Each was a necessity. On each was

thrown

thrown the management of a great political interest, which was divided against itself, and in danger every moment of bursting the fetters which confined it. Each by the exercise of very uncommon talents was able to keep all points of difference in the back-ground, and all points of agreement in the fore-ground. Each had its open question.' Parliamentary Reform was to the Cabinet of Lord Palmerston what Roman Catholic Emancipation was to the Cabinet of Lord Liverpool, and what the Radicals were to the first the Grenvillites were to the second. The death of Lord Liverpool broke up the Tory party; and the death of Lord Palmerston broke up the Liberal party. The former returned to power after a brief interval, firmly believing that the old order of things was re-established, and that the Duke of Wellington was in office for the term of his natural life. The Liberals have returned to power doubtless with similar anticipations. Within three years the Tory party was not only broken up a second time, but scattered to the four winds. The truth was then recognised that no party can be led by any statesman who represents either of its extremes, more especially when the extremes are so divergent as they were in this particular Mr. Canning represented one extreme, and he failed even to form a Tory Cabinet. The Duke of Wellington represented the other, and in an incredibly short space of time the Tory party was a wreck. Both had served together usefully and ably under the mild authority of a Minister who stood between the two, and made his party stronger and more popular every year that he survived. But neither could succeed separately for want of those qualities which, if not indicative of the highest order of political genius, are essential to the successful conduct of parliamentary government. We press the parallel no further.

case.

We are grateful to Mr. Yonge for the opportunity he has afforded us of re-surveying a period so fraught with interest and instruction to all students of political history. His style is not very lively; his research is not very deep; nor does he convey the impression that when undertaking the Life of Lord Liverpool he would not with equal readiness have undertaken the life of Confucius. But he deserves praise for the simplicity of his language, the directness of his method, and the moderation of his opinions.

ART.

ART. VII.-Speeches of Mr. Corry, Lord H. Lennox, Mr. Childers, Sir John Hay, and Mr. Stansfeld. 1868.

ΤΗ

HE administration of the Navy has always excited a lively interest. There was a time, indeed, when the public believed most readily that the Navy was certain to be victorious however unprepared, that the traditions of national glory alone would insure success, and that England, because of her former successes, must always remain supreme at sea.

In recent years, however, the public has become alive to the fact, that the steam-engine, the ironclad, and the torpedo, have in a great measure reduced the great maritime powers to an equality. The repeal of the Navigation Laws has checked the development of maritime talent in our rising generation, and the sad fact is published in Parliamentary Returns that upwards of 21,000 foreign seamen now man our English merchant fleet. This vast concourse of foreigners is no doubt employed more cheaply by the trading community, so far as provisions and wages enter into the calculation, but the result is that our merchant navy is a nursery for foreign seamen, who may attack and can never defend us, and who exclude our own population from gaining a livelihood and experience on the ocean, so as to be able to serve England in her hour of need. These conditions existed when Lord Derby took office in 1866. Large sums were annually voted by Parliament for the Navy. They had been continued all through Lord Palmerston's and Lord Russell's Administrations. But with all the enormous expenditure, it was found when Sir John Pakington assumed office that the French ironclad fleet was more numerous than the English in seagoing ironclads built and building. That the number of men voted was not obtained, and that no measures were taken to insure the necessary supply. That no small vessels were in our harbours to relieve the ships on foreign stations. That the number of marines was so ill adjusted to the wants of the service that men could not be employed at sea (the special cause of efficiency in a marine who might otherwise be a soldier) more than three years in ten. That extravagant numbers of young lads were being entered as officers for whom there was neither employment nor promotion, and that the harbours were crowded with useless or decaying wooden hulks which would have cost millions to repair, and which when repaired would have only given obsolete and unsatisfactory ships to perform the service of the State. The members of the Conservative Admiralty at once decided that it became them boldly to face these evils, and, to

take

take upon themselves the responsibility of recommending a slight increase in the estimates which they have far more than recouped by permanent economies. It was at once decided to complete our seagoing ironclad fleet to an equality with that of France. The Whig Government, though alive to the fact that France was outstripping England in the numbers of her iron fleet, had shrunk from recommending to Parliament the necessary expenditure, and indeed had avoided to build a contract ironclad for which the money had been voted by Parliament. At that time their policy was unintelligible, but a recent speech from one of the new Ministry has developed the secret. The Whig Government had obtained from a Parliamentary Committee a recommendation to spend immense sums on the extension of Chatham Dockyard. Many good authorities disbelieved in the advantage of so large an expenditure in that locality; but the contracts were entered into, and the Whig Government were obliged as their successors have been, to fulfil the engagements to which they were parties. Thus it came to pass that they could not face the House of Commons with the necessary demands for money to build necessary vessels, because they had come under engagements to build unnecessary docks. The old illustration of negligence in locking the door after the steed was stolen was never more signally illustrated than by the men who built the docks and made no provision for the ships which these docks were intended to contain. It was, however, impossible to stop the contracts which the Whig Government had made. The works at Chatham were proceeded with, and the necessary contracts for iron ships were entered into, which, with those begun and completing in our own dockyards, have placed us again on an equality with France. Having thus restored the balance in its most essential particular, which the negligence or supineness of the Whig Admiralty had disturbed, the Conservative Admiralty proceeded to see in what way they could introduce reforms of a permanently economical character. The whole force of the dockyards had been directed by the Whigs to the repair and maintenance of vessels of the old wooden type. The royal harbours were encumbered with hulks whose names recalled glorious deeds, but whose forms and condition rendered them alike unserviceable. Sixty-three of these vessels have been sold during the Conservative administration and with great profit. All these hulks required a certain number of men to look after them. Their engines required cleaning, there were boats to attend them, and all the precautions justly required to guard the property of the Crown. It has been roughly estimated that the cost of guarding, maintaining, and cleaning these ships is not

much

much short of 1000l. a year apiece. The sale of them alone therefore saved the country about 60,000l. a year.

Nor was this all the profit in the transaction. Much has been said of the apparently small sum obtained for Government vessels when sold for breaking up. But the process need only be described to receive the approval of all intelligent minds. A vessel, formerly a man-of-war, is found obsolete in type and decaying. It is ascertained that to repair her for service will cost more than half the price of a new vessel of modern design. The vessel is unfit even if repaired for any mercantile purpose, and as her type is obsolete no foreign Government when at peace would desire to purchase her. A belligerent no doubt might be found to buy, but the comity of nations forbids the sale under such circumstances and to such a purchaser. But in the vessel there is one thing, if it can only be secured, which is really of value. This is the copper. The copper in Government ships is of the highest character. If it can only be recovered, and passed through rolling mills, much money is recovered for the State. The old copper, moreover, as it is taken out of the old ship, has the Government brand on it, and cannot be disposed of by metal brokers; for the Act of Parliament is stringent which prohibits the sale of stores marked with the Broad Arrow, and all the authorities, naval, police, and legal, combine to declare that it would be unadvisable to relax this statute. Two modes remain therefore of disposing profitably of these old vessels; but the profit depends ultimately in both on the realisation of the copper. The vessel, in fact, is treated as a copper mine imbedded in decaying timber. The more profitable mode is to break up the ship in the dockyards, select such portions of timber as may be useful, sell the greater part for firewood and obtain the copper. This process, however, must be carried out either by a temporary increase of the dockyard labour (always objectionable), or by delaying other more necessary work. But in fact where so large a number of ships had to be broken up, there was no space in the dockyards in which to undertake the operation. The other mode was to sell by tender to shipbreakers with an engagement that all the copper should be returned when obtained. at the market price of old copper. The shipbreaker in fact bought the ship knowing that he would have a safe market for the copper contained in her, and that he would have to make his profit out of the difference between his labour in breaking up the ship and the price he could obtain for the old timber. Much stress was laid on the fact that the Admiralty had paid more money to a shipbreaker for the old copper, than they had received for the ship when sold to him. In one case this did occur, and Vol. 126.-No. 251.

P

the