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which is used so as to admit of a plural,—either simply, as 'miracles,'' negroes,'' battles,' or in the more circuitous form of pieces of gold,' cases of deceit,' and so on.

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As this quotation indicates, a class name may consist of more than one word. Any word or group of words which serves to point out any imaginable subject of discourse is looked upon as a name or term. If the name is one that is applicable in the same sense to a number of different cases, the name may be regarded as a class name. Nor does it matter how temporary or artificial the group may be. The men who at the risk of their lives entered the burning building in order to rescue the occupants" is as much a class name as dog,' or tree,' or 'justice.' Moreover, the existence of classes is implied in adjectives and verbs as well as in nouns. To say, for example, that appearances are deceptive, means that appearances belong to the class of things which are deceptive. And in flowers grow' the word 'grow points to a class of objects which have the common characteristic of growth. Adjectives and verbs, therefore, are class names in so far as they are names which are not confined to a single thing but applicable in the same sense to a group of things.

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The Extension and Intension of Terms.-It has been shown that class names have two aspects; they apply to a certain group of objects or things,' and they indicate certain attributes or characters. The size of the group to which the term applies determines the extension of the name, while the qualities for which it stands represent or determine the inten

*Sidgwick, The Use of Words in Reasoning, p. 150.

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sion of the name. Instead of extension and intension, the terms denotation and connotation are sometimes used. As one writer says, The denotation of a name consists of the things to which it applies, the connotation consists of the properties which it implies."*

The Importance of Classification.-We have seen that classes are formed in every case on the basis of certain attributes or characters that are common to the class. As this world of ours is constituted, such an attribute or character may imply another, so that it serves as a sign of this other. If, therefore, we put into the same class the things that are alike in some particular quality, we may be enabled to know in advance what to expect from the entire class. To take a simple illustration, if we abstract the attribute fire' from one of its special forms, whether as a lighted candle, a burning match, or a bonfire, one unpleasant experience with fire will be sufficient to put us on our guard against all the rest. By such a process of abstraction and classification, the child learns that sugar is sweet; that water will quench the thirst; that crockery will break if dropped to the floor, while a rubber ball will not; that glass will cut the fingers, while sticks may be handled with safety; and so on throughout the whole round of its little existence. In adults we have, of course, the same sort of thing, only on a larger and more complex scale.

Classification is, in short, a device whereby we are enabled to simplify tremendously an environment which would otherwise be too complex for any finite intelligence. If we were obliged to become directly

* Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic, p. 88.

acquainted with every object and every event, i.e., if things were entirely, and not merely partly, different from each other, adjustment would be impossible, since we should be unable to forecast the behavior of anything. We can anticipate the future and construe the past because certain things behave alike in certain respects. We can prove that certain things have happened in the past because we know what kind of causes are necessary to produce the given effects; we can foretell the future because we know what effects will be produced by the given causes; we are able to resort to proof because certain things can be depended upon to go together.

The Imperfection of Classification.-It has been stated that the awareness of likeness and difference leads to the formation of ideas and that this in turn involves classification. If the attribute in reference to which the classification was made is shown to be an invariable sign of some other attribute, we are in possession of knowledge that holds for the entire class. But in order to acquire such knowledge the classification must be made with sufficient care to bring out the point of resemblance that is common to the class. As a matter of fact, however, this resemblance is not always clearly discriminated. We may classify without knowing clearly wherein the different cases that are put into the same class resemble each other. Whenever this happens there is danger that we may take the wrong attribute as a sign of the second attribute. Such confusion is apparently at the basis of the assertion, Nor are we much moved by the objection that it is wrong to enter the liquor trade, which appears to us just as legitimate as any

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other. The line of reasoning by which the writer apparently reaches his conclusion is as follows: (1) Whatever is (morally) right is blameless. (2) A man has a good (legal) right to engage in the liquor business; and therefore (3) The liquor business is (morally) blameless. Persons who charge exorbitant rates of interest are apt to reason in a similar way. Moral right and legal right are classed together, and no distinction is made between the two. The fact that they are classed together indicates that they are alike in certain respects, viz., in the conformity to a standard. The standard differs, however, in the two cases. We cannot say that whatever is in conformity to a standard is blameless, but only what is in conformity with the moral standard. This distinction is not made, because in classing moral right and legal right together we do indeed recognize a resemblance, but we do not take the pains to discover wherein they are alike and wherein they are different, with the result that the undefined resemblance is taken as a reliable sign of the second attribute, blameless.' If our ideas always involved sufficient analysis, such errors would not occur. But if these fallacies are to be properly appreciated we must know how classifications are actually made and how the shortcomings of our classifications are intensified by the names that are applied to them. The consideration of these topics, therefore, will be our next undertaking.

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CHAPTER II

CLASSIFICATION AND CLASS NAMES

It has been pointed cut that by means of classification we are enabled to simplify an environment which would otherwise be much too complex for rational conduct. Things that are found to be alike are called by the same name, and we ordinarily proceed on the assumption that the point of resemblance which we have discovered and on the strength of which the name has been applied, is invariably related to some other quality, so that we know beforehand the nature of the entire class. Since classification is so important, it is not a matter of accident that we apply the same name to things which resemble each other in certain respects. Now if names were perfect instruments, they would indicate wherein the different things are alike. They would be names for the common points of resemblance and nothing more. The point of resemblance being known, we could ascertain what quality or attribute goes with it, if any. But this idea! is not often realized. In the case of simple attributes such as squareness, straightness, duration, etc., the point of resemblance is sufficiently well understood for most purposes. Then there are certain 'natural' groups, which for all ordinary purposes can be indicated by a class name with little danger of error, even though we do not know very precisely what the

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