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point by means of an imperfect disjunction. They present various alternative ways in which things might be supposed to come into being, but these alternatives all presuppose some kind of agency. The first argument says that the agency is either a real or a hypostatized abstraction called' Nothing.' The second argument bids us decide whether a given thing was produced by something else or by itself. In each case the disjunction evidently leaves out the one alternative that is under discussion, viz., whether things need any cause at all for their existence. In other words, the disjunction presupposes an agency of some sort for every event, and thus begs the question.

False Assumption and the Syllogism.-It was pointed out before that the study of the syllogism affords no protection against ambiguity, other than false obversion and conversion, nor against imperfect disjunction. The syllogism may, however, be of service in connection with false assumption in the narrower sense, viz., the false assumption which involves the suppression of a premise. This kind of fallacy is due largely to the fact that we have not acquired sufficiently the habit of noticing the implications of our reasoning. The reasoning, as it stands, is incomplete, and if we were properly critical, we should endeavor to complete it. But this ordinarily requires practice; and this practice is furnished, in a way, by the syllogism, since it accustoms us to the requirements of a complete argument. To argue, for example, that democracy is an undesirable form of government, because it has certain specified defects, is to assume, as the syllogism helps us to see, that

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governments with such defects are undesirable; which, as a universal proposition, may well be open to doubt. In short, the study of the syllogism tends toward the discovery of hidden assumptions, and thus it makes for the elimination of assumptions that are indefensible.

To criticize our own arguments and to unearth their hidden assumptions seems to be particularly difficult if the matter at issue is something that concerns our practical interests. We are prone, in such circumstances, to insist exclusively upon our side of the case. The reason why we do not get our opponent's point of view may be that we do not look for our own assumptions and reflect upon them impartially. The following passage from a daily newspaper exemplifies this tendency:

"The cause of the first strike [Chicago Stock Yards, 1903] was wages. More particularly it was the wages of unskilled laborers. Under the agreement of last year the packers had been paying 181⁄2 cents an hour. Meanwhile the conditions of the labor market had changed. Hundreds of men were presenting themselves every morning to request the opportunity of working for 16 or even 15 cents an hour. The packers felt that it was unfair to require them to pay more than the law of supply and demand indicated.

"The argument offered by the union ignored the law of supply and demand. It based itself on living conditions. The average number of working hours provided for unskilled laborers during an average week was said to be about forty. Forty hours at 181⁄2 cents an hour makes $7.40. No man, said the union, could live decently on less than $7.40. And the

packers could pay $7.40 without seriously reducing their dividends."

It is evident that each side is making an assumption. We may attempt to state both arguments in syl logistic form, so as to bring to light the assumptions:

1. Wages as determined by supply and demand are proper wages;

Sixteen or fifteen cents per hour are wages as determined by supply and demand;

Therefore sixteen or fifteen cents per hour are proper

wages.

2. Wages as determined by living conditions are proper

wages;

Not less than eighteen and a half cents per hour are wages as determined by living conditions;

Therefore not less than eighteen and a half cents per hour are proper wages.

Neither side seems to criticize its own assumptions, yet one at least must be wrong. It would probably be pretty generally conceded that both supply and demand and living conditions should be considered. If this is true, then the question of what constitutes proper wages is begged by the assumption that the matter is determined by either of these considerations to the exclusion of the other.

As a second illustration of questionable assumption we may consider this argument, which is intended to show that the accounts of miracles are presumably untrustworthy:

"We must admit that all probabilities must be against miracles, for the reason that that which is probable cannot by any possibility be a miracle.

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Neither the probable nor the possible, so far as man is concerned, can be miraculous. The probability therefore says that the writers and witnesses were either mistaken or dishonest."*

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That neither the probable nor the possible can be miraculous' is perfectly true, if we determine probability and possibility by conformity to natural law, as the writer plainly does. If we confine ourselves to natural law we must concede that it is neither probable nor possible that the dead should come to life or that water should be turned into wine. But if we proceed to say that miracles are therefore improbable, we evidently base our assertion upon the incompatibility of miracle with natural law. Is this incompatibility a fair test of improbability? Since the question at issue is whether events that are incompatible with natural law have ever occurred, the assumption that such events are improbable clearly begs the question. The fallacy involved may also be classified as an ambiguity. The term probability may be taken to refer either to ground for belief' or to ground for belief on the basis of natural law.'

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Two Special Forms of False Assumption.—A. Reasoning in a Circle.-The fallacy of false assumption, like ambiguity, presents some easily recog nizable forms, which are of sufficient interest to entitle them to special mention. One of these is Reasoning in a Circle. It consists in using a proposition as a premise to prove a conclusion, and then at some other stage in the argument proving this premise by means of the very conclusion which it has previously helped to establish. In other words, the conclusion

*North American Review, Vol. 150, p. 332.

presupposes the premise and the premise presupposes the conclusion. In this way the thing that is to be proved is presupposed, for we must be sure of the conclusion before we have a right to use the premise.

To cite examples of this fallacy is usually difficult, for the reason that the fallacy is not likely to occur except in the course of a lengthy argument. When the argument is brief, we are more apt to see all the different parts at once and to notice this peculiar relation of the two propositions that help to prove each other. The following, however, will serve as an illustration:

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It is wrong to take the life of a fellow man, for God has distinctly commanded us not to, and it is. wicked to disobey his commandments. If any one pretends to doubt that this commandment really did come from God, I can only appeal to his own conscience and his own common sense. When God gave the Commandments to his people is it likely that he would have omitted the most important of them all

-a commandment which only expresses the natural feeling of every normal human being?" (Aikins, Logic, p. 469.)

If we state this argument in two syllogisms its circular character will be evident:

I. Whatever is forbidden by God is wrong;

To take the life of a fellow man is forbidden by God; Therefore to take the life of a fellow man is wrong.

II. Whatever is wrong is forbidden by God;

To take the life of a fellow man is wrong;

Therefore to take the life of a fellow man is forbidden by God.

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