political ground at all, is unreservedly devoted to the interest of the United States. It stands in direct opposition to the treason and the misprision of treason, which, mistaking benignity for weakness, have aimed fierce blows at the heart of our country, and made the most determined efforts to destroy her,— efforts, happily, now and prospectively unsuccessful.

Like the great expounder, we believe in nothing less than the whole country. We further believe that the nearest and best way to an honorable peace is by a vigorous prosecution of the war in the manner and according to the principles proposed by the government of the United States as actually administered. As there are but few occasions when such a magazine can be brought into the arena of political controversy, we step out of our way to say this, so that no one may be at the pains of simply conjecturing our position.

Much more might be said in illustration of our views; but it is better, perhaps, that the magazine should speak for itself, and that our growing experience in conducting it should develop and perfect those views before we venture to present them dogmatically.

The prospects of our journal are encouraging. The need exists; we promise our best efforts; we have spirit, energy, enthusiasm, and hope. But, after all, gentlemen of the army and navy, and all good patriots who have interest and pride in our military progress and national success, upon you it depends to recognize and support our labors in the great art which we have undertaken to interpret; and to that end we ask your kind attention and hearty response to this WORD OF GREETING from Your friend,

THE EDITOR.

CHATTANOOGA.

AFTER the reverse at Chicamauga, the Union army fell back to a very strong position around Chattanooga, with its flanks resting on the Tennessee River, near the mouths of the Chattanooga and Citico Creeks. The enemy, following, took up a line in front on the western slope of a part of Missionary Ridge and across Chattanooga Valley, as well as on the top and around the northern end of Lookout Mountain. He thus shut off all communication from Bridgeport by the left bank of the river, while he held the intervening country with some of his forces, as well as the river-road on the right bank by his sharp-shooters opposite; in consequence, it became necessary for the supplies to be hauled from Bridgeport and Stevenson over the Anderson road, and others, to the northward, the shortest distance being sixty miles, leading over Walden's Ridge and through the Sequatchie Valley. Rainy weather set in, and soon the precipitous mountain-roads were almost impassable, and those in the low lands nearly bottomless. A rebel raid occurring then, during which several hundred wagons loaded with supplies were destroyed, and the railroad between Stevenson and Nashville damaged, made a serious matter out of what would have been, in ordinary times, a temporary check. Reinforcements of two corps from the East, under General Hooker, arriving near Bridgeport at this period, also tended rather to increase than diminish the difficulty of subsisting the army at Chattanooga.

Toward the latter part of October, a memorable period, starvation or retreat stared the Cumberland army in the face; and the latter resource would have necessitated the abandonment of artillery and most of the materials of war that required hauling. Although it could have repelled any attack on its direct front, it could not have marched far to check any flank movement on its line of communications, owing to the starved condition. of its animals.

At this critical period, General Rosecrans was relieved, General Thomas succeeding him; and a few days afterward General Grant arrived, having been placed in command of a Military Division, composed of the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee, in which were the armies of Generals Burnside, Thomas, and Sherman; the first and last in a flourishing condition, the other in a serious one, and to relieve which was now the problem to be solved.

General Hooker, with the greater part of his command, had been ordered to move; crossing the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, he advanced seven miles to Shellmound, where he met a force of the enemy, beyond which it would hardly be safe to

force his way, as on the appearance of the heads of his columns in Lookout Valley, they would in all probability be attacked by the enemy in mass, and broken. At this time, a plan proposed by the Chief Engineer, General W. F. Smith, was, after a reconnoissance by Generals Grant and Thomas, adopted: a lodgment was to be effected on the left bank of the Tennessee, at Brown's Ferry, three miles below Lookout Mountain, which, if successful, owing to the peculiar topography of the country, would oblige the detachments of the enemy between Lookout Creek and Shellmound to retire behind the former, thus enabling the junction to be made of the two forces. It would besides open the river to Brown's Ferry for steamboats, distant by land one and a half miles from the ponton-bridge at Chattanooga, and give wagonroads to Bridgeport shorter by one-half than those in use.

To execute this movement, four thousand men were placed under the command of the Chief Engineer. Fifty pontons were built, each capable of holding twenty-five men, besides oarsmen. On the night of the 26th of October, twelve hundred and fifty picked men were placed in them. They floated down around Moccasin Point, in front of Lookout, and landed at Brown's Ferry, six miles by water from Chattanooga, three of which were in front of the rebel pickets, none of whom took the alarm until the landing at two given points was attempted, at one of which firing commenced. The enemy tried to recover from his surprise; but, by the aid of the now empty boats, which were rowed to the opposite shore, reinforcements were sent over from the balance of the four thousand, who were in a concealed camp near by, as was also the bridge-material. A strong position was soon taken up, which, by the use of the axe and spade, was made stronger; the enemy retreating, with his infantry, artillery, and cavalry, to Lookout. Before noon a ponton-bridge, nine hundred feet long, connected the opposite shores.

The forces of the enemy between Lookout and Shellmound were liable to be cut off, and, as they could not well be reinforced, they retired as quickly as possible across Lookout Creek, and took up a position on the western slope of the mountain. Before thirty-six hours, the Eleventh Army Corps had encamped in Lookout Valley, near Brown's Ferry. A portion of one division of the Twelfth Army Corps, halting for the night near Wauhatchie, in an untenable position, plainly visible from Lookout Mountain, offered such an inducement to the enemy to frustrate the effect of the entire movement, which had now developed itself, that he made a night attack upon it; but the fighting qualities of the soldiers, and the fact that it was a night attack in a broken country, caused it to fail. The captured steamer "Paint-Rock" was run by Lookout the night after, and has since been used in carrying supplies from Bridgeport. The anticipated results were all attained.

When looking at the entire field of operations in the Geographical Military Division, covering an area of many thousand square miles, and noting the late movements, one is able to recognize the foresight of the Administration in creating it, and the ability of General Grant to command it.

Although the army near Chattanooga had now no fears of starvation or retreat, it was hardly in a condition to assume the offensive against the strong positions in its front, with any prospect of a decisive result; and the wedge of Lookout, still held by the enemy, necessitated the using of two ponton-bridges, which were liable to be broken at any time by drift or rafts.

To put it in this required condition, General Sherman was ordered from the region of the Mississippi with four divisions. Before his arrival, Longstreet had been sent from Bragg's army with a large force, expecting by superiority of numbers to regain East Tennessee; through the gateways invade Kentucky, and again make it the battle-ground for the restoration of the Union.

Burnside, in pursuance of instructions, lured Longstreet to Knoxville, and retired within his fortifications, where he could stand a protracted siege. About this time Sherman made his appearance at Bridgeport, and, advancing rapidly, threw one division to Trenton, threatening the enemy's extreme left, under cover of which he moved the rest of his command across Brown's Ferry and into a concealed camp on the right bank of the Tennessee, not far from opposite to the mouth of the South Chicamauga.

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A proposed plan of attack combined many elements of success, and, the topography of the country admitting admirably of its being carried into successful execution, it was in the main adopted. The enemy's right resting on Missionary Ridge, near the Tunnel," and the non-occupation of the ridge between that point and its northern end, near the mouth of the South Chicamauga, offered the opportunity of getting a commanding foothold, from which to make a feasible attack, threatening Bragg's immediate communications and piercing his strategic centre. This would also have a tendency to relieve Burnside, as well as weaken the force at Lookout, in Hooker's immediate front.

To get Sherman into a position to occupy this end of the ridge, the topography of the vicinity was called into play. The North Chicamauga flows into the Tennessee, on its right bank, three miles above the mouth of the South Chicamauga, on the opposite shore, and five miles above the mouth of the Citico. Into the first stream one hundred and sixteen ponton-boats were launched, having been carried there by a concealed road from Chattanooga, and near by were three thousand of Sherman's men, ready to embark in them. A bridge site had been selected just below the mouth of the South Chicamauga, and an isolated