ideas of Philofophy is Imitation, is, in the language of Criticifm, called INVENTION. Again; of the endless variety of these original forms, which the poet's eye is inceffantly traverfing, thofe, which take his attention moft, his active mimetic faculty prompts him to convert into fair and living refemblances. This magical operation the divine philofopher (whofe fervid fancy, though it fometimes obfcures [a] his reafoning, yet never fails to clear and brighten his imagery) excellently illuftrates by the fimilitude of a mirror; "which, fays ·“he, as you turn about and oppose to the furrounding world, prefents you inftantly with "a SUN, STARS, and SKIES; with your OWN, and every OTHER living form; with the EARTH, and its feveral appendages "of TREES, PLANTS, and FLOWERS [6]." Just so, on whatever fide the poet turns his imagination, the fhapes of things immediately imprint themselves upon it, and a new correfponding creation reflects the old one. [a] Meλaives Te, fays Dionyfius of Halicarnaffus, fpeaking of his figurative manner, rò capès y Cópw wore wapatkowo [T. ii. p. 204. Ed. Hudfon.] [6] PLATO DE REPUB. lib. x. This fhadowy ideal world, though unfubftantial as the American vifion of fouls [c], yet glows with fuch apparent life, that it becomes, thenceforth, the object of other mirrors, and is itfelf original to future reflexions. This fecondary or derivative image, is that alone which Criticifin confiders under the Idea of IMITATION. And here the difficulty, we are about to examine, commences. For the poet, in his quick refearches through all his ftores and materials of beauty, meeting every where, in his progrefs, thefe reflected forms; and deriving from them his flock of imagery, as well as from the real fubfifting objects of nature, the reader is often at a lofs (for the poet himfelf is not always aware of it) to difcern the original from the copy; to know, with certainty, if the fentiment or image, prefented to him, be directly taken from the life, or be itself, a lively transcript, only, of fome former copy. And this difficulty is the greater, because the original, as well as the copy, is always at hand for the poet to turn to, and we can rarely be certain, fince both were equally in his pow[c] Spectator No. 56. er, er, which of the two he chofe to make the. object of his own imitation. For it is not enough to fay here, as in the cafe of reflections, that the latter is always the weaker, and of course betrays itself by the degree of faintnefs, which, of neceffity, attends a copy. This, indeed, hath been faid by one, to whofe judgment a peculiar deference is owing. QUICQUID ALTERI SIMILE EST,. NECESSE EST MINUS SIT EO, QUOD IMI-; TATUR [d]. But it holds only of strict and fcrupulous imitations. And of fuch alone, I think, it was intended; for the explanation follows, ut umbra corpore, & imago facie, & actus hiftrionum veris affectibus; that is, where the artist confines himself to the fingle view of taking a faithful and exact tranfcript. And even this can be allowed only, when the copyift is of inferior, or at most but of equal, talents. Nay, it is not certainly to be relied upon even then; as may appear from what we are told of an inferior painter's [Andrea del Sarto's] copying a portrait of the divine Raphael. The story is well known. But, as an aphorifm, brought to determine the merits of [d] QUINCTIL. lib. x. c. 11. imitation, imitation, in general, nothing can be falfer or more delufive. For, 1. Befides the fuppofed original, the object itself, as was obferved, is before the poet, and he may catch from thence, and infuse into his piece the fame glow of real life, which animated the first copy. 2. He may also take in circumftances, omitted or overlooked before in the common object, and fo give new and additional vigour to his imitation. Or, 3. He may poffefs a ftronger, and more plastic genius, and therefore be enabled to touch, with more force of expreffion, even those particulars, which he profeffedly imitates. On all thefe accounts, the difficulty of diftinguishing betwixt original, and fecondary, imitations is apparent. And it is of importance, that this difficulty be feen in its full light. Because, if the fimilarity, obferved in two or more writers, may, for the most part, and with the highest probability, be accounted for from general principles, it is fuperfluous at least, if not unfair, to have recourse to the particular charge of imitation. Now 1 Now to fee how far the fame common principles of nature will go towards effecting the fimilarity, here spoken of, it is neceffary to confider very distinctly I. THE MATTER; and II. THE MANNER, of all poetical imita tion. I. In all that range of natural objects, over which the restless imagination of the poet expatiates, there is no fubject of picture or imitation, that is not reducible to one or other of the three following claffes. 1. The material world, or that vaft compages of corporeal forms, of which this universe is compounded, 2. The internal workings and movements of his own mind, under which I comprehend the manners, fentiments, and pasfions. 3. Thofe internal operations, that are made objective to fenfe by the cutward figns af gefture, attitude, or action. Besides these I know of no fource, whence the artist can derive a fingle fentiment or image. There needs no new diftinction in favour of Homer's gods, Milton's angels, or Shakespear's witches; it being clear, that these are only human B 4 |