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490. To this generally succeeds the division, or the laying down the method of the discourse; on which it is neces sary to make some observations.

Obs. We do not mean, that in every discourse, a formal division or distribution of it into parts, is requisite. There are many occasions of public speaking, when this is neither requisite, nor would be proper; when the discourse, perhaps, is to be short, or only one point is to be treated of; or when the speaker does not choose to warn his hearers of the method he is to follow, or of the conclusion to which he seeks to bring them. Order, of one kind or other, is, indeed, essential to every good discourse; that is, every thing should be so arranged, that what goes before may give light and force to what follows. But this may be accomplished by means of a concealed method. What we call division is, when the method is propounded in form to the hearers. The discourse in which this sort of division most commonly takes place, is a sermon.

491. In a sermon, or pleading, or any discourse, where division is proper to be used, the most material rules are,

492. First, that the several parts into which the subject is divided be really distinct from one another; that is, that no one include another.

Obs. It were a very absurd division, for instance, if one should propose to treat first, of the advantages of virtue, and next, of those of justice or temperance; because the first head evidently comprehends the second, as a genus does the species. He who proceeds in this method involves his subject in disorder and indistinctness.

493. Secondly, in division, we must take care to follow the order of nature; beginning with the simplest points, such as are easiest apprehended, and necessary to be first discussed; and proceeding thence to those which are built upon the former, and which suppose them to be known. We must divide the subject into those parts into which it is most easily and naturally resolved; that it may seem to split itself, and not be violently torn asunder: "Dividere," as is com monly said, "non frangere."

494. Thirdly, the several members of a division ought to exhaust the subject; otherwise, we do not make a complete division; we exhibit the subject by pieces and corners only, without giving any such plan as displays the whole.

495. Fourthly, the terms in which our partitions are expressed, should be as concise as possible. Avoid all circumlocution here. Admit not a single word but what is necessary. Precision is to be studied, above all things, in laying down your method.

Obs. It is this which chiefly makes a division appear neat and elegant; when the several heads are propounded in the clearest, most expressive, and, at the same time, the fewest words possible. This

never fails to strike the hearers agreeably; and is, at the same time, of great consequence towards making the divisions be more easily remembered.

496. Fifthly, avoid an unnecessary multiplication of heads. To split a subject into a great many minute parts, by divisions and subdivisions without end, has always a bad effect in speaking.

Obs. It may be proper in a logical treatise; but it makes an oration appear hard and dry, and unnecessarily fatigues the memory. In a sermon, there may be from three to five or six heads, including subdivisions seldom should there be more.

497. The next constituent part of a discourse, which we mentioned, was narration, or explication.

Obs. We put these two together, both because they fall nearly under the same rules, and because they commonly answer the same purpose; serving to illustrate the cause, or the subject of which the orator treats, before he proceeds to argue either on one side or other; or to make any attempt for interesting the passions of the hearers.

Illus. 1. In pleadings at the bar, narration is often a very important part of the discourse, and requires to be particularly attended to. Besides its being in no case an easy matter to relate with grace and propriety, there is, in narrations at the bar, a peculiar difficulty. The pleader must say nothing but what is true; and, at the same time, he must avoid saying any thing that will hurt his cause.

2. The facts which he relates, are to be the ground-work of all his fature reasoning. To recount them so as to keep strictly within the bounds of truth, and yet to present them under the colours most favourable to his cause; to place, in the most striking light, every circumstance which is to his advantage, and to soften and weaken such as make against him, demand no small exertion of skill and dexterity. He must always remember, that if he discovers too much art, he defeats his own purpose, and creates a distrust of his sincerity.

498. To be clear, and distinct, to be probable, and to be concise, are the qualities which critics chiefly require in narration; each of which carries, sufficiently, the evidence of its importance.

Illus. 1. Distinctness belongs to the whole train of the discourse, but is especially requisite in narration, which ought to throw light on all that follows. A fact, or a single circumstance left in obscurity, and misapprehended by the judge, may destroy the effect of all the argument and reasoning which the speaker employs. If his narration be improbable, the judge will not regard it; and if it be tedious and diffuse, he will be tired of it, and forget it.

2. In order to produce distinctness, besides the study of the general rules of perspicuity which were formerly given, narration requires particular attention to ascertain clearly the names, the dates, the places, and every other material circumstance of the facts recounted.

3. In order to be probable in narration, it is material to enter into the characters of the persons of whom we speak, and to shew that their actions proceeded from such motives as are natural, and likely to gain belief.

4. In order to be as concise as the subject will admit, it is necessary to throw out all superfluous circumstances; the ejection of which will likewise tend to make our narration more forcible and more clear.

Obs. In sermons, where there is seldom any occasion for narration, explication of the subject to be discoursed on comes in the place of narration at the bar, and is to be taken up much on the same tone : that is, it must be concise, clear, and distinct; and in a style correct and elegant, rather than highly adorned. To explain the doctrine of the text with propriety; to give a full and perspicuous account of the nature of that virtue or duty which forms the subject of the discourse, is properly the didactic part of preaching; on the right execution of which much depends for all that comes afterwards in the way of per

suasion.

499. Of the argumentative or reasoning part of a discourse. In whatever place, or on whatever subject, one speaks, this, beyond doubt, is of the greatest consequence. For the great end for which men speak on any serious occasion, is to convince their hearers of something being either true, or right, or good; and, by means of this conviction, to influence their practice. Reason and argument make the foundation of all manly and persuasive eloquence.

500. Now, with respect to arguments, three things are requisite.

First, the invention of them;

Secondly, the proper disposition and arrangement of them; And, thirdly, the expression of them in such a style and manner, as to give them their full force.

501. The first of these, invention, is, without doubt, the most material, and the ground-work of the rest.

Obs. 1. But, with respect to this, it is beyond the power of art to give any real assistance. Art cannot go so far, as to supply a speaker with arguments on every cause, and every subject; though it may be of considerable use in assisting him to arrange and express those, which his knowledge of the subject has discovered. For it is one thing to discover the reasons that are most proper to convince men, and another, to manage these reasons with the most advantage. The latter is all that to which rhetoric can pretend.

2. The assistance that can be given, not with respect to the invention, but with respect to the disposition and conduct of arguments, may be reduced to the following methods.

502. Two different methods may be used by orators in the conduct of their reasoning. The terms of art for these methods are, the analytic, and the synthetic method.

Illus. The analytic is that in which the orator conceals his intention concerning the point he is to prove, till he has gradually brought his hearers to the designed conclusion. They are led on step by step, from one known truth to another, till the conclusion be stolen upon them, as the natural consequence of a chain of propositions.

Example. When one, intending to prove the being of a God, sets ou

with observing that every thing which we see in the world has had a beginning; that whatever has had a beginning must have had a prior cause; that in human productions, art, shewn in the effect, necessarily infers design in the cause; and proceeds, leading you on from one cause to another, till you arrive at one supreme first cause, from whom are derived all the order and design visible in his works.

Obs. This is much the same with the Socratic method, by which that philosopher silenced the Sophists of his age. It is a very artful method of reasoning; may be carried on with much beauty, and is proper to be used when the hearers are much prejudiced against any truth, and by imperceptible steps must be led to conviction. But there are few subjects that will admit this method, and not many occasions on which it is proper to be employed..

503. The mode of reasoning most generally used, and most suited to the train of popular speaking, is what is called the synthetic; when the point to be proved is fairly laid down, and one argument after another is made to bear upon it, till the hearers be fully convinced.

Illus. Now, in all arguing, one of the first things to be attended to, is, among the various arguments which may occur upon a cause, to make a proper selection of such as appear to one's self the most solid; and to employ these as the chief means of persuasion. Every speaker should place himself in the situation of a hearer, and think how he would be affected by those reasons, which he purposes to employ for persuading others. For he must not expect to impose on mankind by mere arts of speech. They are not so easily imposed on, as public speakers are sometimes apt to think. Shrewdness and sagacity are found among all ranks; and the speaker may be praised for his fine discourse, while the hearers are not yet persuaded of the truth of any one thing he has uttered.

504. Supposing the arguments properly chosen, it is evident that their effect will, in some measure, depend on the right arrangement of them; so as they shall not justle and embarrass one another, but give mutual aid; and bear with the fairest and fullest direction on the point in view. Concerning this, the following rules may be taken :

505. In the first place, avoid blending arguments confusedly together, that are of a separate nature. All arguments whatever are directed to prove one or other of these three things: first, that something is true; secondly, that it is morally right or fit; or, thirdly, that it is profitable and good.

506. These make the three great subjects of discussion among mankind; truth, duty, and interest. But the arguments directed towards any one of them are generally distinct; and he who blends them all under one topic, which he calls his argument, as, in sermons especially, is too often done, will render his reasoning indistinct and inelegant.

Illus. Suppose, for instance, that you are recommending to an audience benevolence, or the love of our neighbour; and that you take your first argument from the inward satisfaction which a benevolent temper affords; your second, from the obligation which the example of Christ lays upon you to this duty; and your third, from its tendency to procure us the good-will of all around us; your arguments are good, but you have arranged them wrong: for your first and third arguments are taken from considerations of interest, internal peace, and external advantages; and between these, you have introduced one, which rests wholly upon duty. You should have kept those classes of arguments, which are addressed to different principles in human nature, separate and distinct.

507. In the second place, with regard to the different degrees of strength in arguments, the general rule is, to advance in the way of climax, "ut augeatur semper, et incres

cat oratio."

Obs. 1. This especially is to be the course, when the speaker has a clear cause, and is confident that he can prove it fully. He may then adventure to begin with feebler arguments; rising gradually, and not putting forth his whole strength till the last, when he can trust to his making a successful impression on the minds of his hearers, prepared by what has gone before.

2. But this rule is not to be always followed. For, if he distrust his cause, and has but one material argument on which to lay the stress, putting less confidence in the rest, in this case, it is often proper for him to place this material argument in the front; to pre-occupy the hearers early, and make the strongest effort at first; that, having removed prejudices, and disposed his hearers to be favourable, the rest of his reasoning may be listened to with more candour. When it happens, that amidst a variety of arguments, there are some which we are sensible are more inconclusive than the rest, and yet proper to be used, Cicero advises to place these in the middle, as a station less conspicuous than either the beginning, or the end, of the train of reasoning.

508. In the third place, when our arguments are strong and satisfactory, the more they are distinguished and treated apart from each other, the better. Each can then bear to be brought out by itself, placed in its full light, amplified and rested upon. But when our arguments are doubtful, and only of the presumptive kind, it is safer to throw them together in a crowd, and to run them into one another; that, though infirm of themselves, they may serve mutually to prop each other.

509. In the fourth place, we must observe not to extend arguments too far, and multiply them too much. If we do, we rather render our cause suspected, than give it weight. An unnecessary multiplicity of arguments both burdens the memory, and detracts from the weight of that conviction which a few well-chosen arguments carry.

Obs. It is to be observed, too, that in the amplification of arguments,