* the same day they wrote it: "To-day we send you following dispatch, * * by which is to be understood that we order from you two hundred fiftygross cases Bear matches. By telegram from Copenhagen we are informed that shipment of matches by the Thingvalla Line ceases, and we therefore hope that you, immediately on receipt of telegram, make firm contract with the Wilson Line Company for shipment to us of your matches. The agents for Wilson Line here refuse to make up contract for matches, and we hope that you may have better success in Christiania." At the time of sending the dispatch and letter a question as to the construction of the tariff laws had been referred to the attorney-general, and both parties were well aware, that if a certain construction was adopted, defendants could only import matches at a loss. Held, that read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, the telegram and letter would be construed as a direction to plaintiff to make a contract with the steamship line, and not as an agreement by defendants to take all the matches that plaintiff could ship for eight months. Second Division, Feb. 25, 1890. H. Jolsen's Taendstikfabrikker v. Thurber. Opinion by Brown, J. Reversing 45 Hun, 589. inal guaranty, attached to, and belonging to, and guaranteeing any and all securities, acts and paper writings and proceedings of said association in relation to [the bondholder], and of its indebtedness to her, hereafter to be done, continued or made." Held, that defendant did not thereby himself assume payment of the debt, and release the company, and that on the bondholder's subsequently surrendering her bouds to the company in return for property conveyed to her, the debt was extinguished, and defendant was not bound to pay a deficiency on the bonds after sale of the property conveyed. Feb. 25, 1890. Miller v. Rinehart. Opinion by Gray, J.; Earl and Peckham, JJ., dissenting. Affirming 1 N. Y. Supp. 182. JUDGMENT IRREGULARITIES LIMITATIONS.-(1) An error in the form of a judgment, whereby its scope is enlarged beyond that authorized by the verdict, presents no question for consideration on appeal, but may be corrected by motion in the trial court, even after the judgment has been affirmed by the appellate courts. (2) Where a verdict in replevin includes damages occasioned by the detention of the property without finding any definite amount therefor, the awarding of a specific sum in the judgment constitutes a mere irregularity, within the purview of the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, section 1282, which provides that a motion to set aside a final judgment for irregularity shall not be heard after the expiration of one year from the filing of the judgment-roll. Feb. 25, 1890. Corn Exchange Bank v. Blye. Opinion by Ruger, C. J. Reversing 7 N. Y. Supp. 434. MASTER AND SERVANT-CONTRACT OF HIRING-DISCHARGE.-(1) Plaintiff entered the employ of defendant as its secretary, at a yearly salary, without any special contract as to term of service, and continued in such employ with knowledge of a by-law of defendant providing that the office should be held during the pleasure of its board of directors. Held, that plaintiff's employment was controlled by the by-law, and that defendant could exercise the pleasure of removal without waiting the expiration of a current year. (2) When a party enters into service of another at a stipulated annual salary, and continues beyond a year, the presumption is that he does so on the same terms. Huntington v. Claffin, 38 N. Y. 182; Vail v. Manufacturing Co., 32 Barb. 564; Ranck v. Albright, 36 Penn. St. 367; Tatterson v. Manufacturing Co., 106 Mass. 56. Second Division, Feb. 25, 1890. Douglas v. Merchants' Ins. Co. Opinion by Bradley, J. Affirming 44 Hun, CONTRACTS-ACTION FOR BREACH-QUESTIONS FOR JURY-PLEADING.—(1) In an action for breach of contract in refusing to permit plaintiffs to complete a tunnel they had agreed to construct for defendant, it appeared that, with plaintiffs' consent, work thereon was suspended for a period as to the proposed length of which the evidence was conflicting; but, on February 11th following, plaintiffs wrote to defendant, asking whether they were to be allowed to complete the work. Defendant's notification in reply thereto, that plaintiffs might begin work, was not given until the 19th of the same month, and plaintiffs refused to do so, unless compensated for the unreasonable suspension of the work, having in the mean time secured other employment. Held, that plaintiffs' letter was a waiver of defendant's acts or omissions prior thereto, and it is a question for the jury whether defendant's delay in answering it was unreasonable. (2) Where the failure to join as parties plaintiff in such action persons who had been interested in, but had abandoned, the contract, is apparent upon the face of the complaint, it can only be taken advantage of by demurrer, though the complaint does not show that such persons were alive at the commencement of the action. All the other facts sufficient to warrant a demurrer appearing on the face of the complaint, and the objection having been made by reason of a non-joinder of parties plaintiff, the usual presumption of life applies for this purpose. Burgess v. Abbott, 1 Hill, 476; Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322; Merritt v. Walsh, 32 id. 685; De Puy v. Strong, 37 id. 372: Sanders v. Yonkers, 63 id. 489; Eaton v. Balcom, 33 How. Pr. 80; Green v. Lippincott, 53 id. 33. Feb. 25, 1890. Sullivan v. New York & R. Cement Co. Opin-in front of the one on which he was working, thus ion by O'Brien, J. Affirming 1 N. Y. Supp. 403. GUARANTY-CONSTRUCTION- RELEASE.-Defendant induced plaintiffs' assignor to purchase bonds from a corporation in which he was interested, and guaranteed their payment. The company thereafter desired to adjust its affairs, and have its mortgages and bonds cancelled; and, to induce plaintiffs' assignor to surrender her bonds, defendant agreed that, "in case said bonds, or my said guaranty, shall be cancelled or destroyed or otherwise disposed of as required by said association hereafter, and in spite of and notwithstanding any thing that may happen or be done at the request of said association, * ** * my aforesaid guaranty of said bonds * ** * shall remain in full * effect, and this is hereby declared to be a continuing, running guaranty for the payment of said sum * 629. NEGLIGENCE OF MASTER-PROVINCE OF JURY, -(1) While plaintiff, a car repairer in defendant's employ, was engaged in repairing a car on a side track, an unattended freight car was shunted against the car driving his car against the one in the rear; causing the bumpers to come together and crush his arm. Plaintiff's signal flag was properly posted at the time, and could have been seen from the switch which entered the track where he was working. Held, that the question of defendant's negligence was one for the jury. (2) The fact that plaintiff had hold of the bumper with one hand, so as to support himself while working with the other, was not negligence, as matter of law, as he had the right to suppose his signal flag would not be disregarded by defendant's servants. (3) Nor was plaintiff's failure to set the brakes of the car on which he was at work, or the one in front of it, necessarily negligence, it not being his duty to attend the switches, or set the brakes upon the cars at the station. Second Division, Feb. 25, 1890. Murphy v. New York Central & Hudson River R. Co. Opinion by according to the original terms of said orig-Haight, J. Affirming 44 Hun, 242. MASTER AND SERVANT DUTY TO INSTRUCT SERVANT.-Where employers select to run their elevator an employee who has never before performed such a service, they are bound to provide hint for a reasonable length of time with an instructor competent to teach him how to run an elevator, and are liable for any injury to him arising from the incompetency or negligence of such instructor. Connolly v. Poillon, 41 Barb. 366, 369; Ryan v. Fowler, 24 N. Y. 410; Noyes v. Smith, 28 Vt. 59; Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 552; Mann v. Canal Co., 91 N. Y. 500; Wood Mast. & Serv., §§ 349, 350, 444; Brennan v. Gordon, 13 Daly, 208, 210 (this case on former appeal); Loughlin v. State, 105 N. Y. 159, 162, 163; Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553. Second Division, Feb. 25, 1890. Brennan v. Gordon. Opinion by Potter, J. Reversing 14 Daly, 47. RAILROAD ELEVATED -NEGLIGENCE INSTRUCTIONS. At the trial of an action against an elevated railroad company for injuries sustained by a passenger while stepping from the car to the station platform, owing to the sudden starting of the train, a witness testified that, to steady himself when the train stopped, he caught hold of the bell-cord, and thereby gave the signal which caused the train to start. The court charged that if the jury found that the train was so started then defendant was not negligent, and plaintiff could not recover. Held, that defendant could not have been prejudiced by the refusal of the court to charge that there was no proof that there was any vice in the system of communicating signals, or that the method of fixing the bell-rope was not the best method, and that the jury were not to consider these questions. Second Division, Feb. 25, 1890. Ferry v. Manhattan Ry. Co. Opinion by Bradley, J. Affirming 54 N. Y. Super. Ct. 325. REPLEVIN - REDELIVERY BOND- ESTOPPEL.-(1) A sheriff on retaking property which had been replevied from him, executed a bond reciting that plaintiffs claimed the delivery to them of certain property specified in their affidavit, and had caused the same to be taken by the officer in charge, but that the same had not yet been delivered to them, and also requiring a return of the property replevied to the sheriff. The bond bound the sheriff for the delivery of the property to plaintiffs, if delivery thereof should be adjudged. Held, that in an action to recover damages for the wrongful detention of the property, the sheriff would not be allowed to contradict the admissions made in his bond by showing that all the property described in plaintiff's affidavit did not come into his hands. It is said that the recital in the bond was not necessary, as the fact is not by the statute made necessary to be stated. I do not see that that makes any difference. The bond itself is required by the statute, and, in order to make it in any wise intelligible, it is necessary that some statement should be made of the purpose for which it is executed, and the recital in question was made for that purpose; and I cannot see why it should not be just as conclusive in a case where the defendant wishes to deny the possession of part of the property, as where he wishes to deny the possession of the whole. The case of Weber v. Manne, 42 Hun, 557, was reversed in this court, 105 N. Y. 627, mem. The same principle has been held in other States. In Mead v. Figh, 4 Ala. 279, it was held that a bond for redelivery of a chattel, which recited a levy and contained a promise to produce the chattel, could not be contradicted by showing that there was no such chattel, and that the levy was fictitious. The court said: "The law gives the defendant a right to suspend the collection of the money upon his doing certain acts, and it could not be tolerated that he should be permitted afterward to say that these acts are not binding on him because they assert a falsehood." In Lucas v. Beebe, 88 Ill. 427, it was held that a party in a delivery boud, who therein admits the possession of the property, is bound by it; and, if in such a bond proceedings before a justice of the peace in a certain entitled action are recited, the maker of the bond cannot contradict the recital by proof that there was no such suit. It is generally sup posed, said the court, parties mean to bind themselves when they solemnly and deliberately make such statements in writing, the truth of which is attested by their signatures and seals. In Frost v. White, 14 La. Ann. 140, the same holding is maintained. Property was attached which was bonded by an intervenor, and a motion made to dissolve the attachment on several grounds, one of which was that no property was in fact attached. The court said the admission had been judicially made by giving a bond which contained a description of the property attached, and therefore the intervenor was concluded by his admission, and estopped from denying its truth. In Shaw v. McCullough, 3 W. Va. 260, the court said that parties voluntarily entering into a forthcoming bond are estopped from all inquiry into the regularity or validity of the levy of the writ of fieri facias upon which the bond was taken. The bond recited the fact that the writ had issued, and the property had been levied on under it, and that was conclusive. In Brewing Co. v. Niederweiser, 28 Mo. App. 233, 236, the defendant offered to show that certain of the property mentioned in the requisition, and recited in the bond as having been taken under it, was in fact at the time that the bond was given, and ever since had been, in plaintiff's possession. The evidence was excluded, and the court held such exclusion to be right, because the respondents should not be permit ted to contradict by oral testimony their own recitals in the bond given by them. In Carpenter v. Stearns, 32 Mo. App. 132, the court said that the defendants having availed themselves of the benefits of the statute, which allows them to keep the property on giving a bond, are estopped from showing or claiming on the trial that the property described in their delivery bond was never in their possession. In Hundley v. Filbert, 73 Mo. 34, the obligors in a delivery bond were estopped by a recital therein from showing that there was no levy upon which the property was taken. In State v. Williams, 77 Mo. 463, it was held that a recital in a bond is a solemn admission by the obligor of the truth of the fact recited; and where, in an action against him, the bond is pleaded in hæc verba, the effect is the same as if there were a formal plea of estoppel. The claim was made in the above case that there was no proof that a party named was ever appointed guardian. The consideration of the bond recited that "whereas, the above Robert H. Williams is the lawful guardian," etc. The court said: "This recital is a solemn admis sion by the defendants of Williams' guardianship," and defendant was held estopped by such admission from questioning the fact. The case of Miller v. Moses, 56 Me. 128, contains nothing opposed to these views, There the plaintiff in the replevin suit, in order to get his requisition, gave a bond, and of course it was for all the property which he expected to replevy. He was beaten in the action, and the defendant in that action thereupon sued on the bond to recover damages for taking his property. It was held in the latter action that the recital in the bond as to the purpose for which it issued, and describing all the property claimed, did not estop the defendant in such latter action from showing as a fact that only a part of the property described therein had been subsequently taken by the sheriff. The court said in such case the bond consti tutes no estoppel. It is ordinarily given before the goods are replevied. It is based upon the writ, and assumes that what is ordered to be replevied will be. But, if not found, they cannot be; and for those that are found the bond will be security, and for no more. This is not our case. (2) As the Code of Civil Pro cedure of New York, section 1717, requires all replevin papers to be made a part of the judgment-roll, and a copy of each of them to be furnished to the court or referee on the trial, it is not necessary to formally introduce the papers in evidence before they can be considered by the trial court. Diossy v. Morgan, 74 N. Y. 11. Feb. 25, 1890. Martin v. Gilbert. Opinion by Peckham, J. Reversing 3 N. Y. Supp. 958. REVIVAL OF ACTION LIABILITIES OF STOCKHOLDERS.-Laws of New York of 1875, chapter 611, section 37, provides that in limited liability companies all the stockholders shall be individually liable to the creditors of the company to an amount equal to the amount of stock held by them, respectively, for all debts and contracts made by such company, until the whole amount of the capital stock of such company has been paid in, and a certificate thereof has been made and recorded. Held, that the liability of a stockholder in a company organized thereunder was not in the nature of a penalty, but of a contract obligation, and an action thereon survives against his personal representatives. In Lowry v. Inman, 46 N. Y. 119, Allen, J., stated the principle (pp. 125, 126) as follows: "A personal liability of stockholders for the debts of a corporation, in virtue of the charter, is not in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture, and does not exist solely as a liability imposed by statute. It is not enforced simply as a statutory obligation, but is regarded as voluntarily assumed by the act of becoming a stockholder. By such act he assents to be bound, or that his property shall be charged with debts of the corporation, to the extent and in the manner prescribed by the act of incorporation." In Wiles v. Suydam, 64 N. Y. 173, it was sought to hold the defendant as a stockholder in a manufacturing company on his liability under section 10 of the act of 1848, chapter 40a section which in substance, is almost identical with the one now under consideration; and also as a trustee on his liability for all the debts, because of a failure to file a report. A demurrer on the ground of the improper joinder of causes of action was sustained. The court, distinguishing between the two kinds of liability, said (Church, C. J.): "The cause of action against the defendant as a stockholder consists of the debt, and the liability created by statute against stockholders when the stock has not been paid in, and a certificate of that fact recorded. * * * The first cause of action against the defendant as a stockholder is an action ou contract. The six-years statute of limitations applies. The defendant is entitled to contribution." The liability of Wiechers therefore being in the nature of a contract obligation, it survived his death, and the action can be continued against his personal representatives. In Bailey v. Hollister, 26 N. Y. 112, the court expressly recognized this principle. The liability of the estate of the deceased stockholder under the statute is so well established upon principle and authority that further discussion is unnecessary. Chase v. Lord, 77 N. Y. 1; Flash v. Conn, 109 U. S. 371; Richmond v. Irons, 121 id. 27. Feb. 25, 1890. Cochran v. Weichers. Opinion by O'Brien, J. Affirming 6 N. Y. Supp. 304. SALE-BONA FIDE PURCHASERS-BURDEN OF PROOF. - Where defendant, in an action on a note by one claiming to be a bona fide purchaser thereof, testifies that the note was procured from him by fraud, plaintiff's good faith is a question for the jury, and the burden is upon him to show that he had no notice of the alleged fraud. Bank v. Green, 43 N. Y. 298; Bank v. Noxon, 45 id. 762; Bank v. Carll, 55 id. 440; Wilson v. Rocke, 58 id. 643; Bank v. Penfield, 69 id. 502; Nickerson v. Ruger, 76 id. 279; Seymour v. McKinstry, 106 id. 240; Stewart v. Lansing, 104 U. S. 505; Smith v. Livingston, 111 Mass. 342; Sullivan v. Langly, 120 id. 437. The plaintiff did not satisfy this rule by showing that he paid value for the note. It was necessary, in order to entitle him to recover, to go further, and show that he had no knowledge or notice of the fraud with which the instrument was tainted from its origin. It is contended that Richmond, from whom the plaintiff took the paper, was shown to be innocent of any imperfections in it. But the testimony tended to show that Richmond bought the uote from Henderson as the agent, and by direction of, and with funds subsequently furnished by, the plaintiff. It is quite clear, we think, that the testimony on this point was of such a character that it could not be held that absolutely and as a matter of law, Richmond ever had any title to the note; and unless he had, his connection with its purchase as a mere agent or instrument of the plaintiff, could not confer the character of a bona fide holder or shield the plaintiff from the legal consequences of any notice that he might have had of the fraudulent origin of the paper, as between the maker and payee. The most that can properly be conceded in regard to this branch of the case is that Richmond's connection with the transfer, and whether as owner or agent of the plaintiff, was a question of fact for the jury. The good faith of Richmond was not available to strengthen the plaintiff's case, unless it was found that Richmond was the owner of the note when it was delivered to the plaintiff. Feb. 25, 1890. Vosburgh v. Diefendorf. Opinion by O'Brien, J. Affirming 1 N. Y. Supp. 58. car, ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS. CARRIERS-INJURY TO PASSENGERS-POSTAL CLERKS. -A postal clerk of the railway mail service, holding a photographic commission entitling him to ride as a passenger on a railroad train while on duty and in returning home, who, with the conductor's permission, rides, while off duty, on his way home, in the postalis not per se guilty of contributory negligence so as to defeat an action for his death, caused by a collision, though the postal-car was subject to greater risks than the cars intended for passengers, and if he had remained in the smoking-car, in which he commenced his journey, he would probably have escaped injury. It may be that the location of the postal-car was, by reason of its greater proximity to the engine, a place of greater danger than the smoking car or other passenger-cars. Still it was a car for the occupancy of passengers who were entitled to ride as such because of their official position or connection with the post-office department of the government, or who paid their fare, and were connected with that department. There was no rule of the company forbidding the deceased to enter that car, and occupy the same, if he was not in actual service. It was his habit to occupy it when he was returning from duty whenever he chose, and the conductor, who is conceded to be a general agent of the company, not only made no objection, but permitted him from time to time to do so. There are cases, no doubt, where the invitation or permission of the conductor would not protect a man in running a risk which was so obviously dangerous that a prudent man would not think of incurring it. Patt. Ry. Acc. Law, § 276, and cases cited. To justify a court in saying that conduct is per se contributory negligence, the case must present some such feature of recklessness as would leave no opportunity for difference of opinion as to its imprudence in the minds of ordinarily prudent men. Kane's Case, 69 Md. 21; Maugans' Case, 61 id. 61; Fitzpatrick's Case, 35 id. 46; Stansbury's Case, 54 id. 655. Here the deceased was doing what he was actually required to do for the larger part of his time bounds of just punishment. But little reformation may be expected from a prisoner smarting under a dis proportionate and unjust sentence. The fact that he has been convicted of a crime does not authorize the courts to deprive him of those rights which the law stil recognizes, nor to treat him as having no rights." The above expresses our views in this case. The sentence will be reduced under the provisions of the statute so as to expire on the 27th day of November, 1889. Neb Sup. Ct., Nov. 20, 1889. Charles v. State. Opinion by Maxwell, J. on the cars and was permitted to do the rest of his time when on the cars. It was provided for his ocoupancy when on duty as postal-clerk, and his not being on duty did not make the car more dangerous to him. His act therefore in no way contributed to the result which happened. A case precisely like it, being the case of a postal-clerk not on duty, and in the postal-car, and injured while there by the gross negligence of the company's agents, is found in Carroll v. Railroad Co., 1 Duer, 578. The plaintiff in that case was in the postal-car by the permission of the conductor, and was allowed to recover damages. The same principles were given effect in O'Donnell v. Railroad Co., 59 Penn. St. 239, and in Creed v. Railroad Co., 86 Penn. St. 139. Iu the last case the court says there is no legal presumption of negligence arises from the fact that the passenger was in a car not intended for passengers. Lang-in front by reducing the size of the grass plot, and redon's Case, 92 Peun. St. 28, cited by appellant's counsel, there was an emphatic rule of the company forbidding a passenger to ride in a baggage-car, which was controlling. Md. Ct. App., Feb. 5, 1890. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State. Opinion by Irving, J. EMINENT DOMAIN-DAMAGE TO GRASS-A railroad company that has appropriated for its proposed track the rear of a dwelling-house lot, thereby destroying access to the owner's outbuildings from an alley, but which outbuildings can be approached from the street moving some flower beds, is not within the act of Pennsylvania of February 19, 1849, which prohibits the location of a railroad "through any dwelling-house, in the occupancy of the owner or owners thereof, without his, her or their consent. We can readily see that access to the lot by means of the alley was a convenience to the owners, and added to its value; but we cannot assent to the conclusion that an entrance from the front, along the westerly line of the lot, for the carriage of coal and other supplies, and for the necessary uses of a family, would destroy it. It might reduce the size of a grass plot, or require the removal of a flower bed, but these are not necessary to the enjoy ment of the house as a dwelling. They are generally istence in attractive form usually, if not always, deregarded as desirable adjuncts to a home, but their ex pends on the will and effort of the owner or occupant of the premises. The law regards that which is essential to the enjoyment of the dwelling, and not that which is merely ornamental and pleasant in its sur CRIMINAL LAW-EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT.-A young man, less than twenty-one years of age, of previous good character and habits, arrived in the city of Omaha in search of employment. He was without money, and fell in with several persons who induced him to drink intoxicating liquors, and thereafter persuaded him to burglariously enter a dwelling-house in said city with one of their number. His associate escaped, and he was found hiding in a closet in said house, badly frightened. On an information being filed against him, he pleaded guilty to the charge of burglary, and was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for ten years. Held, that while the crime of burglary was one of a grave character, which ordinarily should be severely punished, yet in this case the punishment was too severe, and the term of imprison-roundings. The location of a railroad across a lot on ment would be reduced so as to expire November 27, 1889; the sentence dating from June 30, 1888. The crime of burglary is a serious one. The person who deliberately enters a dwelling for the purpose of larceny or robbery not unfrequently has determined in his mind, and is prepared to commit, the still greater crime of murder, if necessary to effect his object, or secure his escape. Such a case, when fully established, should be severely punished, and perhaps the full limit of the law is not excessive. The statute fixes the mini-practical one, and in the decision of it regard must be mum punishment at one year, and the maximum at ten. Between these periods the court has a discretion in fixing the term of imprisonment; the intention being that the court shall graduate it according to the facts of the case. It was never intended however to impose the full penalty of the law, unless a case of great atrocity was shown. No doubt the prosecuting attorney and court were misled by his plea of guilty, and hence failed to inquire into the circumstances; but nevertheless the sentence is entirely too severe, and is conceded to be excessive by the attorney-general. In Maxwell's Criminal Procedure (page 661) it is said: "There is certainly a great difference in the character of the offense between the hardened villain who waylays and robs his victim, or who burglariously enters your dwelling at night, with the intent to steal, and murder, if necessary, and the young man of previously good character who has been guilty of some act which barely makes him criminally liable. In the one case, the full punishment allowed by law perhaps would not be too severe, particularly if the party had been previously convicted of a similar offense; while in the other, if the law will permit a punishment other than by imprisonment in the penitentiary, and the consequent infamy, it might, and probably would, have the effect thereafter to make him a law-abiding citizen. In no case should the sentence exceed the which the owner has his dwelling-house, or upon grounds which constitute part of a valuable countryseat, is not in violation of the statute. Swift's Appeal, 111 Penn. St. 516; Damon v. Railroad Co., 119 id. 287. In determining what is essential to the reasonable use and enjoyment of a dwelling-house the senti ments and attachments of the owner, springing from his own or his ancestors' long-continued possession of it, cannot be taken into account. The question is a had to that which is necessary, other than to that which is desirable and convenient, and depends alone on the will of the owner. Damon v. Railroad Co., supra. In the cases cited the position of the railroad was sustained, but in each there was a reference to the fact that access to the property was not affected or descriptive of the situation in those cases, and it did materially impaired by it. This was however merely not lay down a rule that wherever a location interfered in any degree with the access to the dwelling-house it was prohibited. The only approach to many valuable residences in the cities and boroughs of the Common. wealth is from the street in front of them, and yet a railroad may be located upon such street, and excava tions and embankments may be made in the construction of such road, and the sole remedy of the owners of the lots is a proceeding under the act of February 19, 1849, to recover compensation for any damage they may sustain. In the present case access to the appellees' lot from the rear is interfered with to no greater extent than if the road was located exclusively upon the alley. Penn. Sup. Ct., Jan. 20, 1890. McKeesport & B. V. R. Co. v. Lyle. Opinion by McCollum, J. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-DEMAND NOTES-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-A promissory note payable "on demand, after date," is due at once, without an actual demand, and the statute of limitations begins to run against it immediately. It is contended that, as the note was made payable on demand after date," it could not have matured at once, aud that therefore an actual demand was necessary to put the statute in motion. The general rule is that a note payable on demand is due immediately, without an actual demand, and that the statute commences to run at once. Brummagim v. Tallant, 29 Cal. 506; Cousins v. Partridge, 79 id. 228; Story Prom. Notes, § 29; Ang. Lim., § 59; Wood Lim., § 124. The language used in the note under consideration does not take it out of this rule. In Hitchings v. Edmands, 132 Mass. 328, the court said: "The words on demand, after date' are more nearly analogous to such an expression as 'with interest after date.' If a promissory note, payable on demand, with interest after date, is paid the next day after it is given, one day's interest is due and payable. In the case at bar, the intention of the parties to the note was apparently that it should be payable immediately, and no intention appears on the face of the note that the parties intended to stipulate for at least one day's time before a demand could be made." So it was held that the note was an ordinary demand note, payable at once, on demand, on which an action could have been brought immediately after it was given." Fenno v. Gay, 146 Mass. 118. These views apply to the note we are considering, and meet with our approval. Cal. Sup. Ct., Dec. 5, 1889. O'Neil v. Magner. Opinion by Works, J. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. BROWNE ON DIVORCE. This work, by Mr. Wm. Hardcastle Browne, of Philadelphia, is of a class which generally we do not highly regard, i. e., a general work on a statutory subject, professing to apply to all the States. The local practitioner must rely on the statutes and decisions of his State, and few outside will rely on a general work, however well done. In other words, such a work cannot supersede the great comprehensive treatises, which do not descend to local details, and cannot afford a safe substitute for a resort to the local statutes and adjudications. Assuming these evident disadvantages, this work of four hundred and sixty pages seems fairly done. It may well serve as a sort of step-ladder to other and larger sources of information. It includes the subjects of alimony and custody of children. It is handsomely but rather spaciously printed. Published by Kay & Brother, Philadelphia. BEACH'S RAILWAY DIGEST. contains cases decided at October term, 1888, and some decided at April term, 1889. It is published by T. & J. W. Johnson & Co., of Philadelphia, and handsomely printed. The head-notes are clear and brief, the statements seem judicious, the arguments discreetly abbre. viated, and the index of one hundred and sixty pages is certainly copious, although rather unconventionally arranged and not according to our own pet theory. For example, we should not make a head of “Dissolution of Injunctions," but should put the matter under Injunctions." Nor should we make a head of "Distinct Demands." Always avoid an adjective at the beginning, if you can. So of "Ministerial Officer." The noun is a better head in each case. There is no table of cases. But the work is decidedly meritorious. FIRST DIVISION. Judgment affirmed with costs, with leave to answer on payment of costs-John Good, respondent, v. William S. Daland.-Judgment affirmed without costs to either party upon this appeal-Owen Donnelly, appellant, v. City of Brooklyn.- Judgment affirmed with costs-Lawrence Kilroy v. President, etc., of the D. & H. Company.- Judgment reversed, new trial granted,costs to abide event Theodore Thomas, respondent, v. Musical Mutual Protective Union.Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event - Wright Duryea and another, appellants, v. Wm. C. Vosburgh.- - Judgment affirmed with costs, order granting an extra allowance of costs affirmed and costs granted to each set of defendants in the case, one represented by Mr. Gleason and the other by Mr. Collyer-Malcolm Calhoun and others, appellants, v. Delhi and Middletown Railroad.Judgment affirmed with costs David C. Woolsey and others, respondents, v. Hugo Funke. Judgment affirmed with costs-Desda Reynolds, respondent, v. Equitable Accident Association. Order affirmed with costs Charles W. Tillinghast, appellaut, v. Troy and Boston Railroad.-Judgment affirmed with costs Moses Bulkley and others, respondents, v. Parker R. Whitcomb.- --Judgment affirmed with costs - - William J. Butler, respondent, v. Glens Falls Railroad Company. This is a digest of railway decisions and statutes, English and American, for the whole year 1889, with notes on striking or novel decisions, and citations of the principal legal text-books published during the year, with an appendix of railroad counsel in the United States and Canada. The editor, Charles F. Beach, Jr., who is also editor of the Railway and Corporation Law Journal, is probably best qualified of any man in this country for this work, and in this handsome volume of some three hundred pages has undoubtedly comprehended all the cases. So far as we can judge, his work is well done, and of its usefulness to the numerous practitioners in this branch of the law there can be no question. Mr. Beach cites the West system of reporters. If it is all the same to him, we wish he would not say "R. R." for railroad. Railroad is a single word by the best usage. Published by F. D. Linn & Co., Jer-spondent, v. City of Buffalo.- Judgment affirmed sey City. 66 MISSISSIPPI REPORTS. Mississippi has new reporters, Messrs. Brame and Alexauder, and they start off well in this volume. It - Judg with costs-Pierre Cauhope, appellant, v. Park, Davis & Co. Judgment affirmed with costs J. Nott Schemerhorn, respondent, v. Schenectady.- - Judgment affirmed with costs--Simon Uhlmann & Co. v. Nathan Brownell and others.- Judgment affirmed |