from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law at the bar of the court. 1 Bac. Abr., tit. 'Attorney,' 306." And in the same case, on page 484, the court further says: "The power to remove an attorney from the bar ought to be exercised with great caution and discretion, but it is a power incidental to all courts; and unless it be clearly exceeded or abused by a Circuit Court, this court should not interpose, as it cannot decide with the same means of information that the court below was in the possession of. Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529; Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9." In Ex parte Secombe, the last case above cited, the court says: "It has been well settled by the rules and practice of common-law courts that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed. The power however is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the court, or from passion, prejudice or personal hostility; but it is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the rights and independence of the bar may be as scrupulously guarded and maintained by the court as the rights and dignity of the court itself." Our statute requires "that any person desiring to obtain a license to practice law in the courts of this State must appear before the County Court of the county, * * * and prove to the satisfaction of such court that he is a person of good moral character," etc. § 1, chap. 119, Code. If the evidence of such moral character must be produced in order to obtain the license, it is equally essential that this character should be retained; and when an attorney commits an act, whether in the discharge of bis duties as such or not, showing such want of professional or personal honesty as renders him unworthy of public confidence, it is not only the province, but the duty, of the court, upon this fact being made to appear, to strike his name from the roll of attorneys. Nor is it necessary that the offense should be of such a nature as would subject him to an indictment. He has by his own misconduct divested himself of qualifications that are indispensable to the practice of his profession; and while he may regard the judgment depriving him of that right as a punishment for the offense, the action of the court is based alone upon the ground of public policy, and for the public good. It would be carrying the doctrine too far to hold that an attorney must be free from every vice, and to strike him from the roll of attorneys because he may indulge in irregularities affecting to some extent his moral character, when such delinquencies do not affect his personal or professional integrity. To warrant a removal, his character must be bad in such respects as show him to be unsafe and unfit to be instrusted with the powers and duties of his profession; and it is not essential that this misconduct or bad character should be in respect to some deceit, malpractice or misdemeanor practiced or committed in the exercise of his profession only, but in the exercise of a sound discretion, the court should only entertain such charges as are in their nature gross, and unfit a person for an honest discharge of the high and responsible trust reposed in an attorney. It would be unjust to the profession, the purity and integrity of which it is the duty of all courts to preserve, and a disregard of the public welfare, to permit an attorney who has forfeited his right to public confidence to continue the practice of his profession. The doctrine here announced is fully sustained by the authorities. Baker's Case, 10 Bush, 592; Leigh's Case, 1 Munf. 481; People v. Turner, 1 Cal. 144; Mills' Case, 1 Mich. 394; In re Woolley, 11 Bush, 95: Austin's Case, 5 Rawle, 191; Jackson v. State, 21 Tex. 668; Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364; Sharon v. Hill, 24 Fed. Rep. 726; Smith's Case, 1 Yerg. 228. The court below, as it was competent for it to do,

found that the charges against the judge contained in the newspaper article set out in the rule were false, scandalous and libellous, and directly tended to impair the respect and authority of the court, and to degrade and insult and bring it into disrespect, and destroy its efficiency in the due administration of justice. I it could be considered at all doubtful whether or not this is the true purpose and meaning of the article, we may safely assume that it meant to charge, and does charge, that the judge of said court had, as such judge, for partisan purposes, corruptly combined and conspired with the executive committee of the Democratic party, and other persons, to unjustly and im properly induce the grand jury of his court to indiet many persons for alleged illegal voting in Mercer county. This charge being false, we have no hesita tion in pronouncing the publication to be a gross libel on its face, and one which no person of character, and a proper sense of his duty as an attorney, would make. If one private citizen should make such a false accusation against another, it would be a base act, and when it is made against a judge, in respect to his official conduct, by an officer of his court, the offense is greatly aggravated and intensified, and manifests a much greater degree of turpitude and depravity. To call such an act" misconduct" simply, is to express but little of its vileness. The disclaimer by the defendant, in his answer, of intentional disrespect to the judge, or design to embarrass the administration of justice, is no excuse, where the contrary appears on a fair interpretation of the language used. People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195. It seems to me therefore, clearly, according to the principles and authorities hereinbefore announced and referred to, that the said publication was, under the circumstances, such gross miscon duct on the part of the defendant as to justify the judgment of the court in revoking his right to practice in said court. The misconduct was, at least, of such a nature as that for which the court might remove him, and having, in its discretion, done so, this court ought not to reverse its action. Ex parte Steinman, 95 Penn. St. 220, was a case in many respects just like the one before us. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the inferior court in that case, but the reversal was put upon the express grounds that the judgment was in violation of the seventh section of the bill of rights in the Constitution of that State, which declares that "no conviction shall be had in any prosecution for the publication of papers relating to the official conduct of officers or men in public capacity, or to any other matter proper for public investigation or information, where the fact that such publication was not mali. ciously or negligently made shall be established to the satisfaction of the jury." The court, in its opinion in that case, says: "This is a new and very important provision introduced into the bill of rights by the Constitution of 1873. It would be a clear infraction of the spirit, if not of the letter, of this article to hold that an attorney can be summarily disbarred for the publi cation of a libel on a man in a public capacity, or when the matter was proper for public investigation or information." We have no such provision in our Constitution, and therefore we, as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania evidently would have done in the case cited, but for the said constitutitional provision, re fuse to reverse the judgment in this case. W. Va. Ct. App., Nov. 21, 1889. State v. McClaugherty. Opiuion by Snyder, P.

CONTRACT-FRAUD-RESCISSION.-The object of this suit was to rescind and set aside the sale and purchase of the undivided three-eighths of the property, on the alleged ground of fraud on the part of defendants in making the sale by misrepresenting the condition of the mine and its value, and by the suppression of facts alleged to have been known by defendants and unknown

EVIDENCE EXPERIMENTS IN COURT. The trial judge is not bound to stop proceedings in order to try au experiment in open court as to the length of time it would take a candle to burn down to the point of those discovered in defendant's saloon after a fire, for setting which he is indicted. It was a matter resting entirely in the discretion of the court. It would probably have admitted similar proof on the part of the defendant, if any had been offered; but the court was not bound to stop the proceedings in the court, and try the experiment in open court, as proposed. In this connection, we notice a point made by associate counsel for the defense, who made the closing argument, and prepared the closing brief. It seems he made a candle experiment, after the case was appealed, in which he practically verified the testimony of the witness on that subject as to the length of time it would take a half candle to burn down to the point reached by those discovered at the time of the fire. From that result, and from the fact that it was half to three-quarters of an hour after the fire was discovered before the candle which was found still burning was found, he argues that it was impossible that these trains could have been laid, and those candles lighted, until at least a half an hour after the defendant left the place. It will be remembered that the candle found burning was found in a closed locker or drawer. It was because it was so closed in that it was not earlier discovered. The fact that it was so shut out from the air, and in a confined space, will of itself account for that candle holding out so much longer than the others; and if counsel will try the experiment, he will probably find that a half candle burning under such circumstances will last fully half to three-quar ters of an hour longer than a similar one burning in the open air of the room. Cal. Sup. Ct., Dec. 5, 1889. People v. Sevine. Opinion by Fox, J.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-DENIAL OF LANDLORD'S TITLE. A person who, while in the possession of land, accepts a lease therefor from one claiming to be the owner, may, after his term expires, by disclaimer and notice to such person, terminate his tenancy; and he will not, in such case, be required to surrender the possession before he will be allowed to set up an adverse title in himself or a third person. It appears that the defendant had held the possession of the premises as the tenant of Voss, and their relation to each other up to the time of the transaction in question was that of landlord and tenant. The important question, then, arises, whether or not a tenant in pos

session can by mere disclaimer and notice to his landlord, without an actual surrender of the premises, terminate his tenancy. In Wilson v. Weathersby, 1 Nott & McC. 373, it was held that where a tenant acquired possession from his landlord he will not be permitted, while he remains in possession, to dispute the title of his landlord; but he is bound, bona fide, to give up the possession, so as to place the parties in the same situa tion toward the premises that they occupied before they assumed the relation of laudlord and tenant. While this rule seems to be just and reasonable, as well as required by good faith on the part of the tenant, it does not appear to be the rule obtaining in many courts. The general rule seems to be that when the tenant disclaims to hold under his lease, and no. tice of this fact is brought home to the laudlord, then the relation of landlord and tenant ceases, and the tenant becomes a trespasser, and his possession is adverse; and the landlord may by action dispossess him, without notice to quit. If the tenant, with notice to the landlord, disclaims the tenure, and claims the fee adversely, in right of himself or a third person or attorns to another, his possession then becomes a tortious one, by the forfeiture of his right; and the landlord's right of entry is complete, and he may sue at any time within the period of limitation from that time. Willison v. Watkins, 3 Pet. 43; Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 90; Tyler Ej. 311; Wild v. Serpell, 10 Gratt. 405: Miller v. Williams, 15 id. 213, 219; Cooey v. Porter, 22 W. Va. 120. In the case at bar, it appears that the defendant was in possession at the time he ac. cepted the lease from Voss, and that consequently he did not acquire his possession from the landlord; therefore whether we apply the rule that a tenant who acquires his possession from the landlord must surrender his possession before he can assert an adverse claim, or the other rule, that without an actual surrender of the possession the tenant may, after a positive disclaimer and notice to the landlord, set up an adverse title, either in himself or a third person, the defendant in this case was entitled to prove that he had given notice to Voss, and that he was holding adversely to his title. This is what he sought to do by the testimony which the court excluded. It seems to me therefore that the court erred in not permitting the defendant to testify in respect to the matters he proposed to testify to, as set out in the said fourth and fifth bills of exceptions. If the defendant should be able to satisfy the jury, that more than three years before this action was commenced, he had disclaimed to hold under the Voss title, and that Voss, or those claiming under him, had notice of such disclaimer, then the right to bring this form of action was barred. W. Va. Sup. Ct. App., Nov. 20, 1889. Voss v. King. Opinion by Snyder, P. J.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-PAYEE.-A promissory note, in the ordinary form, payable to the estate of a named person or order, has a sufficiently certain payee to constitute it a promissory note. The defendant contends that the instrument sued on is not a promis sory note, for want of a sufficiently definite payee, and he cites two decisions which sustain him in this contention. Lyon v. Marshall, 11 Barb. 241; Tittle v. Thomas, 30 Miss. 122. But we think this is too strict an application of the doctrine that the person to whom a note is payable must be clearly expressed. It is an equally general rule that it is sufficient if there is in fact a payee, who is so designated that he can be ascer tained. Story Prom. Notes, § 36. The illustrations of the manner in which this rule has been applied are numerous. Thus, written promises have been held to be valid notes or bills of exchange, though made payable to bearer (Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516); or to persons designated simply by their office, without naming them, e. g., the treasurer of the first parish in H., or his successor in said office (Buck v. Merrick, 8

Allen, 123); the trustees of a particular church (Noxon v. Smith, 127 Mass. 485; Holmes v. Jaques, L. R., 1 Q. B. 376); the manager of the Provincial Bank of England (Robertson v. Sheward, 1 Man. & G. 511); the treasurer-general of the royal treasury of Portugal (Soares v. Glyn, 8 Q. B. 24); the executors of the late W. B. (Hamilton v. Aston, 1 Car. & K. 679); the administrators of a particular estate (Moody v. Threl keld, 13 Ga. 55; Adams v. King, 16 Ill. 169); the trustees acting under the will of the late Mr. W. B. (Meg-| ginsou v. Harper, 2 Cromp. & M. 322); also to the heirs of a particular person, even though that person was living at the time (Bacon v. Fitch, 1 Root, 181; Lockwood v. Jesup, 9 Coun. 272; Cox v. Beltzhoover, 11 Mo. 142); to a business name adopted by the person in interest (Bryant v. Eastman, 7 Cush. 111; Brown v. Parker, 7 Allen, 337); and to the steamboat Juda and owners (Moore v. Anderson, 8 Ind. 18). So a bill which was indorsed to a person who was already deceased was held valid in the hands of his legal representatives. Murray v. East India Co., 5 Barn. & Ald. 204. More literally in point in the present case, and directly opposed to the two decisions relied on by the defendant are Peltier v. Babillion, 45 Mich. 384, where a written promise, payable to the order of J. V. Mebling's estate, was held to be a good note; and McKinney v. Harter, 7 Blackf. 385, which is substantially similar. See also Storm v. Stirling, 3 El. & Bl. 832; same case, nom. Cowie v. Stirling, 6 id. 333; Yates v. Nash, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 581, where a promise to the officer for the time being of a society was held too indefinite, though the general rule, as applied in other cases, was recognized. In the case before us, the promise was to pay to F. B. Bridgman's estate or order. He was dead, and administrators had been appointed. There could be no doubt that the promise was intended to be one of which the administrators could avail themselves. They were in existence, and were ascertainable. If the administrators of his estate had been made the payees, without naming them, there can be no shadow of question that it would have been sufficient. It savors of too much refinement to hold that the instrument was not a valid promissory note, for want of a sufficiently definite payee. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 27, 1889. Shaw v. Smith. Opinion by C. Allen, J.

SHIP AND SHIPPING-LIEN FOR SUPPLIES AT HOME PORT-MORTGAGE.-Supplies furnished a vessel in her home port under a State statute are to be paid in priority to a duly recorded mortgage. The question in this case is, does this lien given by the local law stand on an equal footing with the lion given by the general maritime law to material-men who furnish supplies and other necessaries to a ship in other than her home port, and therefore take precedence over the claim of the mortgagees? The general question here involved has never been directly before the Supreme Court of the United States for consideration. It has arisen however in nearly all of the circuits, and the decisions upon it have not been uniform. In this circuit the rule, as announced by the late Mr. Justice Woods in The John T. Moore and Baldwin v. The Bradish Johnson, 3 Woods, 61, 582, respectively, has been, that a mortgage on a vessel, duly recorded according to section 4192, Revised Statutes, is inferior to all strictly maritime liens, but is superior to any subsequent lien given by the State law for supplies furnished in the home port. Other cases holding the same doctrine are: The De Smet, 10 Fed. Rep. 483, in this circuit, and The Grace Greenwood, 2 Biss. 131, and The Kate Hinchman, 7 Biss, 239, in the seventh circuit. A leading case holding the reverse of this rule, namely, that liens given to material-men by the State statutes, for supplies furnished a vessel in her home port, are of equal rank with strictly maritime liens, and therefore

take precedence over mortgages of the vessel, is The Guiding Star, decided by the late Mr. Justice Matthews in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio. 18 Fed. Rep. 263. To the same effect, see The J. W. Tucker, 20 Fed. Rep. 129; The Arctic, 22 id. 126; The Amos D. Carver, 35 id. 665, in the second circuit; The Venture, 26 id. 285, in the third circuit; The Wyoming, 35 id. 548, and The Menominie, 36 id. 197, in the eighth circuit; Clyde v. Transportation Co., id. 501, in the fourth circuit; The General Burnside, 3 id. 228, and The Rapid Transit, 11 id. 322, in the sixth circuit. There would seem to be no reason, on principle, why the lien created by the local statute should not rank with the lien given by the general maritime law. They each have as a basis the furnishing of necessary supplies to the ship, upon the credit of the ship itself. In each instance the contract is maritime. The proceedings by which the lien, in each instance, is enforced are identical. And the same reason which makes the lien given by the general maritime law take precedence over ordinary mortgage debts, and other claims not maritime, is applicable in the case of liens given by the local law. The rule as to priority is not the same in courts of admiralty as iu courts of common law and equity. In the latter courts the rule of priority of liens is expressed by the maxim, qui prior est tempore, potior est jure. But in admiralty the reverse of this rule is more often true than otherwise. There the rule is that those things which in the highest degree contribute to the safety and preservation of the vessel-the thing which is the subject of all the liens-form the basis of the lien entitled to priority. It would seem therefore that this lien given by the local statute, based as it is upon the same sort of necessaries as constitute a lien under the maritime law (the contract for furnishing these supplies being maritime, and capable of enforcement by proceedings in rem only in the admiralty courts of the United States, under the same rules and proceedings as the general maritime lien), is itself in the nature of a maritime lien-at least, in a much greater degree than an ordinary vendor's mortgage debt; for a mortgage of this kind is not a maritime lien. The Lottawanna, supra; Bogart v. The John Jay, 17 How. 399. It is not a maritime contract; and the mortgagee cannot bring a libel in admiralty on the mortgage, and subject the vessel to the payment of his claim by process in rem. If he gets into admiralty at all, he must do so under the forty-third admiralty rule. The reason of the admiralty law, as regards priority of maritime liens, would seem therefore to be conclusive in favor of giving the material-men in this case priority over the mortgagees, as regards their respective claims; for the repairs, materials and other necessary supplies furnished the vessel in the port at New Orleans all contributed to the safety, the usefulness and the preservation of the vessel itself, and served to protect it so that it might be made available, not only for the satisfaction of the claims thus arising, but for all other valid claims, including the mortgage debt. These supplies having been furnished for the security and protection of the vessel, were for the benefit of the mortgagees as well as of the original owner. The mortgagees should not be placed on a higher plane than the original owner of the vessel; and it goes without saying that, as to the latter, the claims of the material-men are valid and binding, and the liens, of which they form the basis, capable of enforcement in admiralty by process in rem. Furthermore, section 4192 of the Revised Statutes is simply a registry statute. It does not give a maritime lien to the mortgagee; for the contract of mortgage, as we have shown, is not a maritime contract. The Guiding Star, supra; U. S. Circ. Ct., E. Dist. La., Dec. 23, 1889. The Madrid. 40 Fed. Rep. 677. Opinion by Lamar, J.; Pardee, J., coucurring.