jection to the will of God, not to acknowledge it.. He admits, that while "6 reason does not regard," as he says, "His command, as the foundation of the obligation to obey," it does, and ought to regard it "as infallible proof that that which He commands is wise and benevolent in itself, and commanded by Him for that reason;"' of course, in every possible instance. As a practical principle, therefore, our author's theory amounts to little or nothing of value. For he has himself to fall back upon the will of God, and to acknowledge its use, importance, and necessity, in actually determining obligation, where the reasonableness and fitness of circumstances cannot be known by us, and no other reason of obligation can be assigned than that it is the will of God. The mischievous bearing and tendency of his theory on many points of Christian doctrine and practice, we shall have occasion hereafter to notice and develop. At present we must enter our solemn and formal protest against it, as rash and dangerous, and tending to lose men's sense of obligation to God as the great moral governor of the world.

We deem it unnecessary, to follow our author, through his examination of different theories on the subject of the "foundation of moral obligation," in which self-interest, human happiness, utility, right, the moral excellence of God, moral order, the nature and relations of moral beings, and duty, have respectively an undue prominence given to them by their several advocates, as though the one idea met and solved all its phenomena. All things, then, have an influence, in making up our estimate of those obligations, which the law of God imposes, and may furnish motives to obedience. But nothing, whatever, so well meets all the circumstances of human nature, and its relations to, and dependence on God, as the plain common sense Bible view of the matter, which every child can understand, and which has heretofore been regarded orthodox; viz: that we are obliged to obey, because God commands. His will must be the standard by which to judge whether our actions are right or wrong. Wherever this is known by explicit precept or declaration, there can be no dispute, no doubt about our obligation in any case; it is a self-evident truth-that the will of a being infinitely wise, powerful and benevolent, must deserve our unqualified respect, and unhesitating obedience. Where, however, it is not thus known, and other criteria of virtue, which bring into view motives forming an essential part of moral excellence, there the mind is too apt to act upon them, as themselves the foundation of moral obligation. Happy is it for us, that we have the Gospel, the pure word of God, which will practically correct the errors of metaphysical theories on this subject. Yet it is of no slight importance what is the fundamental principle adopted. Some are more restricted, 'p. 70.

more pliant, more accommodating than others; and the morality of their advocates will thence take somewhat of its character. The theory will affect the practice.

It was the distinguishing trait of excellence in our Savior's moral character, that His leading and governing purpose, His habitual ultimate aim or end, was to do the will of God. "He came down from Heaven," said he, "not to do his own will but the will of Him that sent Him." John, 6: 38. "It was His meat to do the will of Him that sent Him." John, 4: 34; 5: 30. we resemble Him will it be our chief end also. Paul found his delight in doing the will of God. Rom. 7: 22. Just as we make it our chief aim or object, to please or glorify God by doing His will, we include every other criterion of virtue, or rule of duty that is reasonable and just. Both reason and conscience, and the supposed tendency of actions, may in certain cases, assist us in estimating, and furnish motives exciting to, moral obligation. But the will of God, in some way made known, is the last point to which we must come, if we would judge whether reason is correct or conscience ought to govern us.

The will or law of God affords the only universal and invariable criterion of duty. We are not possessed of sufficient knowledge and experience to judge, under all circumstances, of the tendency of actions, or of their utility, much less of what the good of the universe may demand, or even the public good. The very dictates of conscience often vary in extent, in power, and in correctness, through the influence of fashion, philosophy, igno rance, example, prejudice, education, selfish interest, and public opinion. But he who makes the good pleasure of God his ultimate aim, or takes His will or law to guide him into the knowledge of the best and proper means of accomplishing it, has a fixed principle, that will not bend to the reasonings of the philosopher, to the promptings of passion, to the authority of the Church, to the dogmatism of the schools, or to the despotism of public opinion. It is firm, steady, and immutable as is the will of God. It is exalting, expanding, and ennobling in its influence on the mind. It is, in an eminent degree, the safest guide; the rule which carries its own obligations; that which the Scriptures everywhere commend and enforce; and without which we shall assuredly err and fail in a thousand cases, with regard to our duty.

Our author has attempted to exalt the good of the universe including God, as our highest aim, and as inducing the ultimate obligation. But we see, in so doing, that which is of very dangerous tendency in morals. It resembles, too much, if it be not identical with, the mischievous element developed in Godwin's Political Justice, and tends in its practical results to similar dangerous applications which were made of it. However specious, at first sight, it may appear, to lay in it the foundation of moral obliga

tion, it cannot fail, we think, to counteract the moral improvement of man, by checking it at its origin. It is a process of logic that hardens the heart. It in effect founds universal benevolence on the ruin of limited charities. He that imposes on himself with this abstraction or mere ideality, and makes the sum and substance of moral obligation to consist in willing good to God and to the universe, cannot fail to injure, if not eventually destroy his sense of obligation, attaching to the near rela tions of social life. For, if the highest good of the universe be the ultimate aim to which moral law obligates us, of course it follows, that every individual exertion should be so directed, as to produce the greatest possible amount of good to our species. Hence it will follow, that should we have, in a given case, power to save only one life, or to promote the happiness of but one individual, we owe our exertions to the stranger whose usefulness is much greater, and of more consequence to society, than to our wife, child, parent or friend, as the case may be. Thus, not only are the claims of self wholly excluded by the general principle; but the promptings of nature, the very kindlings of the passions and affections which God has implanted in us for the better preservation and for the happiness of society, must be extinguished. The beautiful order prescribed by the law of God, which begins with the near relations and extends to those more remote, becomes inverted; and all the obligations growing out of near relations, and in general, of limited social ties, must be lost sight of, or merged in that of the public good. Beginning with the near relations, and seeking to please God by doing good to our fellow-men, as we are brought in contact with any of our species, piety and benevolence find opportunity for their offices, and extend indefinitely. But seeking the good of the universe, with this logical abstraction occupying the thoughts, the heart is fortified against the impressions and motives to action, appropriate to the relations of family, kindred, neighborhood and country, and obligated to resist the impulse of any and every generous emotion, till the intellect has well considered what is the greatest economy, and best upon the whole. The question, in all such cases, by which to estimate duty, according to this theory,, must not be, is he my father, child, relative, friend, neighbor or benefactor, but which is the most worthy or worthless member of society. What desolation may such a principle of moral obligation produce in the walks of social life! The public good becomes omnipotent-the Deity to be adored and obeyed. Not only when private interest interferes with the good of the universe must it be sacrificed; but the tenderest ties and all the obligations of near relationship must be rent asunder. The limited charities must give way, as being too selfish in their character, whenever the public good demands the sacrifice.

We admit that the conduct which the limited charities prescribe, must sometimes give way for that demanded by the general good. But who is to be the judge when they seem to conflict? Must we act in all cases regardless of their dictates? Certainly not. The law of God has settled that question, and left no room for us to judge in the case, by imposing obligations on us to respect the limited charities. General benevolence can never be developed but through the medium of the limited affections. Our author takes a fearful leap when he requires as the very foundation of moral obligation, as the element of virtue, that we will good to God and to the universe.

God's law requires us to love our neighbor as ourselves. Love to others flows from their fountain. As the child learns to distinguish objects around it, its parents, kindred, friends, acquaintances become the objects of the same sort of regard it cherishes for itself. As it forms the desire to do good to some, it learns to extend that desire to all. Such is the order of God's constitution. The confined charities form too important a part in the general system, to be on this account rejected as not being, on the whole, safe guides. The neglect of them, and of the obligations growing out of them, as must indubitably be the case, if we are to be determined in our estimate of moral obligation, by the greatest good of the universe would render human life a matter of mere calculation, and often of very erroneous calculation. The principle, if carried out, would utterly destroy society. The barbarities and butcheries of the French Revolution might all be justified upon this principle, as it certainly contributed no little to suggest and sanction them. Every attempt to make the highest good of the universe the paramount object of pursuit, conceding to human reason a right of judgment in the case, and its dictates supreme in the human breast, is to counteract the essential laws of our nature, and drive the ploughshare of ruin over all the bland, benignant charities of social life, and the obligations arising out of the more limited virtues. We should dread the diffusion and prevalence of such principles and philosophy, as we would the pestilential vapor or the scalding flood. And we think that some practical tendencies of this sort have, of late years, begun to manifest themselves precisely in the wake of this metaphysical morality. What means this ceaseless tendency to revolution in churches? This special hostility to the organization of those that are Presbyterian? This war proclaimed in certain quarters against all who oppose the views of our author, deemed by himself and others so essential to the greatest good? Whence this sundering of relations, and contempt of social obligations, and the avowed purpose to divide and scatter and destroy the churches which stand in the way of its progress? Whoso is wise may understand these things; and the prudent may observe them.

We think we descry the elements of revolution at work, and fear that the morality and theology of our author may be exerting, without his meaning it, a fearful and fatal influence toward the ultimate subversion, in many churches, of the great cardinal doctrines of the Gospel!

ARTICLE III.

ROMANISM AND BARBARISM.

BY REV. HENRY P. TAPPAN, D.D., New York.

Barbarism the First Danger; a Discourse for Home Missions. BY HORACE BUSHNELL, Pastor of the North Church, Hartford, Conn.

THE destiny of our country is a great problem, and one in which every Christian and philanthropist must be interested. The extent of territory, the rapidly increasing population, the extensive and important commercial relations, the vast accumulation of wealth, the political and religious institutions, form a power for good or evil, whose effects cannot be limited to this continent, if they do not extend to the whole human race. Those are poor philosophers, and, certainly not good Christians, who compute national destinies in the spirit of narrow, national competitions; and who cannot see that the well-being of each separate nation is connected with the well-being of all nations; that if France did not lie on the other side of the Channel, the entire history and condition of England would he changed, and that the extinction of America would deprive her of the noblest field for the spread of her race, her literature, her laws and her religion. If an ambitious Pleiad would blot out one of its sisters, the light and influence of the lost star will be withdrawn from the spheres of all the others, and the ambitious Pleiad will be no brighter, or more powerful, because there is a vacant spot in the heavens.

The destiny of our country! Why should we attempt to solve this problem?

Our aim is to see the point to which we are tending, that if the destiny a head, under the action of present elements, be not such