19° Martii, 1924.]

[Continued.

King's Bench Division" and began to be called "of the Central Office," because it would be more historical tradition in respect of the fact that they belong to the King's Bench than in respect of the fact that they belong to the, no doubt, more important and larger office appointed under the Act of 1879, but which had no historic tradition. (Sir Thomas Willes Chitty.) The King's Bench Masters are drawn from the Bar and the other two classes of Masters are drawn from Solicitors.

224. That is rather too wide a proposition of yours. You have forgotten my old friend, Master Johnson?-I was referring to what took place at the present day. I do not want to open an old controversy, but of course in those days no one had a word to say against Master Johnson, because he was an excellent Master from every point of view, but in those days the King's Bench Masters did taxation and for that purpose it was very useful, and I should have thought it was almost essential, to have a solicitor amongst them. Now they do not do any taxation.

225. I think it is a convenient thing to call them Masters of the Supreme Court King's Bench Division? It has always been found so.

Chairman.] I will withdraw my point. I will not press my point about it.

Sir Malcolm Macnaghten.

226. Would it be more convenient to call them simply Masters of the King's Bench Division, Masters of the Chancery Division and Taxing Masters? (Sir Claud Schuster) I would rather call them Masters of the Supreme Court King's Bench Division myself.

227. How would you describe the Taxing Masters ?-I think we do describe them as Masters of the Supreme Court Taxing Office.. They are so described in the Schedule to the Act of 1921. The category is "Master of the Supreme Court King's Bench Division, Master of the Supreme Court Chancery Division, Master of the Supreme Court Taxing Office, Master in Lunacy," and so on.

Chairman.

228. I think we had better adopt that. It is contained in one of the Statutes

now?-(Mr.

Graham-Harrison.) It is

always used in the Amendment Bill, the same terminology.

229. How far does Part V go?-To Clause 135.

230. You think you had better postpone that?-Yes.

231. I should like to make one point in regard to the last of these Clauses, 135. The point arises at an earlier stage also. It is with regard to that very odd enactment you have put in, "For the purposes of this part of this Act a judge of the Supreme Court shall not be deemed to be an Officer of the Supreme Court." If I recollect rightly that proviso is in the clause about notice of a vacancy?—Yes.

232. And I think it only applied to the question of notice of a vacancy. I do not think it should be put in as applying to the whole. Cannot we get rid of it in any way?-It occurred in the clause relating to notice of vacancies, but in terms the provision was not limited. It simply said "The word officer' in this Act shall not include the office of any judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature."

233. That was the old Act?-Yes, Section 21. It did not say "The word 'officer' in this Section."

234. But it was only for that. That was what was meant. It is in the Section, is it not? Yes.

235. There was a most absurd thing which happened just after that Act was passed. The Treasury took exception to the Lord Chief Justice having appointed a woman for cleaning the old robing rooms at Westminster, which had not yet been abolished. It was immediately after the passing of the Act of 1881. The Treasury took exception to Lord Chief Justice Coleridge having appointed a new female cleaner, and they said that no notice had been given under this Act, and Lord Coleridge maintained that a female cleaner in a robing room was not an officer of the Supreme Court. These words were not put in by way of covering her, but as stating the other extreme of the scale of people connected with the Supreme Court, that a judge was not to be regarded as an officer of the Supreme Court, and so you do not now have to give notice to the Treasury and the Lord Chancellor of a vacancy in a judgeship. Of course, if the word "Act" is used,

19° Martii, 1924.]

[Continued.

it does make it look as if in strict consolidation we ought to put it in here?— (Sir Claud Schuster.) But look at Section 15 of the Act of 1879 and look at Section 18 or Section 20. Section 15 says, "The salaries of the several officers of the Supreme Court shall be of such amounts as the Lord Chancellor," and so on. Section 18 says, "If any officer of the Supreme Court, being afflicted with any infirmity which disables him from the due execution of his office, refuses to resign or becomes incapable of resigning his office, it shall be lawful for the Lord Chancellor by Order to remove him from his office." Section 20 says, "An officer of the Supreme Court appointed after the commencement of this Act shall not be entitled to a pension under this Act unless he has been admitted to his office with a certificate from the Civil Service Commissioners." It is obvious that for all those purposes the judges are not officers of the Supreme Court.

236. To my mind it is absurd to suppose that anyone would think for a moment, whether reading that Act or anything else, that a judge was an officer of the Supreme Court?-I should wholly agree if it had not been that the draftsman of the Statute of 1881 seems to have supposed that such a contention could have been put forward, and enshrined his view in the Statute. (Mr. GrahamHarrison.) It looks as if it had been put in hurriedly as an amendment.

Chairman.

237. No, it was only with regard to a notice of a vacancy.-Would not it be better to transfer it from Clause 135 to Clause 117, which deals with vacancies, because that would raise the horrible presumption that in other Clauses an officer did include a judge?

238. That is exactly what I think. I think if you would do that, it would be all right. That is what I should prefer, that you should put it in Clause 117.(Sir Claud Schuster.) If you do that, will it not be said that in Clause 117 you have negatived the idea that a judge is an officer and why have not you negatived it in the other places where officers are referred to; and if you have not, is it not the presumption that they are officers for the purposes of those other clauses? That is what is troubling us. Of course,

the whole thing is ridiculous. Might I suggest that we leave the whole thing out altogether? Part V is headed, "Officers and Offices." Previous Parts of the Bill have dealt rather exhaustively with the position of judges, and the whole tenor of Part V makes it pretty clear that judges are not included in it.

Would it not be safe now to leave it out?

239. I think it would be entirely safe. I should like to move that we do leave it out. We shall make a note and we will call attention to the fact that we have left it out. Does the expression "officer of the Supreme Court " appear elsewhere than in Part V?-I do not want to be off-hand pinned to that proposition. I should not think it does.

240. You do not think it does?-Unless it is in the arbitration provision. (Sir Thomas Willes Chitty.) The arbitration provision does contain the expression "officer of the Court." (Sir Claud Schuster.) It is quite clear in the arbitration provision that he could not be a judge. If you look at the context you could not twist it.

Chairman.] I should like to move that we leave out Clause 135. We shall make a note of it, and show we have left it out, and state why in our Report. Does anybody object to that?

(Clause 135 is struck out.)

ON CLAUSE 136. Chairman.

241. We ran through the Part relating toFunds in Court" in the Autumn.-(Mr. Graham-Harrison.) Yes. It is in exactly the same form, subject to one exception, which I mention in the introductory note on page 32, that there is nothing in this Part corresponding to what was Clause 160 in last year's Bill. The reason for this is that Section 25 of the Act of 1872, which was reproduced in Clause 160, is not repealed by the present Bill. It is left outstanding, but it is going to be repealed by the Amendment Bill, and therefore the Committee need not bother about it at all.

242. Which Clause is it? It was Clause 160 in last year's Bill.

243. Is it Clause 142 now?-No, it does not appear at all now.

244. You have left it out? Yes.

245. It had to do with the Consolidated Fund for Slave Compensations?—Yes.

19° Martii, 1924.]

[Continued.

Lord Askwith.] Apparently we shall have to go through this again when the Amendment Bill is passed. The note says: "Clause 5 of the Amendment Bill will involve several amendments in Part VI. the principal one being the substitution throughout of the Accountant-General of the Supreme Court for the Paymaster-General.”

Chairman.

246. That is a very simple affair. What do you think, as a matter of convenience? It seems to me that the great majority of these clauses, except, perhaps, the substitution of Accountant-General for Paymaster-General, are simply transferred from the old Act.-(Mr. GrahamHarrison.) The case with regard to Part VI is quite different from the case with regard to Part V. The amendments to be made will be quite simply made with the substitution of Accountant-General for Paymaster-General.

247. We had better postpone it. There will be very little trouble when the time

comes.

(Clause 136 is postponed.)

Chairman.

248. Would you consider Clause 139 necessary? It says, "The Treasury shall cause the Paymaster-General to keep in or near the Royal Courts of Justice an office for the purpose of carrying on the business of the Paymaster-General." Is that necessary, especially on the change made to the Accountant-General? The pay office always has been in the Royal Courts of Justice and always will be. Is it necessary to have that clause, which was simply put in at the time of the opening of the Law Courts, when the thing is more or less under the Treasury, saying that nevertheless the AccountantGeneral shall be accommodated in the

Royal Courts of Justice? Do not you

alter that in the Amendment Bill about providing "such clerks and officers as are necessary for that purpose "?-Those words are repealed by the Amendment Bill as unnecessary.

249. I thought the whole clause might go out. I do not think it very much matters either way?-There is also the consideration in this connection that in the future, instead of having the Paymaster-General, you will have an

Accountant-General, who is an officer of the Supreme Court. I think it might safely be left out.

Chairman.] I think it might. Perhaps you will consider that and call our attention to it when we go through this part of the Bill eventually. Now will the Committee go to Clause 153.

ON CLAUSE 153. Chairman.

250. In this clause we get a large part of what was introduced by means of the second Bill last Session, and we never considered it in our Committee. I think that is pure consolidation and is simply transferred from the old Act, is it not?— (Mr. Graham-Harrison.) Yes.

(Clause 153 is passed.)
(Clause 154 is passed.)

ON CLAUSE 155. Chairman.

251. Is there anything on this Clause? -(Sir Claud Schuster.) It is very probable, as far as I can gather, that when the amending Bill is going through the House of Commons an amendment will be moved to take away the territorial limits of the District Probate Registries. I cannot tell whether such an amendment will be carried, and I cannot even tell what attitude the Government will take towards it, but such an amendment would be in accordance with the report on the District Probate Registries, which has been made to the Lord Chancellor and the President, and which both the Lord Chancellor and the President have said that they accept and propose to adopt. So that I think the Government might be in little difficulty in resisting such an amendment. We might have to return to some of these clauses, so far as they do impose a territorial limit. But perhaps it would be better to take them and amend afterwards, if such an amendment were moved and passed.

252. Yes, I think it would be a pity to postpone it. It is a point which the country solicitors attach a great deal of importance to, particularly in Liverpool.

Sir Malcolm Macnaghten.

253. People who die in Birkenhead have to go to Chester?-Yes.

19° Martii, 1924.]

[Continued..

254 Although their business is entirely in Liverpool?—Yes. Why should people who die at Birkenhead have to go to Chester when their business is wholly in Manchester? Personally I have every sympathy with what they say, but whether it is possible to carry such an amendment is another matter.

Chairman.

255. Has Mr. Inderwick anything to say on that subject? (Mr. Inderwick.) No.

256. Sir Claud has mentioned that there may possibly be some amendment noved on the Administration Bill which will do away with the territorial limit of the District Probate Registries. I am rather inclined to think that as no amendment of that sort yet appears on the Administration Bill, it will be on the whole better that we should run through these clauses?-(Sir Claud Schuster.) I was not suggesting otherwise, but I thought you ought to know what might possibly happen.

Chairman.] I propose that we through these clauses. There is little difference between them.

(Clauses 155 and 156 are passed.)

ON CLAUSE 157.

run very

Chairman.] It occurred to me again to raise the point which I mentioned before. but I think we settled not to accept what I had to say about it-whether you could not say formerly instead of referring to the practice of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury. But I think it was agreed that you must leave in the reference.

Lord Askwith.] The suggestion is that sub-section (2) should be left out because it is already in in Clause 32.

Chairman.] Is that on the Notes?

Lord Askwith.] Yes. You raised your point on Clause 32 on page 20 of the Bill. Chairman.] This at any rate may be left out, may it not, because we have Clause 32?

Lord Askwith.] Yes, you already.

have it

Chairman.] I think we may leave it out, and I should rather like to see it left out.

(Sub-section (2) is struck out.)

(Clause 157 is passed as amended.)

ON CLAUSE 158.

Chairman.

There is a question about those words, "By Probate Rules and Orders," but that is evidently right according to the way we have the rules defined now.

(Clause 158 is passed.)

ON CLAUSE 159. Chairman.

257. On this Clause you call attention to the change made about Belfast instead of Dublin, and I think the way you have drafted it in regard to "the office of the Commissary Clerk of Edinburgh" is also right?—(Mr. Graham-Harrison.) I think that is right. There is one point which I might raise. It is in my note. If you look at sub-section (1) of Clause 159, you will see it is "The President of the Probate Division" who attends to these matters. It is an administrative matter

and not a judicial matter. But when we come to sub-section (3) the matter is no longer left to the President, but it is "such other offices as the High Court shall from time to time direct." Surely that is a matter which should be in the discretion of the President.

258. I thought it ought to be the President. It would be very inconvenient for the High Court, I think. It is not at all a matter for the High Court. Do you think so, Sir Claud? (Sir Claud Schuster.) No, I think it is for the President. When the old Act was passed they said the court and they ought really to have said the judge. Will your Lordship move that amendment, to leave out 66 High Court and insert "President "? Chairman.] Yes.

(The amendment is agreed to.)
(Clause 159 is passed as amended.)

[Continued.

which may from time to time be made between the Commissioners of Inland Revenue and the Senior Probate Registrar."

Chairman.

259. Going through the Bill by myself I thought it was right. I thought it would be best to put in those words. Of course we shall have to call attention to the fact that we have introduced them?(Sir Claud Schuster.) But it will be the President, not the Senior Probate Registrar, will it not? There is a great deal to be said for making the Senior Probate Registrar the Administrative Officer, but if you make the President the Officer you must stick to him.

260. What do you say, Mr. Inderwick? -(Mr. Inderwick.) I agree.

261. "Subject to any arrangements which may from time to time be made between the Commissioners of Inland Revenue and the President." Shall we put in those words? I think there we ought to say "President of the Probate Division," and then just call him "President" in line 36? (Mr. GrahamHarrison.) Yes.

"the

Lord Askwith.] Will you not put President" before "the Commissioners of Inland Revenue "?

Chairman.

262. Yes. It will be: "Subject to any arrangements which may from time to time be made between the President of the Probate Division and the Commissioners of Inland Revenue "?-(Mr. Graham-Harrison.) I ought to say that I consulted the Commissioners of Inland Revenue and they quite agree.

Chairman.] I am very glad you mentioned that. We will slip that into our note, I think.

(Clause 160 is passed as amended.)

ON CLAUSE 161.

Chairman.] This is a very ancient Clause.

Lord Askwith.

263. You do not want 66 President" instead of " High Court" in this Clause? -(Mr. Graham-Harrison.) No, that is a judicial matter.

(Clause 161 is passed.)

ON CLAUSE 162.

Witness.] (Mr. Inderwick.) This Clause follows upon the Law of Property Act.

Chairman.

264. The Law of Property Act is not in operation ?—(Mr. Graham-Harrison.) It is not. It is not proposed that this Bill should come into operation before the date at which the Law of Property Act would now, if nothing were done, come into operation.

265. That is 1925?-Yes.

266. Is it not proposed in the Bills that are being prepared to postpone it? will require an Act of Parliament by itself, will it not?-(Sir Claud Schuster.) It will. It looks as if we must have such an Act.

267. What is the effect of this Clause? -(Mr. Graham-Harrison.) I do not think there is any. I think that the Act which your Lordship contemplates, postponing the operation of the 1922 Act, will probably fix the same date as we have fixed for the commencement of this Act, so it is all right. (Mr. Inderwick.) But if that does not in effect come to pass this will be a new departure.

Chairman.] We had better leave this clause as it is, had we not? "Trust Corporation is defined somewhere. Is it in the general definition clause?

Lord Askwith. No, it is in clause 177 on page 89.

(Clause 162 is passed.)

ON CLAUSE 163.

Lord Askwith.

268. The words at the end of sub-section (3)" and he shall be entitled to be kept indemnified by the Corporation in regard to matters so authorised as aforesaid" are not wanted. What is the effect of your note on Clause 163, Mr. GrahamHarrison? (Mr. Graham-Harrison.) The first point is a small one. I rather dislike having words which are unnecessary in Statutes, and the last two lines on page 81 are, I think, really unnecessary. It simply states a well established general principle of law, that an agent is entitled to be kept indemnified.

Sir Malcolm Macnaghten.

269. I should have thought they might be left out?-I am certain that if the