true in all its extent, it furnishes no apology whatever for the theory of vibrations. If the science of mind admit of any illustration from the aid of hypotheses, it must be from such hypotheses alone as are consonant to the analogy of its own phænomena. To assume as a fact the existence of analogies between these phænomena and those of matter, is to sanction that very prejudice which it is the great object of the inductive science of mind to eradicate.' (P. 448.)

It is certainly true that this view of the nature of hypothetical reasoning incidentally occurs in Hartley's account of the doctrine of vibrations; a portion of his treatise beyond comparison the least important, but with which alone, from his almost exclusive reference to it, we might imagine that Mr. Stewart was familiarly acquainted:- but, in the more detailed account of his opinions on this subject, contained in a succeeding chapter, we do not find the most distant allusion to the theory of vibrations; except in one or two instances in which it appears in a slight degree to have affected the phraseology of the author; - certainly, no express application of the principle to vindicate that theory. We do not, consequently, perceive any foundation for Mr. Stewart's assertion in this passage, that Dr. H.'s object in advancing this logical principle was to vindicate the hypothesis of vibrations: but, granting that this had been Dr. Hartley's express object, where is the impropriety or inconsistency of applying it to such a purpose? Have we any independent evidence for the maxim here laid down by Mr. Stewart, that no hypotheses can serve to illustrate the science of mind except such as are consonant to the analogy of its own phænomena?" (a phrase to which we do not profess to attach any very distinct ideas.) If not, it seems nothing more than a mere arbitrary assumption, exactly on a level with its opposite; and the establishment or refutation of either may equally lead to the enlargement of our knowlege. -We have another and more decisive objection to the account here given of Hartley's application of his principle; viz. that it proceeds on an entire misconception of the real nature of the hypothesis of vibrations. Let Mr. Stewart, or any one else, point out the passage in which Hartley professes to explain the nature of mind by the theory of vibrations. The application which he makes of it is entirely different, and perfectly consistent with the views which both he and Mr. Stewart have recommended. Whe ther any analogy prevail between the phænomena of matter and mind, or not, it must surely be admitted that they are united, that they are so organized as to affect each other; and that this union and mutual influence must be regulated by

certain general laws. Now it is precisely for the purpose of investigating these laws, (which Mr. Stewart himself admits to be a perfectly legitimate object of philosophical inquiry, see vol. i. p. 11.) that the theory of vibrations is brought forwards. Whether the object be or be not attained is an entirely different question; we are only vindicating the reasonableness of the object itself.

This article has already extended to such a length, that we have no longer room to notice, as minutely as some of them deserve, the discussions contained in the succeeding sections. of this chapter. The conclusion, however, of the speculation concerning final causes, in which the author takes the opportunity to inveigh with unusual warmth against what is commonly called the system of utility in ethics, appears to us to call for a more particular examination. He sets out with denominating it a theory which resolves the obligation of all the different virtues into a sense of their utility. Now we must take the liberty of protesting most decidedly against this representation of the doctrine in question. We know of no such theory. That of Paley, which is here more particularly meant, is widely different; resolving obligation into utility, not a sense of utility; which expressions, however similar, and however (as it appears) easily confounded, do really mean very different things. Having assumed this false statement, Mr. Stewart then presents us with several pages of very elaborate declamation on the evils which must follow, if the conduct of such a fallible and short-sighted creature as 'man were left to be regulated by no other principle than the private opinion of each individual, concerning the expediency of his own actions; and he concludes with this impressive passage:

'One very obvious consideration seems to have entirely escaped the notice of many late enquirers ; that in ethical researches, not less than in those which relate to the material universe, the business of the philosopher is limited to the analytical investigation of general laws from the observed phænomena; and that if, in any instance, his conclusions should be found inconsistent with acknowledged facts, the former must necessarily be corrected or modified by the latter. On such occasions the ultimate appeal must be always made to the moral sentiments and emotions of the human race. The representations for example which we read with so much delight, in those poets, of whatever age and country, who have most successfully touched the human heart; of the heroical sacrifices made to gratitude, to parental duty, to filial piety, to conjugal affection;are not amenable to the authority of any ethical theory, but are the most authentic records of the phanomena, which it is the object of such theories to generalize. REV. AUG. 1818.

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The sentiment of Publius Syrus, Omne dixeris maledictum quum ingratum hominem dixeris, speaks a language which accords with every feeling of an unperverted mind; it speaks the language of nature, which it is the province of the moralist not to criticize but to listen to with reverence. By employing our reason to interpret and to obey this, and the other moral suggestions of the heart; we may trust with confidence that we take the most effectual means in our power to augment the sum of human happiness; but the discovery of this connection between virtue and utility is the slow result of extensive and philosophical combinations; and it would soon cease to have a foundation in truth, if men were to substitute their own conceptions of expediency, instead of those rules of actions which are inspired by the wisdom of God.' (P. 509.)

What a pity it is that so much eloquence should be so completely thrown away, in consequence of a mistake in the nature of the object to which it is intended to apply! We are persuaded that all who understand the subject will readily perceive that the whole of this argument proceeds (if we may be allowed the use of an expression derived from technical logic) on a most complete ignoratio elenchi. Mr. Stewart has overlooked a very obvious and important distinction, on which the supporters of this system lay the greatest stress, between the foundation and the criterion or standard of moral obligation. Utility, or the tendency of an action or disposition to promote happiness, is maintained as constituting the foundation, but it is not maintained as the universal criterion by which we are to judge in all cases whether an action be right or wrong. Because we regard the tendency of virtue to promote our own happiness, or the welfare of the world at large, as the reason why a conformity to it is desirable and obligatory on us, it by no means follows that it is solely or chiefly in consequence of, or in proportion to, the beneficial tendency of certain actions as they present themselves to our understandings, that we regard them as virtuous. This would -be the extreme of arrogance and presumption. It would be to suppose ourselves omniscient and infallible; and it is indeed so palpably and glaringly absurd, that we are disposed to wonder that Mr. Stewart should not have paused before he ascribed it to the eminent philosophers who are the immediate objects of this attack. If from general reasoning, from our confidence in express declarations, from our experience of the great preponderance of the happiness which we actually enjoy over the sufferings to which we are occasionally exposed, or from any other considerations, we are fully convinced of the infinite goodness and wisdom of God, it is evident that we cannot avoid the conclusion that obedience to his will, by whatever

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whatever means ascertained, must be the surest mode of acquiring those objects which constitute the importance and obligation of virtue. In other words, we cannot but regard utility or expediency as the foundation, and the will of God as the standard or criterion, of virtue.

Lest we should be misunderstood, however, we must observe that, when we admit that Mr. Stewart has triumphantly refuted the doctrine which he ascribes to his opponents, we would by no means be supposed to imply that this refutation extends so far as he and other adversaries of the system of utility would have us believe, even when taken in reference to this principle considered merely as the criterion of morals. We may grant that the human faculties are limited and imperfect, or that our means of information and our powers of reasoning on this information are by no means sufficient to enable us to follow all our actions to their remotest consequences, without allowing that this method of determining the propriety of different modes of conduct is in no instance admissible. The constant resort to it, by all classes of practical moralists and divines, (when, for instance, having shewn the excellence and obligation of brotherly love from the divine word, and from such other sources as they may conceive it necessary to consult for this purpose, they proceed to enforce it on their readers or hearers from its utility or importance, from its tendency to promote the general happiness, our own happiness, or the improvement of the best and noblest part of our nature,) shews at least that mankind are capable of following these consequences to a certain extent; and that it is from such sources that their notions of obligation are in a great measure derived. Surely, cases occur in which the relations that we bear to others are so far simplified, and in which the consequences of certain modes of conduct are so obvious and glaring, as to force conviction on every reflecting mind. To deny, for example, that we may safely appeal to this as our rule in determining that an adherence to truth is important to the well-being of society, and that an habitual disregard of it is in the highest degree pernicious, would be to introduce a scepticism of the most alarming kind; -a scepticism in our opinion infinitely more dangerous to the interests of virtue, even than the flagrant misconception of the principle of utility supposed by Mr. Stewart to be recommended as a practical rule of conduct by the most eminent moral philosophers of modern times.

Now that we are speaking of dangerous consequences, how shall we find words adequate to express our strong feeling of the pernicious tendency of the doctrine so forcibly maintained in the passage last quoted?—a doctrine which calls on

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us to supersede the authority of reason, and to enthrone imagination in her stead; which rejects the dictates of calm and sober investigation, in order to deliver us up to the guidance of blind sentiment and passion; which authorizes and indeed requires us to listen with reverence to the first crude suggestions and hasty impulses of the most untutored understanding, as rules of action inspired by the wisdom of God! An action is to be regarded as right orw rong, not because it is good or evil, but because it gratifies or offends a vague, mechanical, irrational sentiment! The patient investigations of philosophers respecting the probable consequences of human actions are to be received with distrust; while the sudden ebullitions and summary decrees of popular feeling, or the representations of poets, whose business it is not so much to enlighten the understanding as to excite the imagination and rouse the passions, are to be listened to with reverence!'

We have to solicit indulgence, if in any thing we seem to have infringed on that respect which is certainly due to a writer who occupies so high and well-merited a place in the public estimation: but we have been actuated by no feeling except a sincere regard for what we consider as important truth, and a strong conviction of the dangerous tendency of some of the doctrines against which we have been arguing. Still we cannot and ought not to conclude without expressing our high sense of the service which Mr. Stewart has rendered to the student in this elevated branch of science, by the original and impressive views which he has communicated on many subjects, and the interest which he has diffused over all by that elegance and variety of illustration of which his work is so eminent an example. May he long continue to enlighten the world by his writings, and to exert a powerful influence in inspiring the youthful mind with a taste for these momentous and ennobling studies !

ART. V. Iceland; or the Journal of a Residence in that Island, during the Years 1814 and 1815. Containing Observations on the Natural Phenomena, History, Literature, and Antiquities of the Island; and the Religion, Character, Manners, and Customs of its Inhabitants. With an Introduction and Appendix. By Ebenezer Henderson, Doctor in Philosophy, Member of the Royal Society of Gottenburgh, Honorary Member of the Literary Society of Fuhnen, and Corresponding Member of the Scandinavian Literary Society at Copenhagen. Illustrated with a Map and Engravings. 2 Vols. 8vo. About 420 pages in each. 11. 8s. Boards. Hamilton, &c. 1818.

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o such of our readers as may be startled at the intimation. of a new work on Iceland, it might suffice to remark that the Letters of Von Troil, and the interesting accounts of Six

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