an effectual test; a test which will enable us to detect logical inaccuracies, whether in our own reasonings, or in those of others. Now we contend that, if this were the sole benefit which logic conferred, it would be well worth the very moderate pains and industry necessary to secure such a knowledge of it as should be practically useful. And, by the bye, we must observe, that even in Dr. Whately's book, much, in our estimation, might have been dispensed with. The old technical system, in all its completeness, was far too cumbersome and artificial, and justified the objection that, to learn it thoroughly, would cost more time and trouble than would be repaid by any occasional benefits the knowledge would confer. Not so with a knowledge of the general structure of the syllogism; of the only valid forms of it; and of the most usual species of fallacy.

If this, then, were the only benefit as it is the only direct benefit which logic secures, we think it would be well worthy of some attention. But it is not the only one. Though it is not the proper office of any science effectually to guard us against the ambiguity or indeterminate meaning of every term, logic is indirectly, even in this respect, of considerable use; and that not merely by habituating the mind to pay particular attention to the meaning of terms, whether the fallacy be in the premises or in illogical inference from them, but still more by disclosing the source of the fallacy, which can hardly fail to appear upon the very attempt to throw the argument into the form of syllogism. Whatever the nature of the fallacy, whether it be purely in the premises or in the reasoning, it almost always arises from the abridged forms in which, in ordinary discourse and writing, we express our reasonings. Commonly one of the premises is suppressed; or the order of conclusion and premiss is frequently inverted; in that case a totally different set of particles being employed to mark the connexion. Often one of the propositions of an argument shall itself be a long conditional proposition, involving in itself an abridged syllogism, and requiring distinct analysis. The involution becomes still greater in the more complex forms of dilemma, and in that form of argument called Sorites.' The disguises of fallacy are still further increased by the mere varieties of grammatical construction, into which the different propositions may be thrown. Sometimes the conclusion, or the premiss, may be expressed in a bold apostrophe or a startling interrogatory, prefaced with, 'Who can deny it?' Lastly, the premises and the conclusion are very generally separated, the interval being filled up by one or more parenthetical sentences or clauses, all tending, however, to give the fallacy an additional chance of concealment. Now it is, in such cases, that the test which logic supplies becomes principally of value; and indeed, fallacies when thus tested, become so transparent, that the

illustrations introduced into logical books, (which, by the bye, have generally been exceedingly ill-selected,) have often raised a laugh at logic as the art of discovering what every body already knows. But as fallacies meet us in books, they assume a much more formidable appearance; and the principal use of the syllogism as a test, is to enable us to detect them, and to throw them into that very form in which they are laughed at as arguments so plainly illogical, that nobody could possibly be deceived by them. Nor is it uncommon to see a somewhat muddle-headed man-who would certainly be one of the first to admit an artfully disguised fallacy-contemptuously proclaiming, when once expressed in full, the absurdity of supposing that any body could be deluded by it. Such conduct reminds one of Hogarth's picture of Columbus breaking the egg.

As Whately well observes, the chief danger of fallacy lies in the abridged form in which ordinary reasoning is necessarily carried on. Mr. De Morgan has also afforded some good illustrations of this point in his 'First Notions of Logic preparatory to the Study of Geometry.' It is in such propositions,' says he, 'that the greatest danger of error lies. It is also in such proposi'tions that men convey opinions which they would not willingly express. Thus, the honest witness who said, 'I always thought 'him a respectable man-he kept his gig !'-would probably not ' have admitted, in direct terms, Every man who keeps a gig must 'be respectable.

'I shall now give a few detached illustrations of what precedes. His imbecility of character might have been inferred from his "proneness to favorites; for all weak princes have this failing.'' The preceding would stand very well in history, and many would 'pass it over as containing very good inference. Written, how"ever, in the form of a syllogism, it is, 'All weak princes are prone 'to favorites-he was prone to favorites; therefore, he was a weak 'prince,' which is palpably wrong. The writer of such a sentence 'as the preceding might have meant to say, 'For all who have this 'failing are weak princes;' in which case he would have inferred 'rightly. Every one should be aware that there is much false in'ference arising out of badness of style, which is just as injurious to the habits of the untrained reader, as if the errors were mis'takes of logic in the mind of the writer.'

Mr. Douglas triumphantly adduces the admissions of Whately; that Logic does not 'obviate difficulties in the use of language;' that it is not an engine for the investigation of nature;' that it does 'not furnish a peculiar method of reasoning, &c.'- all which constituted the fallacious arguments of Campbell, Reid, and Stuart; and the supposition that they should have any weight affords, in fact, a good instance of our liability to be deceived by abridged forms of reasoning, and of the value of the syllogistic test.

For

when such arguments as the above are examined, it is found that their conclusiveness rests on a suppressed premiss, which we are inclined to think few would be disposed to admit. That no science 'or art is useful but such as is a means of investigating nature;' that no science or art is useful but what obviates the ambiguities ' and equivocations of language;' that no science or art is useful 'but what furnishes us with a peculiar method of reasoning,' are propositions which, though essential to the soundness of the above arguments against logic, are propositions which would not find favor in Mr. Douglas's eyes, nor in those of any one else. Logic may be useful or not, but if useless, it is not to be proved so by showing that it does not do what lies out of its province; what it never pretends to do; what belongs to other arts and sciences, or, perhaps, to no art or science whatever; but by distinctly showing that it does not tend to effect the specific object which it professes to effect, or that that object is a useless one. If, indeed, we were instituting a comparison between the utility of logic and that of some other art or science, such arguments as the above might find place, but not otherwise. The logic of Aristotle, even if it had been never abused, could never do for the world what the inductive philosophy of Bacon has done. But it by no means follows from this that it is useless. A spade is not so useful as a plough, but it is impossible, so far as the spade is useful, that the plough should supply its place.

As to the section on Freedom and the Will,' though we believe we fully agree with the sentiments of Mr. Douglas, we think it is far too brief and trenchant for so important a subject; that standing on the vantage ground, which a very prolonged discussion of the subject by so many master minds has given us, he has not done sufficient justice to previous writers; that, admitting with him, as we fully do, that much needless obscurity has arisen from the terms necessary, necessity,' &c., and that the words 'certain and certainty' would have been far better, we cannot see that the substitution of these latter terms would have made the matter so very plain and simple as he apprehends; and that if these terms were uniformly substituted, this great question would still involve a mystery which will for a long time, and perhaps for ever, (at least in this world) overshadow and perplex it. We must beg leave to explain ourselves; and we will endeavor to do it in as few sentences as possible.

We quite agree with Mr. Douglas that the very question as to the freedom of the will, is an improper one; since freedom properly belongs to action. Freedom can only mean, properly, a power of acting or not acting according to the decisions of the will; and as our author properly remarks, 'the question of the 'freedom of the will can only be interpreted, whether the will wills 'as it wills.' He also quotes with deserved approbation the words

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of Locke, who calls it 'that long agitated, and, I think, unreason'able, because unintelligible question, whether man's will be free 6 or no; for, if I mistake not, it follows from what I have said, that the question itself is altogether improper; and it is as insig'nificant to ask whether man's will be free, as to ask whether his 'sleep be swift, or his virtue square; liberty being as little ap'plicable to the will, as swiftness of motion is to sleep, or square'ness to virtue.' He also quotes with approval Jonathan Edwards's well-known sentiment that, 'to talk of liberty, or the contrary, as 'belonging to the very will itself, is not to speak good sense." It is plain also, from what follows, that our author substantially agrees with the writers who take Edwards's side of the question, only blaming them for an abuse of terms. He strenuously affirms, that the mind is not exempted from the 'law of causation;' that, therefore, the same certainty, though not the same necessity,' attends the phenomena of mind, as those of matter. He also, though briefly yet satisfactorily, shows by Edwards's arguments, that the liberty for which the opponents of this doctrine contend, is a chimera and absurdity. Still he says, 'as is usual in disputes, both parties are in the wrong;' though it must be confessed, that his censure falls far less heavily on the advocates of moral necessity than on the claimants of an impossible and irrational liberty. He merely blames the one party for abusing terms, and pleads for the substitution of others as 'certainty' for 'necessity,' and so on. This proposition, however, is no novelty; nor if it were, do we think the expedient would make so material a difference in the controversy as to justify him in charging the great advocates of this side of the question with serious errors. For, first; many other writers have expressed a wish that such substitution could have been effected; secondly, some of the very writers he blames have used the terms necessity' and 'necessary,' &c. expressly because these terms have entered so largely into the controversy, that it is almost impossible to avoid them. Thirdly; the best of these writers have so explained the sense and guarded the meaning which they attached to these words, that no candid and intelligent person can possibly misunderstand them; and fourthly; it is more easy to recommend the disuse of such terms than to abide by it; since nothing is more common, even in popular language, than the transfer to mind of terms which, in strictness, are applicable only to the phenomena of matter, to mark the certainty of the connexion between cause and effect. Thus we say of one man, whose moral habits are fixed and inveterate, that he cannot be generous; and of another, that he cannot keep from drink. The great thing is, undoubtedly, to fence and guard the terms from misconstruction. However desirable, therefore, the proposed substitution may be, and we admit its desirableness, it is not necessary for a full appreciation of the merits of the controversy.

We think the substitution very desirable in order to ouviate the prejudices of the captious or the dull-sighted; but we cannot admit that the great writers on this subject have been, as from Mr. Douglas's language we should almost suppose them to have beer, groping in the dark for want of this wonder-working change. What is chiefly objectionable,' says Mr. Douglas, 'in Edwards's Treatise, is the improper use of terms; alter a few words, and 'the whole will appear so simple and reasonable that, at least nine"tenths of the work might be dispensed with.' This appears to us a very extravagant assertion. Mr. Douglas should have recollected that, half of Edwards's Treatise is taken up in the disproof of the theories of various classes of his opponents; and, though it is very easy now-a-days for Mr. Douglas to throw deserved ridicule on that impossible liberty for which such opponents contended, it was strenuously maintained by many writers previous to the appearance of Edwards's Treatise. Nor even as to the rest of that Treatise, can we flatter ourselves that the time is yet come when the simple substitution for which Mr. Douglas contends, would make it so palatable to the generality of readers, as to render nine-tenths of it superfluous.

For ourselves, we are astonished, we confess, that Mr. Douglas should appear to suppose that this exchange of terms, however desirable on the grounds above stated, would be so miraculously efficacious; or that he should seem to speak as if there would then be no great mystery any longer connected with the question. It is true that we feel even while we admit the doctrine of the certainty of volition, that we are still responsible for our actions, and this we should feel even if we retained the word necessity; we feel that so long as we are under no external restraint, that is, so long as we do what we do willingly, we have freedom of action; that if in addition to this freedom from external restraint with regard to an action, we have the knowledge of duty, that is, that we ought to act in such and such a way; we cannot divest ourselves of the idea of responsibility. Wherever, therefore, these separate elements concur,-a knowledge of how we ought to act, and an entire freedom from external coercion or restraint,-they immediately suggest the idea of responsibility, though it may still be ever so true that volition will certainly be as is the conjoint influence of the understanding, of the passions, and of external circumstances. But though we may thus enumerate the conditions of responsi bility, though we cannot conceive that any more should be necessary to constitute it, and though we cannot but feel that where they concur in the same being, that being is responsible; this is a very different thing from demonstrating how it is that these conditions harmonize with the great fact that volition will certainly follow the law of causation! We feel that there must be some mode of harmonizing them, but we cannot demonstrate

VOL. VI.

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