 | Peter A. French, Theodore Edward Uehling, Howard K. Wettstein - 1979 - 430 Seiten
...thing you are seeing identity too." Then are two things the same when they are what one thing is? And how am I to apply what the one thing shows me to the case of two things?4 Wittgenstein was by no means the first to feel the tension between the two applications of... | |
 | Jonathan Z. Smith - 1982 - 181 Seiten
...solved by theories and reasons, of which we have had too little. So we are left with the question, "How am I to apply what the one thing shows me to the case of two things?" The possibility of the study of religion depends on its answer. 3 Sacred Persistence: Toward... | |
 | Rudolf Haller - 1986 - 776 Seiten
...thing you are seeing identity too". Then are two things the same when they are what one thing is? And how am I to apply what the one thing shows me to the case of two things? 216. "A thing is identical with itself. — There is no finer example of a useless proposition,... | |
 | Gaṇeśvara Miśra - 1990 - 120 Seiten
...thing you are seeing identity too." Then are two things the same when they are what one thing is? And how am I to apply what the one thing shows me to the case of two things?" (Investigations, Section 215) So, law of identity cannot be understood either with the help... | |
 | Barbara A. Holdrege - 1996 - 784 Seiten
...comparisons or the reasons for its practice. ... So we are left with the question [posed by Wittgenstein], "How am I to apply what the one thing shows me to the case of two things?" The possibility of the study of religion depends on its answer.62 Among the various modes... | |
 | Peter A. Morton - 1996 - 522 Seiten
...destroys this notion with one blow: "Then are two things the same when they are what one thing is? And how am I to apply what the one thing shows me to the case of two things?" (215). The point to he made here is that when one has given oneself the private rule 'I will... | |
 | Sam D. Gill - 1998 - 294 Seiten
...somehow address even if temporarily, the issue of comparison itself, which as Smith described it is this: "How am I to apply what the one thing shows me to the case of two things?" 79 Or as Jacques Derrida wrote in his characteristic style: "We must first try to conceive... | |
 | Kimberley C. Patton, Benjamin C. Ray - 2000 - 260 Seiten
...solved by theories and reasons, of which we have had too little. So we are left with the question, "How am I to apply what the one thing shows me to the case of two things?" The possibility of the study of religion depends on its answer. Notes This essay originally... | |
 | Rowan Williams - 2002 - 372 Seiten
...us to say anything about the unity between them. ' Comparison is, at base, never identity ' ; so, ' How am I to apply what the one thing shows me to the case of other things?' (p. 36). If we are not permitted to speak of 'essences', how shall we define a religion... | |
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We seem to have an infallible paradigm of identity in the identity of a thing with itself. I feel like saying: "Here at any rate there can't be a variety of interpretations. If you are seeing a thing you are seeing identity too". 