keep legislation within proper limits, and defeat the schemes of unscrupulous lobbyists and wirepullers to fleece the public. Whilst protecting themselves, they protect others.

They are, also, a bond of union between the different states and sections of this confederacy. The more extended their operations, the greater their influence, the stronger that bond becomes. It is the interest of the roads, it is the interest of all those who hold their securities, to do what they can to avert civil strife, and discountenance whatever would even remotely threaten the integrity of the Union. Slavery had much less to do in bringing about the late civil war than the sectional interests of the South, and its desire to build up a great southern empire. The rapid changes in the avenues of trade and commerce, taking place in our day, may put a like temptation in the way of other parts of this country sooner than we think for. Professional patriots and politicians are not to be relied on in such a crisis. Men who systematically rob their country, will, it is to be feared, not hesitate to divide it when it becomes worth their while to do so. So, in such a contingency, our chief hope would be in our great corporations, and, especially, in our railroads. Had Northern roads and Northern capital had, relatively, as much influence in the South before the war as they have now, or are destined to have in the near future, the rebellion might not have occurred. But, be this as it may, it is certain that great railroad companies, extending their lines, as ours are soon destined to do, from ocean to ocean, and from Canada to the Gulf, are, in themselves, the best guarantee we can have of national unity in the future. They will prevent secession, which, were it to occur, could be remedied only at the cost of much blood and treasure.

Whilst providing, then, as far as possible, against abuses, on the part of corporations, they should be dealt with in a friendly, not a hostile spirit. Laws intended to affect them should be framed with the greatest care, and by lawyers of acknowledged ability and integrity. "Tidal-wave legislation," in their affairs, might be productive of very serious consequences before it could be repealed. In trying to remove the evils of "monopolies," we should not have recourse to remedies that would be worse than the disease. The danger to be apprehended, just now, is, it seems to us, not the growing strength of private corporations, but the undue interference of the state in their affairs. The effects of this interference on municipal affairs, where it is less reprehensible than in the case of private corporations, and the motives that inspire it, may be gathered from the following paragraph from the Philadelphia Ledger of a recent date:

"State commissions appointed to do municipal work, are always at variance with sound principles of local government or home

rule; but the Delaware legislature, by appointing a water commissioner to take charge of the water supply of Wilmington, hitherto under the control of the city government, has made this abuse of power so clear, that it may serve for future illustration of more obscure cases. The sole motive of the change appears to have been partisan; there is no allegation of local mismanagement, but the majority of the city council differs in political faith from the majority of the legislature, and by creating the commission, power and patronage are transferred from one party to the other. Even the partisan advocates of a commission ought to be able to see, however, that it is unjust to take from the people of Wilmington the control of the water works, which they alone use and pay for, and to give that control to the agents of members of the State legislature from all parts of Delaware. Philadelphia has suffered grave injuries from just such abuses of legislative power. Not even in Ireland is there more reason for the existence of a party of 'Home Rulers' than there is, in many instances, in American cities."

But it is not alone the capitalist, technically so called, that is anathematized by the apostles of Socialism; the manufacturer, and all who profit by the labor of others, fare no better at their hands. According to Lassalle, Marx, and Proudhon, all that remains to the manufacturer, after having paid the cost of production, or, in other words, his net profit, belongs not to him but to his workmen. The reason of this is, they say, and as the Socialist Society of German Workmen stated in their address, in 1875, that "labor is the source of all wealth, and of all culture," and that, as the difference of value between the raw material and the manufactured article has been caused by labor, to the laborer it belongs, after the necessary expenses of production have been deducted from it.

This is truly a startling claim, but, happily, it is as absurd as it is startling. Labor is, indeed, a source of wealth. and culture, but it is not the only one. There are many others, needless to mention here. In the cases under consideration there are, ordinarily, three sources or efficient causes of the profit realized,—capital, directing skill, and labor. With us the manufacturer generally represents the first two. He provides the means necessary to build the mill or factory, to furnish it with the necessary machinery, to purchase the raw material, and pay the hands. The workman converts the raw material into the manufactured article that is to be put upon the market. These three causes are indispensable factors of this sort of production, but all are not equally important. Common labor is easily procured, and what is common and easy to procure is, in the nature of things, cheap. Skilled labor, because more rare, commands a higher price. But rarer than skilled labor is.

the intelligence that enables a man to provide the money and material necessary to run a mill, or a large workshop, to superintend its various departments, and find a market for its products. Such a man does not work with his hands, but his brain works, how ceaselessly you may tell by his haggard looks, and the anxious days and the sleepless nights he is doomed to pass. He is the guiding spirit of the establishment over which he presides. It is he who gives unity and direction to its different departments. The workmen are intelligent instruments in his hands, by which he forms the fabrics on which they are engaged. Surely, then, he has a right to an important share in the profits of the work to which he contributes so much.

Capital is harder to command than either labor or superintendence. It is, in itself, fruitful of good to its possessor. It gives him a right to the domestic and social enjoyment it procures for him. Should it cease to benefit him when, instead of spending it on himself, he invests it in business? Capital is not treasure-trove. It is presumed to be, and usually is, accumulated savings. It represents the labor, the privations, the thrift of years on the part of the manufacturer. Why should the fruit of so much toil, of so many privations be enjoyed by others without paying for it? The thing is preposterous. The manufacturer, then, representing two of the three causes of production above mentioned, that is, the money and the brains of the establishment, has a right not only to a share in the profits, but to a share proportionate to the influence he had in realizing them. The effect belongs to the cause or causes that produced it. What remains belongs, for the same reason, to the workmen.

This being the principle that underlies the matter, to know precisely how much of the profit should go to the manufacturer we have only to determine what should be considered a just compensation to the laborer. Can this be done? It can; though at times not without considerable difficulty. One reason of the difficulty is, that the value of labor is not absolute, but to a great extent relative. It is affected by a variety of circumstances; by the kind and quality of the labor, by the amount performed within a given time, by the law of supply and demand, by the cost of living. Brumidi, who frescoed the dome of the Capitol at Washington, had a right to better pay than the man who swept the floor beneath him. The mechanic who does twice the amount of work of a given kind done by another, and does it as well, is entitled to twice as much wages. When laborers are few higher wages are offered, and may be accepted, than when they are plenty. In our day, a bill-poster is better paid than was Domenichino in the sixteenth century, when at work on his greatest masterpieces. But, if labor

was cheap then, so also were the necessaries of life. Labor, according to Ricardo, and other political economists, has its natural and its current prices. The natural price is that amount of compensation that enables the workman to support himself and his family. The current price is the wages he actually receives, and which is regulated by the law of supply and demand. The workman must live and make suitable provision for his wife and children. He can do this only by his labor. His labor, then, is worth to him what will give him and his the means of support. He can ask this amount of compensation for it, but no one is bound to give it to him, except in virtue of a contract made with him. Wagessuppose a free contract between laborer and employer, a contract of bargain and sale. It is the contract that gives the laborer a claim to his wages. Antecedently to this contract he has no claim to receive the amount of them from the employer or anybody else. No employer is bound to engage his services. Society does not owe him a living, except in the sense that it cannot prevent his obtaining it by honest means. He can ask the natural price for his labor, he can refuse to take less, but he cannot compel others to give it to him. His labor is worth it to him, but it may not be worth it to the employer. Generally speaking, it is; but, under certain circumstances, it may not be. There are some laborers, at every trade, who "are not worth their salt." The employer is not bound to pay the natural price for labor when the price of the article to be manufactured will not enable him to do so. When it does, he should pay that price, for justice requires that a man should give an equivalent for what he receives. In this matter, however, the employer should consider not only the actual, but also the prospective value of the article. Some articles fall in price to rise no more. Others are subject only to periodical fluctuations in value. When the employer foresees that he can carry these through a period of depression, and sell them at a large profit, the labor that produces them is worth more than the current price, and he is bound to pay more. Immense profits are made by individuals and by corporations with large capital, who can afford to manufacture extensively when prices and labor are low, and wait to sell till prices are high. This can hardly be done without injustice to the workman.

What is certain, then, in this matter, is this, that when labor is worth its natural price, the employer is bound to pay it. When it is worth more, he should pay more. In like manner the workman cannot exact more for his labor than it is worth to the employer. Each is bound to give a just equivalent for what he receives. But who shall decide what that equivalent should be? It is certainly within the competency of government to legislate on

the labor question. In every country this question greatly affects the public welfare, and, occasionally, even the peace of society. It is, therefore, a proper subject for legislation. And, in point of fact, governments have in all times legislated on it. There is, however, one difficulty connected with it with which they have been loath to grapple, and which they have for the most part approached only indirectly, and it is this: how to regulate future rates of wages, so as to make them at once equitable and satisfactory to laborer and employer, and be able to enforce their observance. In the Middle Ages the maximum price was sometimes fixed by law, and it was made punishable for the employer to give or for the laborer to receive more. In our own day boards of arbitration and conciliation have undertaken to deal with this and other difficulties growing out of the labor question, and they have done so with very considerable success. Of these boards Joseph D. Weeks, Special Commissioner of the State of Pennsylvania, says in his report to the Bureau of Statistics of Massachusetts in 1881:

"Boards or courts of arbitration and conciliation, for the settlement of certain or all disputes or differences between employers and employed, have existed generally in the industries of France and Belgium since early in the century, and in England, for certain trades, for twenty years. The constitution and method of these boards, and the success that has attended them, can be learned in detail from the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor for 1877, or from a report of an investigation, with their practical workings, made to the Governor of Pennsylvania in 1879, by the writer. It is sufficient here to remark that, in France, in 1878, there were brought before these boards, the Conseils des Prud'hommes, which are established at unimportant trade centres, and which are quasi-judicial bodies, with legal sanctions for their awards, 35,046 cases, of which 25,834 were heard in private without a formal trial, and 71 per cent. settled without a public hearing. Of the entire number of cases 21,368 were relative to wages, 4733 to dismissals, and 1795 to matters relative to apprentices.

"In England where these boards are purely voluntary, without any legal existence or sanction to their decisions, their success in removing causes of difference between employer and employed, or in settling disputes, should they arise, has been most marked in those trades in which the principle has been fairly tried. In the hosiery trade of Nottingham, in which a board has been in existence for twenty years, there has been no general strike since its organization. In the manufactured iron trade of the north of England, where the board has a history for ten years, it is also true that in that time there has been no general strike; though in both of these trades, prior to the establishment of these boards,