separable concomitant of the imagination. When the good, keen Bishop Berkeley had resolved the material world into simple ideas, his great difficulty was in making mankind at large believe his theory. He had violated the first principles of human nature. He had opposed the common sense of men. For there was a belief in men more original, more authoritative, more ultimate, than any eccentric speculation, than any fine-spun theory-we mean the primal belief of an external world on the evidence of sense. This first principle was too potent and universal to yield to the eternal pressure of the ideal system. Hence the comparative inefficiency of Berkeley's philosophy. Airy, beautiful, learned, and wellmeant, it yet remained, and always will, an unconvincing and an unaccepted speculation of a great and good man. Strauss, too, has constructed his ideal system of theology. But it stands, and ever will stand, a long speculative elaboration which finds no sympathy in the first principles of our nature. Like the system of Berkeley, it violates a primal belief of the consciousness, namely, the natural faith in a sufficient testimony. God seems to have established our intellects in the strong fortresses of first principles, which prevents any successful conquest of our perceptions by the knight-errantry of airy speculation. Strauss admits that the consciousness of the Church and the dictum of his philosophy are at extreme points in regard to Christianity. He seems to feel that the idea of his system will be alike unappreciated and rejected by the common mind. Hence that most singular charge to the rising ministry, that ever escaped the brain of sane or insane man. The theory of Strauss, then, as well by the virtual confession of its author, as by a true principle of philosophy, has neither the basis of an unadulterated consciousness, which is the foundation of all real science, nor yet the quality of adaptation to the wants of universal humanity.* A theory which presumes to set at nought the

"De quo autem omnium natura consentit id verum esse necesse est."-Cic. "Radix cognitionis fides."-Lat. version from Algazil of Bagdad "Consciousness is for the philosopher what the Bible is for the theolologian."-Hamilton.

"Religion is verified by the wants of our own nature."-Trench.

common sense belief in the great testimony of the past, bears the unmistakable traces of its own falsity.

We have no wish to draw a parallel between Strauss and Berkeley any further than our present comparison has led us; for no comparison can be found between the moral purposes and perceptions of the two men. Berkeley felt a deep concern for the moral welfare of the race. Strauss, in this regard, has manifested the coldest indifference. Berkeley honestly hoped, by his labor, to reconcile the philosophers and common people in a united admission of Divine truth. Strauss leaves the field with a proud complacency in having, as he supposes, set on foot a perpetual war between philosophy and common sense, between the theologian and the humble believer. Berkeley firmly believed in a God and a Christ objective to human thought. Strauss never admitted the existence of Deity as separate from the thinking, and the thinking power of men, except that he was allowed to inhere in all natural objects as a principle. Berkeley lived and died a good man. The life of Strauss, whatever may be his death, is most suspicious. If Berkeley with his virtues could not recommend his idealism, certainly Strauss may vainly hope to do so with his vices. The style of Strauss is classical; his reading in the department of Biblical criticism, and not in general science and history, has been extensive and thorough. Never was so much ability and so much cunning combined in any critical author.

ART. II. MACAULAY'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

The History of England, from the Accession of James II. By THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY. New York: Harpers. 8vo. Vols. I. and II., 1849: Vols. III and IV., 1856.

IN attempting, at this late day, a formal examination of a work that has been subjected to so much criticism as Mr. Macaulay's History, we labor under the disadvantage of having to choose between the risk of repeating what has been uttered by others, and that of passing by material questions through fear of such repetition. But the first two volumes were only a fragment, even of the history of the English Revolution. For the fortunes of the revolutionary government, and of the men most active in its establishment, though not necessarily included in the narrative of that great event, are yet material to a proper judgment of it; and the manner in which the historian treats them in the progress of his work, sheds light on the usage they had previously received at his hands. We have, therefore, forborne to do more than announce the publication of these volumes,* at the hazard of taking up the subject at a time when the public might have comparatively lost their interest in it. But the delay has at least enabled us more perfectly to satisfy ourselves upon some questions suggested by reading the work, and, we would hope, more perfectly to satisfy such of our readers as are disposed to review a subject on which they may have already bestowed much attention.

If the historian proposed to himself no higher end than to dazzle and delight contemporary readers, criticism would be unnecessary at any time, and doubly superfluous now. The verdict on that isssue is already secured. The great popularity of the first two volumes is outrun by that of the two that have just succeeded them. But we cannot err in believing that Mr. Macaulay's ambition is higher and better.

* Christian Review, Vol. XIV., p. 210, and Vol. XXI.,

p. 310.

He aims to speak in a voice that shall reach future ages. In trying his title to the homage of generations to come, we must descend below the qualities of style and manner which have so much to do with the awakening of present admiration, and inquire how far he conforms to the inflexible standard of veracity and justice, by which historical fame must be tested. Not that the externals of historical composition are unimportant. A history, equally with a tragedy or an epic, is a work of art, and an object of criticism as such. But the architectural grace of a structure has little to do with its use or durability. History, to be read, must, indeed, give pleasure in the reading. If, however, readers are permanently attracted to a production that is insincere, or radically defective in substance, art becomes the occasion of evil, great in proportion to its own excellence.

Some qualities of a great writer in almost any department of composition,-some of special value in an historian,—are conceded to Mr. Macaulay by common consent. His general force of intellect and varied accomplishments, his rare powers of analysis and combination, of narrative and description, his consummate critical skill, and his vast stores of learning -resources gathered with diligence and thoroughly at command-are confessed by all. Historical studies have evidently been a favorite pursuit. He did not enter upon a history of England till he had much pondered the annals of ancient and modern Europe, and made himself familiar with the great masters of historic art. He has had a practical acquaintance with civil policy, beyond the reach of the mere scholar, and of more worth than mere erudition. His insight into human character and motives, so acquired, has been quickened and strengthened by much well-directed study of literature and art, of philosophy, law, and religion. We do not imagine, indeed, that he is profoundly versed in all these studies. No one person could be. But it would be difficult, we apprehend, to find another man better instructed in any department of learning to which he is not professionally devoted. Entering upon his task with such preparation, in the full maturity of his fine powers, he could not fail to produce a work fitted to challenge universal

and admiring attention. His success, to that extent, is notorious. He has enchanted scholars and statesmen, and has beaten the novelists within the precincts of the circulating library. In his person international "copywrong" has been made illustrious.

Yet it cannot be denied that much scepticism prevails in regard to the durability and value of his success. There is a marked contrast, in this country especially, between the popular judgment and that of professional critics. Sundry commonplaces of depreciation have run through our higher periodicals, importing a lofty consciousness of superiority to vulgar admiration. One speaks with frigid dignity of "a work called a History of England," and another wisely predicts what history will be in the ascendant when "the mob of novel-readers" shall have deserted Mr. Macaulay for some new favorite. Apart from the ancient prejudice which suspects every writer of trifling who is not somewhat tiresome, and the later foppery, which argues an author's profundity from his obscurity or paradoxical hardihood, there are some special occasions for so damaging an estimate.

One circumstance which is a source of power-political experience is also a source of weakness. It occasions distrust. Party animosities and suspicions are easily aroused; and those who are not consciously affected by them may sus pect their existence in the historian, whom he identifies with the politician, or in many of the readers whose applause he now wins. But before venturing to predict his future neglect from this cause, it is well to consider that time, which dims, sometimes also brightens fame. The fortune of an author, in this department of composition especially, may depend much upon whether he is in the line of human progress or of reaction. Prejudice on this score, moreover, can hardly outweigh the substantial advantages secured by public life. No man can worthily write the history of a great nation without some familiarity with affairs. The mere scholar, unskilled in civil and diplomatic transactions, laboriously as he may search among the archives of State, will be in danger of missing some of the most important materials for a sound judgment of men and events. His uninstructed eye is liable