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action admit attainable believe benefit binding force capable character common conduct consider considerations constitutes cultivated degree derive desire desire happiness duty Epicurean Epicurus equally ethics evil excitement existence expediency external sanctions fact fellow creatures give Greatest Happiness Principle habit happiness Herbert Spencer human nature hurt idea of justice impartiality imperfect individual inflict influence injustice instinct interest mankind maxims of justice means means of happiness ment mind mode moral obligation moral right moralists motive natural justice necessary ness noble notion of justice object obligation of justice opinion origin pain particular person philosophical pleasure possible present principle of morals principle of utility proof punishment question rational recognise regard right and wrong rule selfish sentiment of justice social Social Statics society solely sources Stoic superior supposed sympathy theory things tion transcendental unjust utilitarian doctrine utilitarian ethics utilitarian morality utilitarian standard vidual violate virtue virtuous word
Seite 53 - No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.
Seite 24 - I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned; as, between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.
Seite 10 - The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals Utility, or the Greatest Happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.
Seite 13 - ... a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong that nothing which conflicts with it could be otherwise than momentarily an object of desire to them.
Seite 22 - All the grand sources, in short, of human suffering are in a great degree, many of them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and effort; and though their removal is grievously slow— though a long succession of generations will perish in the breach before the conquest is completed, and this world becomes all that, if will and knowledge were not wanting, it might easily be made— yet every mind sufficiently intelligent and generous to bear a part, however small and unconspicuous, in the endeavour,...
Seite 89 - Thus the moralities which protect every individual from being harmed by others, either directly or by being hindered in his freedom of pursuing his own good, are at once those which he himself has most at heart, and those which he has the strongest interest in publishing and enforcing by word and deed. It is by a person's observance of these, that his fitness to exist as one of the fellowship of human beings, is tested and decided; for on that depends his being a nuisance or not to those with whom...
Seite 28 - In the case of abstinences indeed — of things which people forbear to do from moral considerations, though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial — it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a class which, if practised generally, would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it.
Seite 59 - ... and persists in acting on them, even though these pleasures are much diminished, by changes in his character or decay of his passive sensibilities, or are outweighed by the pains which the pursuit of the purposes may bring upon him.
Seite 12 - Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures : no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and hase, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
Seite 4 - Yet to support their pretensions there ought either to be some one fundamental principle or law, at the root of all morality, or if there be several, there should be a determinate order of precedence among them ; and the one principle, or the rule for deciding between the various principles when they conflict, ought to be self.evident.