On ReflectionOUP Oxford, 27.09.2012 - 177 Seiten Hilary Kornblith presents a new account of reflection, and its importance for knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity. Philosophers have frequently extolled the value of reflective self-examination, and a wide range of philosophers, who differ on many other things, have argued that reflection can help to solve a number of significant philosophical problems. The importance of reflecting on one's beliefs and desires has been viewed as the key to solving problems about justification and knowledge; about reasoning; about the nature of freedom; and about the source of normativity. In each case, a problem is identified which reflective self-examination is thought to address. Kornblith argues that reflection cannot solve any of these problems. There is a common structure to these issues, and the problems which reflection is thought to resolve are ones which could not possibly be solved by reflecting on one's beliefs and desires. More than this, he suggests that the attempt to solve these problems by appealing to reflection saddles us with a mystical view of the powers of reflective self-examination. Recognition of this fact motivates a search for a demystified view of the nature of reflection. To this end, Kornblith offers a detailed examination of views about knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity in order to better understand the motivations for extolling self-reflective examination. He explores both the logic of these views, and the psychological commitments they involve. In the final chapter, he offers a more realistic view of reflection, which draws on dual process approaches to cognition. |
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action animal cognition animal knowledge argue arrived assessment automatically behavior beliefs and desires BonJour Christine Korsgaard Cognitive Ethology commonsense concept conscious deliberation distinction empirical engage epistemic agency Epistemology evaluation evidence example explain fact first-order beliefs first-order desires first-person perspective first-person point form beliefs Frankfurt freedom Gilbert Harman higher-order belief human Ibid idea important inference infinite regress internalist involved issue justified belief Korsgaard Laurence BonJour learning mechanisms mental mind Moran natural kind non-human animals normative claims one's one’s beliefs Oxford University Press perception phenomenology philosophers piping plovers problem processes of belief propositional attitudes psychological psychologists question rational reason to believe reasoning in System reflective endorsement reflective knowledge reflective scrutiny relevant reliably produced requires result role second-order beliefs second-order desire seems self-consciously sensitivity to reasons simply skeptical social sort Sosa Sources of Normativity stop to reflect suggestion theory things tion true unproblematic unreflective belief acquisition Virtue Epistemology Williams