OUR present purpose is to prove, that Political Economy cannot be studied with advantage and satisfaction in the modern writers on that subject, by any person who wishes to be convinced of the soundness of its first principles; who expects perspicuity, consistency, and accurate reasoning in the deductions from these principles, or to find them applicable to, and explanatory of what is occurring, or sure guides in the advancement and acquisition of social wealth.

We shall endeavour to prove this, principally, because we shall then prove, that there is a field, almost entirely unoccupied, for our labours. But we have another object in view: By pointing out, as we trust we shall be enabled to do, obscurity, contradiction, and ambiguity in the use of words, and illogicalness in reasoning, we shall in some measure render it unnecessary to employ much time in the refutation of doctrines we conceive to be erroneous, when we enter directly on our subject, and we shall also be enabled to unfold and detect the principal and most powerful and general causes of the obscurity and contradiction in which Political Economy is involved.

All writers on this subject are agreed that the object of Political Economy is the natural means of wealth-that is, those means which nature supplies, without any other interference of man, than simply employing them ;-those means rendered more productive by the labour and skill of man ;-the interchange and distribution of wealth; and the various methods by which wealth can be increased in its production, or facilitated in its interchange and distribution. Whether Political Economists are agreed and consistent VOL. XV.

Malebranche, Recherche de la Verite.

on those points,-especially on the sources of wealth, will be an after inquiry. Let us first examine what they mean by the term Wealth; for it is evident, unless to this term is affixed a definite and clear meaning, vagueness and inconclusiveness must attend all the inquiries respecting its sources and distribution.

It is maintained by some, that a certain degree of scarcity is necessary to constitute wealth; and, on this ground, water is said not to form a part of wealth. But in the first place, the term scarcity is indefinite and ambiguous. Corn may be produced in a country quite equal to the demand; then there can be no scarcity: it may even be produced in such quantity as to exceed the demand, when, of course, a superfluity exists; and yet, surely no one will maintain, that corn in these cases ceases to be an article of wealth, or that the claim of any article, to be included among the ingredients of individual or social wealth, can depend on its abundance or scarcity.

With respect to the instance of water, there is also a mistake. Water, even where it is in the greatest abundance, requires labour to procure it, which must either be performed, or paid for, by the person requiring it: and in either case, water must be considered as an article of wealth, as much as any other object which is acquired either directly or indirectly by labour.

Some state the wealth of a nation to consist in the totality of the private property of its individuals; others in the abundance of its commodities. The Economists distinguish public from private wealth, considering the former as possessing a value in use, but no value in exchange; and the latter, as having an exchangeable value, but 40

no value in use. Lord Lauderdale agrees with the Economists in distinguishing individual riches from public wealth, but he defines the latter as consisting in all that man desires as useful or delightful to him; and the former, as consisting in all that man desires as useful or delightful to him, which exists in a degree of scarcity.

Say maintains that wealth can only exist where there are things possessed of real and intrinsic value, and that it is proportionate to the quantum of that value; great, when the aggregate of component value is great-small, when that aggregate is small. Mr Prinsep, his ingenious and able translator, objects to this definition. "It is strange," he says, "that a writer of so much research should begin with such a loose definition. The term wealth, or riches, in its most enlarged sense, means abundance, in some degree or other, of those things which satisfy the wants and desires of mankind. In estimating, however, wealth, account is taken of such things only as are objects of desire, and therefore of value. Neither does wealth consist in the possession of value, which is a mere quality, but in the possession of things wherein the quality, value, is vested."

It is unnecessary to multiply instances of the vague use made of the term wealth by Political Economists, and of the various meanings they attach to it. It will appear, that in explaining it, another term is introduced, value, the exact definition of which, we shall find equally loose and unsatisfactory. Most writers draw a distinction be tween value in use, and value in exchange; and no little of the confusion in which this branch of Political Economy is involved, has arisen from this double meaning of the term value.

If Political Economists differ in opinion so much respecting the nature and definition of wealth and value, they differ not less when they treat of the sources of wealth and the measure of value. The very early writers on this subject, Raleigh, Misselden, Ro-, berts, Mun, Davenant, King, &c. considered the precious metals, obtained in return for the raw and manufactured produce exported, as the cause of the wealth of nations. Others, especially the earlier Italian and French writers, ascribed the origin of wealth to the lowering of the rate of legal interest. The Economists regarded agri

culture as the only sure and abundant source of wealth. Hume's doctrine is, that everything in the world is purchased by labour. This, it is observed by Ganilh, probably suggested to Adam Smith his theory, that wealth is "Labour improved by subdivision, which fixes and realizes itself in some particular object, or vendible commodity, which lasts, for some time at least, after that labour is past."

Say, in his treatise on Political Economy, already referred to, maintains, that there is no actual production of wealth, without a creation, or augmentation, of utility. To this explanation of the source of wealth, his translator, Mr Prinsep, adds, in a note, "and without the surmounting of na tural difficulty of attainment." In another part of his work, Say states, that wealth consists in the value that human industry, in aid and furtherance of natural agents, communicates to things: here a term of very loose and ambiguous meaning is introduced; it would seem, by comparing the two passages, that value in the latter has the same meaning as utility in the

former.

Sismondi refers wealth to three sources: land, labour, and human life, or existence. It is not easy to perceive how the last can be said to be one of the sources of wealth; if it is not synonymous with labour, it can hardly have any meaning in this place.

If we consult Ricardo, Malthus, &c. we shall find the same looseness of expression with respect to wealth, though it is obvious that an accurate definition of it is indispensable towards the full and clear development of the very elementary principles of Political Eco

nomy.

All, however, are agreed that labour is the chief source of wealth: but here again, we are stopped and perplexed with a fresh difficulty. The Economists first broached the opinion, that labour was of two different and opposite kinds, productive and unproduc tive. That labour which is bestowed on land, they represented as exclusively productive; and all other kinds of labour,-the labour of the manufacturer, the merchant,-the lawyer,→ soldier,-physician,--painter,-author, &c. as entirely unproductive. And even Smith admits the distinction between productive and unproductive labour; but transfers many of the class

es ranged by the Economist amongst unproductive labours, to the class of productive labours. Later writers have in general admitted the distinction, though they have still farther reduced the number of what they consider unproductive labours. This is a pregnant and instructive instance, not only of the vague and unsatisfactory results to his inquiries, to which a student of Political Economy is exposed, but of one of the most fertile sources of ambiguity and contrariety of opinion. The opposing opinions are maintained partly in consequence of no precise, clear, and definite meaning being attached to the term productive by the disputants, and partly from a very loose mode of reasoning, in which, either the point in dispute is taken for granted, or the conclusion does not flow from the premises. Perhaps in no science are all those sources of error so common and so prolific, as in Political Economy.

Let us turn to value; we have already remarked that a grand distinction is made in the writings of nearly all the Political Economists with which we are acquainted, ancient and modern, native and foreign, between value in use, and value in exchange. Hence it is manifest much error and obscurity must arise-granting for the moment that the distinction is a proper one-that it exists in nature-that it is a distinction which ought to be introduced, when treating of Political Economy-and that the marks of difference between value in use, and value in exchange, are clearly and accurately, as well as fully, laid down by those who adopt it;-it is very difficult for writers always to remember, and adhere to the distinction in the use of the term value, and it is still more difficult for the reader always to remember and apply it. Hence must arise error and obscurity, and they have arisen from this source in no small degree, and contributed to perplex and darken the subject of Political Economy.

Supposing that value in exchange alone is meant, when it occurs in the writings of Political Economists; still we cannot proceed a single step farther, without meeting with a fresh difficulty and impediment. We are called on to understand what is meant by the terms measure of value, and what constitutes this measure. There is scarcely

any point in this science which has been so much discussed; and the discussion, though it has proceeded for a long period, has given rise to tedious, prolix, and laboured disquisitions, and has been conducted by men, not only of undoubted talent, but who have brought the habitual use of those talents to bear directly and powerfully on Political Economy-has not conducted us to any satisfactory conclusion. Even the first part of the dispute, which is merely verbal, is not terminated, nor do we yet know what precise meaning we should attach to the term measure, when applied to value. By some it would seem to be used as simply equivalent to the expression of value; as, when we say that a quarter of wheat is worth 31., we mean nothing more than to express the value of wheat, as it is usually expressed in the current coin of the kingdom. This is a very harmless, but a very unnecessary use of the term measure of value; and, therefore, because unnecessary, it ought to be avoided; for unnecessary terms, or terms employed in an unusual and unnecessary meaning, must do mischief, in producing error and obscurity.

But the dispute respecting the measure of value-affixing to the word, when used in this connexion, the same meaning as is affixed to it, when we speak of the measure of length, breadth, thickness, &c.,-is not a mere verbal dispute. It might, therefore, perhaps, have been expected-as verbal disputes are often the most difficult to settle, that as this related to a fact, or what is supposed to be one, and not to a mere term-that there was a clear and certain mode of settling it. But it is not so. As we have already remarked, it has been for a long period, and still is, a most fertile subject of dispute; so that he who wishes to study Political Economy will be under the necessity,-if he wishes to understand it-in the first place to read much, and with great attention, on the subject, and then to rise from the perusal, certainly not quite clear and satisfied in his own mind, if he exactly comprehends what the different writers mean in their discussions; or whether he himself has adopted any precise and clear view of it, which he can really explain and defend.

He will find two points to be settled, even after he has got over the verbal

dispute, and confines himself to the consideration of what is the measure of value, in the same manner as he might be called on to investigate what is the measure of length. The first point to be settled is, whether there can be a measure of value; the second point is, the existence and applicability of such a measure being proved, to ascertain in what it consists-what are its distinguishing marks-what gives it a claim to be a measure of value-whether it alone can be a measure of value-and whether it is an universal measure of value, which be ing essentially and exclusively so, must have been so in all ages, and is so in all countries.

The first inquiry-can there be any such thing as a measure of value? which, it is obvious, must be settled before we can advance to the investigation of what that measure is-is still undetermined. Some writers contend that there cannot possibly be any such thing; and the figurative nature of the language employed,-which, in other investigations, as well as in those relating to Political Economy, draws us away from the real question, and involves us in misapprehension and error,-lends its assistance towards the support of their opinion. There cannot be, they contend, any measure of value, or of anything else, unless it possess essentially and unalterably two qualities:-in the first place, it must be of the same nature as the thing measured-what determines length must have length-what determines weight must have weight-what determines number must have number; whatever, therefore, determines or measures value, must possess value. But in this case, how, or on what principle, is the measure of value in that which is used to declare and determine value in other things, ascertained and fixed? for if this principle can be detected and ascertained, it, as a previous and originating principle, must take the precedence.

We do not mean to involve ourselves in this discussion, which, we apprehend, though seemingly subtle and metaphysical, is, after all, at bottom, merely a verbal dispute, and if closely examined would restore itself into that verbal dispute respecting the measure of value, meaning thereby the terms in which the value of a commodity is expressed, as when we say a

quarter of wheat is worth 31., to which we have already adverted; our aim is answered if we have supplied an additional illustration and proof of the obscurity and perplexity in which the most important and elementary questions in Political Economy are involved.

We shall encounter the same difficulties, when we turn our consideration towards the other quality, which, it is contended by those who maintain there can be no measure of value, must inhere in such measure, if such there could be. A yard is a measure of length; a pound is a measure of weight; but a yard could not measure length, nor a pound weight, if it were possible that a yard should vary in length, and be sometimes extended to four feet, and sometimes curtailed to two; nor could a pound measure weight, if the pound sometimes was equivalent to eighteen ounces, and sometimes only to ten.

In like manner, it is contended that there can be no measure of value, because there can be no commodity which does not itself vary in value, and which, therefore, is not destitute of the essential attribute of a measure. Labour and corn are usually regarded as measures of value: to both of these objections are made by those who are of opinion there can be no measure of value, because they both fluctuate. They maintain that corn, when at 21. a-quarter, and corn, when at 4l. a-quarter, cannot possibly determine or measure any other commodity; nor can labour, when its wages are 2s. a-day, and when they are 4s. a-day, any more than the length of a road could be ascertained by applying to it a yard-measure, which sometimes expanded to four feet, and sometimes contracted to two, and which measure was constantly fluctuating between these two, or any other given ex

tremes.

Here we are again involved in difficulty and doubt. Let us, however, pass on to the next point of inquiry— What is it that fixes and regulates the price of articles? This, a little reflection will convince us, is a modification of the point respecting the measure of value. Two articles are brought into the market ;-on what principle is an interchange to be effected between them? or, in other words, what will fix the price of one, expressed in terms of the other? For example, let the