tion has not proceeded from a penetrating and comprehensive view of Political Economy as a science.

If we can substantiate these charges, we shall then have proved that the stage is not fully occupied-that there is room and opportunity, as well as occasion, for the task we have undertaken. Whether the task is of a nature that can be accomplished; that will repay the pains bestowed upon it; whether, if accomplished, it will end in any useful and practical result, will remain for a subsequent and separate investigation. We should despair of succeeding in our first undertaking, we should even deem it highly presumptuous to enter upon it, if the materials were not supplied us by those we mean to attack; and if we were not able, as we have already stated, to point out such numerous and palpable contradictions in their writings, besides positions so vapidly or obscure ly laid down, and inferences so erroneously drawn, that the task requires little more than an extensive and careful examination of their works.

We are well aware that the opposite party, those who ridicule the notion that Political Economy has assumed, or can possibly assume, the rank of a science, and who regard the writings of Malthus, Ricardo, &c. as either absurd or unintelligible, or as containing doctrines and reasonings quite remote from, and unconnected with practice, will cheerfully, and without much deliberation, award us the victory: but we are anxious to obtain much less prejudiced judges of our labours, and we shall deem our task very imperfectly accomplished, if, in executing it, we convince only them, that they have bestowed wellmerited ridicule on Political Economy. In fact, if our labours had no other result except this, we should in reality be fighting against ourselves; for though we should destroy one party, yet their destruction would add to the strength and the boldness of the other. And yet we are afraid we cannot altogether avoid this consequence; for those who are sceptics and scoffers on the subject of Political Economy, will naturally hail any attempt to prove that its most celebrated advocates and illustrators are unintelligible, contradictory, erroneous, or even only speculative, as their triumph, and a confirmation of the justice of

their scepticism and scoffing. Hence we shall strengthen those whom we next design to attack. But the inference which they will draw, though a natural one, by no means follows: and we hope to prove that Political Economy is neither so perfect as one party maintain, nor so completely out of human intellect, as the other party insinuate by their scepticism and ridicule.

We shall, however, deem our first attempt very badly executed, if we do not prove-to the satisfaction of those who are neutral and impartial, and, we even trust and hope, also to the satisfaction of those who are not very strong in their belief, that modern Political Economists have exhausted the subject, and removed all the difficulties, and cleared up all the obscurities under which it previously laboured-that little, in fact, has been added to the science;that the writings of these Political Economists will in vain be studied by those who are anxious of obtaining a perspicuous and comprehensive view, or of ascertaining in what manner its doctrines bear on any great practical question. If we can secure the approbation, the faith, and the advocacy of those two classes to what we advance, we shall not regard either as a triumph or a misfortune, and the source of future difficulty, the having confirmed the prejudices of the scoffers and ridiculers of the science; nor shall we be cast down, or think our labours useless, because the very staunch believers in the perfection of modern Political Economy, still adhere to their belief with undiminished confidence and pertinacity.

It may, however, be said, that we shall have but imperfectly cleared the stage, by proving that it is not fully, and ought not to be exclusively occupied by Malthus, Ricardo, &c. that if we succeed in this attempt, we merely place Political Economy in the state in which it was before they commenced their labours; and that the work of Adam Smith will then resume the full and undivided sway with Political Economists-if justly, our farther labour is

unnecessary-if unjustly, our prior labour will have been of little benefit towards proving that Political Economy needs our illustrations.ed

But assuming that we prove the insufficiency of the writings of modern Political Economists only, and that

they have added little to the science as it was left by Adam Smith-we think we shall have accomplished a needful and useful task. The contrast between the Wealth of Nations, and the modern writings on Political Economy, is obvious and strong in many respects. The former is written in a style, which, though prolix, is so transparent, that the author's meanings and reasonings can easily be traced, whether they be sound or otherwise; and this of itself is a great advantage and merit, on all subjects, especially on Political Economy. In perusing the Wealth of Nations, we are sometimes a little puzzled by finding words used in a loose or double sense, but we soon ascertain in what particular sense they are used: we not unfrequently detect weak and inconsequent reasoning arising from this ambiguity of language, or from other causes, and we certainly feel the want of simple and fundamental principles, and of a regular and systematic arrangement of matter, and deduction of consequences. But all is plain and perspicuous; these is no subtlety-no metaphysical refinement; what is laid down and argued, might have been said in fewer words, but the multiplicity of words, though tiresome, does not obscure the meaning of the author. How different from these are the writings of the most celebrated modern Political Economists. On a subject which is entirely founded on facts, which are of notorious and of constant occurrence, more subtlety of thought and language is displayed than on the most abstruse points of metaphysical speculation. We can always perceive what Adam Smith means, and this is going a great way to ascertain whether his arguments and opinions are sound or not; whereas, it is often extremely difficult, and sometimes impossible, to determine the precise meaning of modern Political Economists, and of course to determine whether their doctrines be true or erroneous. If, then, we retread our steps to the Wealth of Nations, we shall have done much towards destroying both sets of prejudices, which we have already represented as lying in the way of our present design; for, looking to this work as the text-book of Political Economy, we believe that not even its warmest admirers will contend that it is free from errors, or that it has carried Political Economy so far as it may be car

ried; nor will those who ridicule and scoff at Political Economy, as laid down in modern works, be disposed to treat with the same degree of scepticism and scorn that science as taught in the Wealth of Nations.

If, therefore, we succeed in proving that Ricardo, Malthus, &c. have perplexed the subject, and exposed it to unmerited prejudice-that their leading positions and doctrines are either old and obvious truths, couched in subtle and uncouth terms, or utterly unfounded-that they hold diametrically opposite doctrines, sometimes among themselves, and not unfrequently individually; and that Political Economy has been little, if at all, advanced by them, beyond the confessedly imperfect state in which it was left by Adam Smith; we may then be permitted to draw the inference, that there is room for our discussions; and to turn our attention to the examination of the other proposition that stands in our way, viz. that Political Economy is an impracticable subject not worth studying.

In examining the nature and bearings of this opinion, as well as the hold which it possesses on the minds of those who entertain it, it will be necessary to proceed with caution, and in a regular and methodical manner; since, if we do not meet it fairly, and in its different bearings, we shall effect little towards the proof of its unsoundness. The opinion that Political Economy deserves not our study, arises from several sources. Some entertain it, because they are convinced that in its very essence it is of such an abstract and speculative nature, that it can never be applied either to explain what happens in the commercial concerns of nations, or to point out what ought to be pursued or avoided by them: the ground of this particular opinion rests on the conflicting and contradictory notions entertained, and counsel given by the most celebrated Political Economists, with respect to the great questions lately agitated on the Corn Laws, Poor Laws, Bank Restriction, &c. Those who entertain this opinion, do not refuse to Political Economy the appellation and the dignity of a science; but they contend, that though its principles are clear and definite, and the deductions from them legitimate and unimpeachable, yet, as they do not make allowance for the disturbing

forces which actually exist in society, the practical results must always differ most materially from the results which in speculation and theory are drawn from the science.

Those opponents of Political Economy, it is obvious, must be treated in a different manner from those who advance much farther in their scepticism and ridicule: the latter-who seem to have gained in strength and numbers, in consequence of those very publications, to which many appeal and look up as having placed Political Economy on a solid and firm basis-broadly and positively assert, that even as a speculative study, Political Economy is involved in inexplicable mystery; that much that is taught is incomprehensible or contradictory-that much is directed in the teeth of the common sense and uniform experience of mankind, and that the remainder consists of palpable truisms, couched in obscure or ambiguous language.

As we have already remarked, our very success in the first attempt we shall make, viz. to prove that modern writers on Political Economy, instead of having rendered it more clear in its principles, and more extensively and fully explanatory of what is taking place around us, have involved the subject in mystery, and unsettled its very foundations-will put weapons into the possession of all those who are sceptics and scoffers, on the utility and reality of this science.

We must, therefore, be careful and precise in our meaning, and strict and conclusive in our logic, when we come to examine and repel the statements and arguments of these opponents: we must separate with a broad and distinct line, the facts which they draw from the writings of modern Political Economists, as establishing their position, that Political Economy is either a merely speculative and useless science, or a mere jargon of words without meaning and value-from the facts to which they appeal, in support of either of these accusations against it from the very nature of the subject, and the excessive and inexplicable intricacy in which it is necessarily in volved. The old adage will assist us in this respect, that the abuse of a thing is no good argument against its use. And if we can succeed in proving --which we flatter ourselves we shall be able to do that Political EconomyVOL. XV.

professing to develope and explain the sources and causes of social wealth, and the means by which it is distributed-must have its foundation in facts and experience; and, therefore, can be reduced to general laws, which, as drawn from these facts, must be such as will explain all other facts and events that may occur, relative to social wealth; we shall then have, in a great measure, destroyed one of the principal strongholds of those who deny to Political Economy the name and dignity of a science.

Whether these facts are sufficiently namerous, from which to deduce any simple and general laws-whether the really operative part of circumstances and events, bearing on Political Economy, can be thoroughly and satisfactorily separated from those which are inert, so as actually to arrive at such laws, as will bear the closest examination and scrutiny, and will not fail us when we come to apply them to the most involved and difficult cases-and whether the very frame and texture of the language employed on Political Economy, does not create a larger portion of those obscurities and difficulties, which have brought it into such discredit and contempt all those points must be separately and carefully discussed.

It certainly will be a most extraordinary, and, we will add, an unprecedented and unparalleled circumstance, if it should prove that it is impossible so to class the facts that relate to the sources and distribution of social wealth, as to draw from them any general laws; and no less extraordinary, if the result should be that laws strictly and logically deduced from these facts, should fail us, or lead us astray, when we wish to apply them either to direct our conduct in the management of social wealth, or to explain what is constantly taking place respecting its increase, diminution, and distribution. We are no advocates for the doctrine formerly, we believe, much more common and popular than it is at present, that what is true in theory may be false in practice: on the contrary, we believe that what is really true in theory, must be true in practice; that the reverse position virtually involves a contradiction; and that in proportion as the knowledge and experience of mankind become more correct, extensive, and minute,

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the falsehood and absurdity of this doctrine has become, and will become, more glaring. We are perfectly aware, that in all sciences, except pure mathematics, there are disturbing forces, and that these alter the result, and make it different from what mere theory would suggest or establish; but a result not exactly corresponding with that which theory gives, certainly will not warrant the doctrine, that what is true in theory, is often false in practice; besides, as the bearing and amount of these variations must become the subject of accurate foreknowledge and calculation, in proportion as mankind advance in knowledge; we shall at last be able to make that allowance for them which they require -neither more, nor less-and then to bring about a perfect coincidence between the results of theory and practice.

As, however, the almost proverbial opinion to which we have alluded, is greatly relied on by those who ridicule and scoff at Political Economy, and as this science, being conversant with those affairs and events which are necessarily much involved, of course presents many combinations of circumstances, which cannot always be foreseen, nor easily unravelled and reduced to their elements, it will be necessary to enter into a strict inquiry, whether Political Economy, though true and well founded in theory, is of no use, or will even prove an unsafe and dangerous guide in practice.

Even after we shall have terminated both these preliminary and preparatory investigations, and, we anticipate and trust, in such a manner, and with such effect, as to convince our readers, both that Political Economy still requires much elucidation before it is rendered a simple, easy, intelligible, consistent, systematic, and practical science; and that it not only requires such elucidation, but admits of it; and that it amply deserves to form a part of general education, as being much more intimately and extensively connected with social good than it is generally supposed to be-there still remain other preparatory inquiries, before we can fairly enter upon the consideration of the science itself.

As there is confessedly great and general doubt and uncertainty re pecting the first principles of Political Economy, and palpable contrarieties of opi

nion among its most able and celebrated authorities-it will be proper, or rather highly advantageous, to investigate and examine the nature and sources of the difficulties which seem to beset this science, and to have given rise to those doubts, uncertainties, and contrarieties of opinion. We shall thus be able to prove, that they do not exist in the subject itself; and, moreover, by pointing out that they originate in the manner in which it has been studied, guard ourselves, in our investigations, against meeting with, or creating similar causes of error. This preparatory investigation will be serviceable to us, not only against those who believe our task is unnecessary, but also against those who believe it is vain and useless. For if, in addition to our proof, that modern Political Economists are obscure and contradictory, we point out the causes which have necessarily led them into obscurity and contradiction-we strengthen our proof against them; and in the same manner, if, in addition to our proof, that Political Economy may be rendered intelligible, systematic and practical, we point out the causes that have reduced it to such a state as to become the subject of scepticisin and ridicule, we shall strengthen our proof against those who deem our task vain and useless.

In this part of our investigation, it will be necessary, as well as serviceable, to draw a plain and broad line of distinction between those causes which have involved Political Economy in obscurity and contradiction, or impeded its progress towards its perfection as a science, and its ready and safe application to practice, in common with other similar branches of knowledge, and those causes of error, obscurity, and imperfection, which are peculiar to Political Economy.

We shall thus be enabled to proceed in a more regular and systematic manner, as well as to hold up to more palpable and easy avoidance those difficulties, whether in the subject itself, or in the manner in which it has been usually studied, that have rendered it, with many, an object either of disdain or despair. But we have another end in view in thus purposing most carefully to separate the causes and sources of error and contradiction common to Political Economy, and other topics of similar research, from those which