done by cool reasoning, a moral poem does not fall fhort of reafoning in affording conviction: the natural connection of vice with mifery, and of virtue with happinefs, may be illuftrated by ftating a fact as well as by urging an argument. Let us affume, for example, the following moral truths; that difcord among the chiefs renders ineffectual all common measures; and that the confequences of a flightly-founded quarrel, foftered by pride and arrogance, are not lefs fatal than thofe of the groffeft injury these truths may be inculcated, by the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles at the fiege of Troy. If facts or circumftances be wanting, fuch as tend to roufe the turbulent paffions, they must be invented; but no accidental nor unaccountable event ought to be invented or adinitted; for the neceffary or probable connection between vice and mifery, is not learned from any events but what are naturally occafioned by the characters and paflions of the perfons reprefented, acting in fuch and fuch circumftances. A real event of which we fee not the cause, may afford a leffon, upon the prefumption that what hath happened may again happen: but this cannot be inferred from a flory that is known to be a fiction. Many are the good effects of fuch compofitions. A. pathetic compofition, whether epic or dramatic, tends to a habit of virtue, by exciting us to do what is right, and reftraining us from what is wrong * Its frequent pictures of human woes, produce, befide, two effects extremely falutary: they improve our fympathy, and at the fame time fortify us in bearing our own misfortunes. A moral compofition muft obviously produce the fame good effects, becaufe by being moral it ceafeth not to be pathetic it enjoys befide an excellence peculiar to itself; for it not only improves the heart, as above mentioned, but inftructs the head by the moral it contains. For my part, I cannot imagine any entertainment more. fuited proper pictures of virtue and vice are exhibited: but the bulk of thefe collections convey no inftruction, nor afford any amusement beyond what a child receives in reading an ordinary story. *See chap. 2. part 1. fect. 4. fuited to a rational being, than a work thus happily illuftrating some moral truth; where a number of perfons of different characters are engaged in an important action, fome retarding, others promoting, the great catastrophe: and where there is dignity of ftyle as well as of matter. A work of that kind, has our fympathy at command, and can put in motion the whole train of the focial affections: our curiofity in fome fcenes is excited, in others gratified: and our delight confummated at the clofe, upon finding, from the characters and fituations exhibited at the commencement, that every incident down to the final catastrophe is natural, and that the whole in conjunction make a regular chain of caufes and effects. Confidering that an epic and a dramatic poem are the fame in fubftance and have the fame aim or end, one would readily imagine, that subjects proper for the one must be equally proper for the other. But confidering their difference as to form, there will be found reafon to correct that conjecture, at leaft in fome degree. Many fubjects may indeed be treated with equal advantage in either form; but the fubjects are ftill more numerous for which they are not equally qualified; and there are fubjects proper for the one and not at all for the other. To give fome flight notion of the difference, as there is no room here for enlarging upon every article, I observe, that dialogue is the beft qualified for expreffing fentiments, and narrative for displaying facts. Heroifm, magnanimity, undaunted courage, and the whole tribe of the elevated virtues, figure best in action: tender paffions, and the whole tribe of fympathetic affections, figure beft in fentiment: what we feel is the most remarkable in the latter; what we perform is the most remarkable in the former. It clearly follows, that tender paffions are more peculiarly the province of tragedy, grand and heroic actions of epic poetry *. I have no occafion to fay more upon the epic, confi dered * In Racine, tender fentiments prevail; in Corneille, grand and heroic manners. Hence clearly the prefer ence of the former before the latter, as dramatic poets. Corneille would have figured better in an heroic poem. dered as peculiarly adapted to certain fubjects. But as dramatic fubjects are more complex, I must take a narrower view of them; which I do the more willingly, in order to clear a point thrown into great obfcurity by critics. In the chapter of emotions and paffions*, it is occafionally fhewn, that the fubje& beft fitted for tragedy is where a man has himself been the cause of his misfortune; not fo as to be deeply guilty, nor altogether innocent the misfortune must be occafioned by a fault incident to human nature, and therefore in fome degree venial. Such misfortunes call forth the focial affections, and warmly intereft the fpectator. An accidental miffortune, if not extremely fingular, doth not greatly move our pity: the perfon who fuffers, being innocent, is freed from the greatest of all torments, that anguish of mind which is occafioned by remorfe : Poco é funefta Ne di pentiri, né darroslir. Metaftafio. An atrocious criminal, on the other hand, who brings misfortunes upon himself, excites little pity, for a different reafon: his remorfe, it is true, aggravates his diftrefs, and fwells the firft emotions of pity; but then our hatred of him, as a criminal. blending with pity, blunts its edge confiderably. Misfortunes that are not innocent, nor highly criminal, partake the advantages of each extreme: they are attended with remorfe to embitter the diftrefs, which raifes our pity to a great height; and the flight indignation we have at a venial fault, detracts not fenfibly from our pity. For that reafon, the happiest of all subjects for railing pity, is where a man of integrity falls into a great misfortune by doing an action that is innocent, but which, by fome fingular means, is conceived by him to be criminal: his remorfe aggravates his diftrefs; and our compaffion, unreftrained by indignation, knows no bounds. Pity comes *Part 4. thus thus to be the ruling paffion of a pathetic tragedy; and, by proper reprefentation, may be raised to a height fcarce exceeded by any thing felt in real life. A moral tragedy takes in a larger field; as it not only exercises our pity, but raises another paffion, which, though felfith, deferves to be cherished equally with the focial affection. The paffion I have in view is fear or terror; for when a misfortune is the natural confequence of fome wrong bias in the temper, every fpectator who is confcious of fuch a wrong bias in himfelf, takes the alarm, and dreads his falling into the fame misfortune: and by that enotion of fear or terror, frequently reiterated in a variety of moral tragedies, the fpectators are put upon their guard against the diforders of paffion. The commentators upon Ariftotle, and other critics, have been much graveled about the account given of tragedy by that author: "That by means of pity and 66 terror, it refines or purifies in us all forts of pallion.” But no one who has a clear conception of the end and effects of a good tragedy, can have any difficulty about Ariftotle's meaning: our pity is engaged for the perfons reprefented; and our terror is upon our own account. Pity indeed is here made to ftand for all the fympathetic emotions, because of these it is the capital. There can be no doubt, that our sympathetic emotions are refined or improved by daily exercife; and in what manner our other paffions are refined by terror, I have just now faid. One thing is certain, that no other meaning can justly be given to the foregoing doctrine than that now mentioned; and that it was really Ariftotle's meaning, appears from his 13th chapter, where he delivers feveral propofitions conformable to the doctrine as here explained. Thefe, at the fame time, I take liberty to mention; because, so far as authority can go, they confirm the foregoing reafoning about fubjects proper for tragedy. The firtt propofition is, That it being the province of tragedy to excite pity and terror, an innocent perfon falling into adverfity ought never to be the fubject. This propofition is a neceffary confequence of his doctrine as explained: a fubject of that nature may indeed excite pity and terror; but the former in an inferior degree, and the latter in no degree for moral in struction. ftruction. The fecond propofition is, That the hiftory of a wicked perfon in a change from mifery to happiness, ought not to be reprefented; which excites neither terror nor compaffion, nor is agreeable in any refpect. The third is, That the misfortunes of a wicked perfon ought not to be represented: such reprefentation may be agreeable in fome measure upon a principle of justice; but it will not move our pity; nor any degree of terror, except in thofe of the fame vicious difpofition with the perfon reprefented. The laft propofition is, That the only character fit for representation lies in the middle, neither eminently good nor eminently bad; where the misfortune is not the effect of deliberate vice, but of fome involuntary fault, as our author expreffes it *. The only objection I find to Ariftotle's account of tragedy, is, that he confines it within too narrow bounds, by refufing admittance to the pathetic kind: for if terror be effential to tragedy, no representation deferves that name but the moral kind, where the misfortunes exhibited are caused by a wrong balance of mind, or fome diforder in the internal conftitution: fuch misfortunes always fuggeft moral inftruction; and by fuch misfortunes only, can terror be excited for our improve ment. Thus Ariftotle's four propofitions above mentioned, relate folely to tragedies of the moral kind. Those of the pathetic kind, are not confined within fo narrow limits: fubjects fitted for the theatre, are not in fuch plenty as to make us reject innocent misfortunes which roufe our fympathy, though they inculcate no moral. With refpect indeed to fubjects of that kind, it may be doubted, whether the conclufion ought not always to be fortunate. Where a perfon of integrity is reprefented as foffering to the end under misfortunes purely accidental, we depart difcontented, and with fome obscure fente of injuftice: for feldom is man fo fubmiffive to Providence, as not to revolt against the tyranny and vexations * If one can be anused with a grave difcourfe which promileth mach and performs nothing, he may fee this fubject treated by Brumoy in his Theatre Grec. Preliminary Gifcourfe on the origin of tragedy. |