natural integrity of the people, and in the safety and extent to which they might trust themselves with a control over their government." Did not general Washington and he differ about the funding system, the assumption of the state debts, on the proclamation of neutrality, on the British treaty, on the necessity of suppressing the whisky insurrection and the means adopted for that purpose? Whether Mr. Jefferson came to this conclusion by often repeating the same idea until he believed it, according to the rule mentioned in the foregoing extract, or not, cannot now be determined; but it appears to be a case that falls very naturally within the scope of the maxim he has there laid down.

13*

CHAPTER IX.

Mr. Jefferson afraid to attack general Washington's character openly-Letter to W. Jones, January, 1814, à specimen of his insidiousness--Great body of republicans think of Washington as he does-His belief that we should eventually come to something like the British constitution had some weight in his adopting levees, &c.-Pains taken by the federalists to make him view Jefferson as a theorist, &c.-Jefferson never saw Washington after the former left the state department, otherwise these impressions would have been dissipated-Letter from Jefferson to M. Van Buren, June, 1824-Notice of charges in a work published by T. Pickering-Letter to Mazzei-Not a word in that letter that would not be approved by every republican in the United States-Not a word in that letter about France-By forms of British government was meant levees, &c.-Subject of ceremonies at Washington's second election referred to heads of departments-Jefferson and Hamilton thought there was too much ceremony-The phrase, "Samson's in the field," meant the society of the Cincinnati-Jefferson says general Washington knew this-Never had any reason to believe that general Washington's feelings towards him ever changed-Washington a sincere friend to the republican principle-Knew Jefferson's suspicions of Hamilton-After the retirement of his first cabinet, general Washington fell into federal hands-Remarks on this letter.

THAT Mr. Jefferson was afraid to run the risk of openly attacking general Washington's principles or character is beyond a doubt. But that he took every opportunity, by insinuations, suggestions, and various other means which no other man ever knew how to employ with so much effect, to depreciate his understanding and talents, to lower him in the estimation of those with whom he was inti.

mate, to make him the object of party animosity and newspaper rancor and calumny-and this with so much art and address as to make it appear to a cursory observer that he was his sincere admirer and friend-cannot be doubted.

And such was emphatically the course which he pursued towards his memory when he was preparing materials for future generations to read, and which he doubtless intended should form the basis of their opinions respecting his own talents and character. At page 234 of the fourth volume of his posthumous works is a letter to Dr. Walter Jones, dated January 2, 1814, which furnishes a remarkable specimen of the manner in which Mr. Jefferson could exercise his ingenuity in praising general Washington in one breath and in taking off the force of what he had said in his favor in the next. It is as follows:

"You say that in taking general Washington on your shoulders to bear him harmless through the federal coalition, you encounter a perilous topic. I do not think so. You have given the genuine history of the course of his mind through the trying scenes in which it was engaged, and of the seductions by which it was deceived but not depraved. I think I knew general Washington intimately and thoroughly, and were I called on to delineate his character it should be in terms like these.

"His mind was great and powerful, though not so acute as that of a Newton, Bacon or Locke; and as far as he saw no judgment ever was sounder. It was slow in operation, being little aided by invention or imagination, but sure in conclusion. Hence the common remark of his officers of the advantages he derived from councils of war where, hearing all suggestions, he selected whatever was best; and certainly no general ever planned his battles. more judiciously. But if deranged during the course of

the action, if any member of his plan was dislocated by sudden circumstances, he was slow in readjustment. The consequence was, that he often failed in the field, and rarely against an enemy in station, as at Boston and York. He was incapable of fear, meeting personal dangers with the calmest unconcern. Perhaps the strongest feature in his character was prudence, never acting until every circumstance, every consideration was maturely weighed; refraining if he saw a doubt, but, when once decided, going through with his purpose whatever obstacles opposed. His integrity was most pure, his justice the most inflexible I have ever known-no motives of interest or consanguinity, of friendship or hatred, being able to bias his decision. He was, indeed, in every sense of the word, a wise, a good, and a great man. His temper was naturally irritable and high-toned, but reflection and resolution had obtained a firm and habitual ascendency over it. If ever, however, it broke its bonds, he was most tremendous in his wrath. In his expenses he was honorable, but exact; liberal in contributions to whatever promised utility, but frowning and unyielding on all visionary projects and all unworthy calls on his charity. His heart was not warm in its affections, but he exactly calculated every man's value and gave him a solid esteem proportioned to it. Although in the circle of his friends, where he might be unreserved with safety, he took a free share in conversation, his colloquial talents were not above mediocrity, possessing neither copiousness of ideas nor fluency of words. In public, when called on for a sudden opinion, he was unready, short and embarrassed. Yet he wrote readily, rather diffusely, in an easy and correct style. This he had acquired by conversation with the world, for his education was merely reading, writing and common arithmetic, to which he

added surveying at a later day. His time was employed in action chiefly, reading little, and that only in agriculture and English history. His correspondence became necessarily extensive, and with journalizing his agricultural proceedings occupied most of his leisure hours within doors. On the whole, his character was, in its mass, perfect, in nothing bad, in few points indifferent; and it may truly be said, that never did nature and fortune combine more perfectly to make a man great and to place him in the same constellation with whatever worthies have merited from man an everlasting remembrance. For his was the singular destiny and merit of leading the armies of his country successfully through an arduous war for the establishment of its independence; of conducting its councils through the birth of a government, new in its forms and principles, until it had settled down into a quiet and orderly train; and of scrupulously obeging the laws through the whole of his career, civil and military, of which the history of the world furnishes no other example.

"How then can it be perilous for you to take such a man on your shoulders? I am satisfied the great body of republicans think of him as I do. We were, indeed, dissatisfied with him on his ratification of the British treaty. But this was short-lived. We knew his honesty, the wiles with which he was encompassed, and that age had already begun to relax the firmness of his purposes; and I am convinced he is more deeply seated in the love and gratitude of the republicans than in the pharisaical homage of the federal monarchists. For he was no monarchist from preference of his judgment. The soundness of that gave him correct views of the rights of man, and his severe justice devoted him to them. He has often declared to me that he considered our new constitution as an ex