notion, that the mind perceives and contemplates its own ideas only, I think his argument unanswerable. All its knowledge is upon that supposition limited to its own ideas, and cannot possibly go beyond them. But I am quite satisfied that this is a false notion; and that the mind perceives external objects directly, and without the interven

non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed that, though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity, with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, I refute it thus.' This was a stout exemplification of the first truths of Père Bouffier, or the original principles of Reid and of Beattie; without admitting which, we can no more argue in metaphysicks, than we can argue in mathematicks without axioms. To me it is not conceivable how Berkeley can be answered by pure reasoning; but I know that the nice and difficult task was to have been undertaken by one of the most luminous minds of the present age, (Burke,) had not politicks turned him from calm philosophy aside.' What an admirable display of subtlety, united with brilliance, might his contending with Berkeley have afforded us! How must we, when we reflect on the loss of such an intellectual feast, regret that he should be characterised as the man,

'Who born for the universe narrow'd his mind,

And to party gave up what was meant for mankind?

"Dr. Johnson seems to have been imperfectly acquainted with Berkeley's doctrine," says the annotator K., " as his experiment only proves that we have the sensation of solidity, which Berkeley did not deny. He admitted that we had sensations or ideas, that are usually called sensible qualities, one of which is solidity: he only denied the existence of matter, i. e. an inert,

tion of any ideas of its own. Try the experiment: look at an object. Do you not perceive it directly? Is anything besides the object itself present to your mind? Shut your eyes — you lose the object itself; you no longer perceive it. But you retain the idea of it: the idea is then alone present to your mind. Are not these two cases totally different? Neither does Berkeley say that there is no cause of the mind's perceiving external objects, but only that this perception does not imply, does not prove their absolute existence. This he illustrates by the case of dreams, in which the objects before the mind appear to have as real existence as in the case of waking perception. He does not mean, however, to prove anything by the example of dreams; but only to shew that things may appear as if they had real and absolute existence, when in fact they have not. He would therefore say the seeing a guinea, and being told the constituent properties of it, was the same thing, or that those two cases or effects were to be ascribed to the same cause. He would admit, nay he would contend, that there was some cause in the first instance, different from that in the last; but he would at the same time insist, that this cause was not necessarily the absolute existence of the guinea, and that you cannot prove it to be such. But enough of this. The question itself is perfectly frivolous; the relative existence of external objects being the only sort of

senseless substance, in which they are supposed to subsist. Johnson's exemplification concurs with the vulgar notion, that solidity is matter. But Johnson's reply to Soame Jenyns, sufficiently proves that he had a capacity for metaphysics, if he had turned his attention to the science. E. H. B.]

existence, that is of any consequence to us, or to any perceiving mind.*

"Sensible evidence, then, is original, is direct, is perfectly satisfactory; as it admits of no preceding proof, so neither does it admit of subsequent contradiction. But is there not sometimes deception in sensible perception?

*[To a friend I am indebted for the opportunity of gratifying some readers by the introduction of three Letters, which among many others he received from the late amiable, ingenious, learned, philosophical, and scientific Capel Lofft, Esq. :

1. "Ipswich, June 25, 1816. I have laboured hard this morning in walking for the definition of a noun: will this satisfy? A noun is a word expressive of any subject of thought under the consideration of 1. being, 2. idea, 3. quality, or 4. relation. A noun adjective, or adnoun, expresses quality or relation, with reference to some being or idea in particular.

Do not the representations of our senses often impose upon and mislead us? Never : - the reports of sense are always the same—always the same in the same circumstances; and the senses would really deceive us, were their representations the same in different circumstances. There are two cases only, in which there is this appear

You will see that space and time, in my nomenclature, fall under the head of relations. If this be right, matter is necessarily no more; and mind is properly the sole being, the rest being idea, phænomena, or sensible effects, or the relations of these. I know not why the tangible idea of body should be considered more real than the visible colour, or the audible sound. Now that space and time should be beings, things, or substances, is to me as inconceivable as that mere extension should be so. Space is an extended order of simultaneous ideas; time, an extended order of succession; and I cannot think that either has more than a relative existence, deduced from the modes and phænomena of the existence and energies of mind. You will pardon me for adding the adjectives, which serve to exemplify my distinction of the abstract nature of those substantives, which signify idea, quality, or relation, from adjectives, which signify it in the particular or concrete. For the reason already given place does not fall under my idea of the category of the genera of substantives; it being included under relation, as being the relation of space to body."

II. " Woodbridge, May 25, 1813. I really never read Dialogues so perfectly Socratic, or rather Platonic, as those of the great and amiable Berkeley on the Principles of Human Knowledge. I wonder that it did not strike him that motion,

ance of deception. The first is, when the same object is perceived through a different external medium, or in any other difference of external circumstances. Take a familiar instance. A stick, that appears to be strait both to the eye and the touch, when plunged in part into cold water, will appear to be bent. Draw your hand along it,

though as to inanimate objects an idea, is as to sentient, an energy of mind and volition. The ancient philosophy of the Stoics, which conversed of mind as δύναμις αὐτοκινητική, καὶ δὶ ἧς πάντα κινείται, appears to me to be solid and profound. All movement, all action, all energy, is assuredly referable to mind as its sole principle and source. Mind, the ἐν ᾧ καὶ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμὲν of the Apostle, seems to me to be perfectly consonant to the system of pure idealism. I admit external objects, without which created minds would probably be incapable of all discipline, all improvement, all idea of analogy between cause and effect. But I believe that external objects are solely permanent and general phænomena, the result of mind regulated by laws of divine wisdom; that sensation cannot result from that which is insensible, nor thought with percipiency be a quality of impercipient substance; - that mind cannot originate from matter, nor matter, as being essentially inert, act upon mind, which is essentially active ; — that the system of pure materialism is demonstrably false; - the complex hypothesis of mind and matter uselessly and gratuitously complex and contradictory;—— and consequently the simple system of mind true and certain, and alone adequate to all phænomena and all principles. I have long thought that matter is the Indian elephant, which supports the universe; which elephant has another chimerical support, the forlorn, immoveable space: to support that, Noûs, 'Idéa, 'Apμovía, τò IIâv, is my motto."

III." Sept. 22, 1813. I have been turning my thoughts