nient, either by his own fole Authority, or by joining his own Forces, when it should be neceffary to employ them for that Purpose: This Cafe of Neceffity being the fole one which could change the Confiderations of the Honour of his Majefty, and the Intereft of his Nation, we have now to examine at what Time it began, when it was preffing, and how far we may impute to the Prince we fpeak of, the having failed in what all these Confiderations together counfelled him to do. We fhall eafily agree, that while our Forces were fufficient, not only to defend us, but even to attempt upon France, it would not have been handsome for us to have propofed to that King to have engaged himself contrary to the Intereft of his Nation. Now it is manifeft, that during the three firft Campaigns, at leaft after the Peace between his Majesty and Holland, we were in that Pofture, which may be easily made appear by looking back upon the Events of those Campaigns. Certain it is, that at and after the Battle of Seneffe in the Year 1674, the Forces of France were worsted and continued in the weakeft Condition, the Prince of Conde was obliged to retire beyond the Sambre, and the Army of the Confederates was then in a Pofture of laying Siege to Oudenarde; and though the Prince of Conde made an Effort to come fuddenly to its Relief, he would in all Probability have been repulfed, if the Count de Souches, General of the Imperial Army, would have come up in Time according to the Advice of the Prince of Orange, of which his Highnefs made great Complaints to the Emperor, and feveral of the principal Officers of the Army refused to serve any longer under this Count, which obliged the Emperor to take away his Commiffion. The Armies of the Allies were likewife much the ftronger upon the Rhine that fame Campaign; the Elector of Brandenbourg took his Winter-Quarters in Alfatia, from whence Monfieur De Turenne was obliged to retire and go to Paris; and though by an admirable Diligence and Conduct he returned the fame Winter, and conftrained the Forces of the Elector to repafs the Rhine, which he likewife paffed himself, make to the Campaign of 1675. (this however having been his laft and fatal Year) General Montecuculi repulfed and purfued his Army, diminished by above half, to the other Side of the faid River, and laid Siege to Saverne: And tho when the Prince of Conde (who was fent to fave the Ruins of that Army, and' give Reparation to the Affairs of France) approached him, he raised the Siege, yet indeed it was only to triumph over that Prince, and to drive him before him as far as he pleafed; after which, when it seemed he might have made fome good Use of his Advantage, he attempted nothing farther before their going into Winter-Quarters. On the other Side, the total Rout of the Marfhal De Crequi by the Forces of the Dukes of Lunenburg, and the Recovery thereupon of the City of Treves out of the Hands of the French, had reduced their Affairs into that Condition, that his moft Chriftian Majefty found not a more prefent Remedy than to have Recourfe to his Arricreban, which was likewife beaten by the Duke of Lorrain; the Elector of Brandenbourg having befides fo gloriously freed his Country from the Swedes, and the Duke of Lunenberg and Bishop of Munfter having ftripped them of all they poffeffed in the Dutchy of Bremen, except the City of Staden; Denmark likewife having taken Part in the War, whereby the Swedes remained altogether unable to defend themselves, and much lefs to affift France, the Forces of the Allies began to be formidable to it, and found themfelves capable, in the Campaign of 1676,

to

to attempt at the fame Time the two Sieges of Maestricht and Philipfbourg: But as most of them faw themselves in a fair way of making Conquefts, Jealoufy began to rife up among them, each Party fearing that his Neigh bour would have too good a Share therein; the Difputes for the Dividend haveing delayed the taking of Staden, as well as the Succours which were to have come to the Prince of Orange, of the Troops which blocked up that Place, were the Causes that this Prince was obliged to raife the Siege of Maestricht, during which the French had Time to take Aire from the Spaniards. Hitherto we all thought ourselves uppermoft in our Affairs, which I might eafily demonftrate by Things that paffed openly in the Congress of Nimeguen, where it was clearly to be seen by all the World, that the moft Chriftian King aimed at nothing but fecuring his Honour by a Peace that might have given us Satiffaction. But after the Misfortune of Maeftricht, the Hollanders began to fear with more Apprehenfion what afterwards happened, namely, That the Remifsness and different Interefts of the German Princes, the Weakness of Spain, and the Diligence of the French, the Spanish Low Countries would be fwallowed up in Spight of all the Forces of the Confederates: Yet, as by the taking of Philipfbourg the Power of the Emperor was augmented, by that of Staden the Princes of Lunenburg and of Munster had their Hands free, that they promised a good and fincere Correfpondence, and as there were great Hopes conceived from the Zeal and good Conduct of the Duke of Lorrain, who commanded the Imperial Army, the Power of the Allies feemed ftill vigourous and formidable. But as the moft Chriftian King, by his ufual Diligence, began the Campaign of 1677 with the Sieges of St. Omer's and of Cambray at the fame Time, before any Army of the Allies could or would appear, except that of the States; and the Prince of Orange being nettled with the Reproaches of the Spaniards, that he did but eat up their good Land of Waes while he saw two of their Towns befieged, out of a Generofity which filled them with Admiration, he hazarded both his Army and Perfon for the Relief of St. Omers, but without any other Success than what might be expected from an Army inferior in Forces to that it attacked, which was likewife powerfully fuccoured by that of the King, infomuch that the abovementioned Places, and the Town of Valenciennes were thereupon taken by the French, and afterwards the Prince of Orange was obliged to quit the Enterprize of Charleroy, by a laudable and neceffary Prudence not to hazard once again all the Forces the States had left for their Defence. On the other Side it was evident, that it was impoffible for the Duke of Lorrain, and would be always fo for the Imperialists, to make any great Invafion into France, or to execute any confiderable Enterprize elsewhere, while the French fhould content themfelves with acting upon the Defenfive with a fufficient Army. I muft confefs it was in that Juncture our Affairs began to stand in need of fome powerful Interceffion of the Prince whofe Conduct we are confidering, and it is from what paffed fince in England that we are principally to judge of his Intentions.

The Parliament had been a long Time making him Addreffes to recall his Troops out of the Service of France; and though his Majefty, fuffering at the fame Time fix Regiments of his Subjects in Holland, and being to keep his Neutrality as Mediator, did at first only forbid by his Proclamations any new Troops from paffing into France, he recalled them at length, and they returned

1

returned very much diminished in Number, and mifufed, as is well known But as this was but the leaft Remedy to our Evils, and the Parliament had more warmly taken the Alarm, in the Beginning of the Campaign 1677, thofe Gentlemen were of Opinion that it was Time to make fome Paces towards a War, and prayed the King in their Addreffes to fortify himfelf with Alliances againft France: Hereupon, to our Misfortune, which will be found theirs like wife at the End of the Account, Jealoufies began to break out between the King and his Parliament. His Majefty demanded of them a Sum of 600,000 / Sterling, as neceffary for the putting him in a Pofture of speaking and acting as became him: Thofe Gentlemen gave him Credit for only 200,000l. with general Promises of affifting him after he had made his Alliances. His Majesty imagined that the Course they took was an Encroachment upon his Prerogatives, and upon that prorogued from Time to Time their Affembly, until the Beginning of the Year 1678. In the mean while, after the End of the aforementioned Campaign of 1677, he called his Nephew the Prince of Orange intox England, for the perfonally concerting Affairs with him, and giving him in Marriage the Lady Mary, against the Will, as was believed, of the Duke of York, that Princess's Father; which methinks is a fufficient Testimony that this King withdrew himself entirely from France, and it has not been doubted but that the French fo understood it. His Majefty made likewife thereupon an Alliance with your Republick, and at the affembling of the Parliament com municated to them these Things, with Promifes, if they would arm him fuffi-› ciently to enter into a War, that he would never be at Reft until he had re-eftablifhed a Peace in Christendom, which any one Prince fhould not be capable of disturbing. Those Gentlemen thereupon prefented an Addrefs, wherein, giveing him ftill only general Promifes of Affiftance, they defired him to make new Alliances, engage all his Allies not to make any Peace but upon the foot of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, nor to have any Commerce with France, nor to fuffer the Ships of any Nation to enter or go out of the Ports of that Kingdom. This Propofition, which was very remarkable, gave different Motions to those it concerned; most of the Allies took Courage, feeing the Affurance and Refolution with which thofe Gentlemen fpoke; it gave Aftonishment to you in Holland, where you were not defirous to embark in a long War, and were content with a Peace of lefs Safety; and your profound Dreamers in Policy did already imagine that the English might carry their Arms as far as formerly into France. But it was very difpleafing to the King, as may be seen by the Answer he made thereto, which was found very rational, and wherein, after his Arguments, he preffes them again to haften their Affiftance of Money as the Time required: But there ftill paffed a Month or more, before they compleated the Refolution for Money to raife Forces. By that Time the French had made themselves Masters of Ghent, and were in a Condition of proceeding much further, before the Succours that were preparing in England could hinder them. The Hollanders feeing none of their Allies ready, fome refufing to march, their own Forces being for the greatest Part in the Spanish Towns, from whence they could not withdraw them, and the reft being uncapable to defend them, in a great Confternation. The most Christian King did not fail to take Advantage of this Juncture, and having made them Propofitions of a general Peace, which he caufed to be printed, they easily difpofed themfelves to accept

were

them,

them, and to perfuade their Allies to do the like. They fent for that Purpose to the Duke of Villa Hermofa, who oppofed it a long Time; but the Parliament in England, feeing by the Difpofition of the Hollanders that it would be almost impoffible to prevent the Peace, and not being willing to leave the King armed, turned all their Thoughts from War, and took the Refolution to fpeak no more of Money until they had obtained their Demands in Affairs of Religion; that Duke did likewife then accept of the Peace, feeing there was no timely Succour to be expected from England.

This, Sir, I take to be the true Draught of Things, from whence we are to judge if the King of England is the only Caufe of the Greatnefs of France. We may certainly fay, the Jealoufies that arofe betwixt him and his Parliaments were the true Occafion of them. It was to be wifhed, both for him and us, that either one Party or other had yielded sooner. I am not well enough acquainted with the Maxims of their Country to decide pofitively which ought to have done it. The King not only thought his Prerogatives were ufurped upon, but feemed to have juft Apprehenfions of engaging in a War, which it was in the Power of his People to put an End to by fhutting their Purses. If they had furnished him with the Sum of 600,000l. when he demanded it, he might either have engaged himself in a War, or been in a Pofture of making Peace, as he thought convenient; but thofe Gentlemen dreaded to put Arms into the Hands of his Majefty, for fear he fhould make use of them to render himself abfolute: However, fince they found it neceffary to do it afterwards, had it not been better they had done it in Time? To fpeak the Truth, methinks that great Body, though compofed of fo many wife Heads, did not fufficiently foresee what might happen, or thofe Gentlemen did fecretly aim at Peace while they openly declared for War; and they hoped the Heat and Refolution which they fhewed for the latter, would produce the former without ftriking a Blow, and fuch an one too as they defired. We must however say, that they fhewed a great deal of Wisdom in not continuing inflexibly bent to the last, to hazard rather the Ruin of Europe than to confide an Army in the King. The Confideration they had for the publick Good has likewife appeared, in that they made no Difficulty of paying that Army, though the King kept it on foot much longer than they ordered, for the obliging the French to restore the Towns of the Spanish Netherlands before the Reftitution of the Swedes. The King likewife, on his Side, had manifeftly made appear the little Ground there was to fufpect him of a Design to render himself abfolute; fince having that Army fo long at his Difpofal, he made not the leaft Ufe of it to that Purpose: Methinks then that his Subjects may be in Repofe on that Side; and would to God for our Interests, that the future Parliaments may be in the fame Difpofition as was that we fpeak of, of yielding rather to his Majefty, than fuffer France to draw the fatal Advantages from their Diffention, which in all Likelihood it will endeavour to do.

I am, &c.

The

مرة

They fent for that Purpofe to Time; but the Parliament in ders that it would be almoft ling to leave the King armed, e Refolution to speak no more s in Affairs of Religion; that g there was no timely Succour Things, from whence we are fe of the Greatness of France. betwixt him and his Pariao be wifhed, both for him and boner. I am not well enough decide pofitively which ought his Prerogatives were ufurped engaging in a War, which it bby fhutting their Purfes. If ol. when he demanded it, he been in a Pofture of making entlemen dreaded to put Arms d make ufe of them to render neceffary to do it afterwards, Time? To fpeak the Truth, fo many wife Heads, did not e Gentlemen did fecretly aim at nd they hoped the Heat and buld produce the former without efired. We must however fay, ot continuing inflexibly bent to han to confide an Army in the ick Good has likewife appeared, Army, though the King kept it e obliging the French to refore the Reftitution of the Swede made appear the little Ground ■ himself absolute; fince having not the leaft Ufe of it to that be in Repofe on that Side; and re Parliaments may be in the yielding rather to his Majefty, es from their Diffention, which

TRACTS on all SUBJECT

The CHARACTER of a TRUE PROT

H

1682.

E is one that profeffeth the Doctrine and Difcipline England, as it is established by the Laws of the Ki feffeth against the Contrary. He sticks to the Protefta from whence he had his Name. He loves the Unity of the C endeavours next her Verity in Faith, her Unity and Conform with that Church, not daring to broach any new Opinion, no difturb the Peace of his Aged Mother! Private Interpretation approves not; but fubmits his own, and maintains none agai and approved Doctrine of the Church, whereof he is a Memb that Evangelical Counsel is to be obferved, and that all Things Order and Decency. He owns the King to be the Head of the perfonal, and hath fworn him God's Deputy in Government, the Sword, which he must not bear in vain. He dares not que rity, who is only answerable to God; but in his Heart honours Vicegerent; and knows, that to refift his Power, is to refift hi and though the Penalty be Damnation, yet he fears not for th the Offence given to God, who gave that Power. to God's Moral Laws, and Man's Judicial; and that there muf He confeffet Active as well as Paffive, to the One and the Other. He Spiritual Kingdom oppofeth not the Temporal Claim and Pow but Cæfar must have his Tribute (the Badge of Conqueft) as G his Acknowledgment of his Protection; and dare not call his Anointed of God, fince God called Cyrus an Heathen fo; not for of External Unction, but the Internal Character of Supreme P can make a Difference between Types and Metaphors; the One fons, the Other in Words. He conceives Paffive Obedience alw King, where Active cannot be performed with a good Confcien lieves Faith alone cannot justify without Works but both to First before God, the Second before Man. He believes God reward rit; yet that there is Difference in Glory and Reward, though al nefs. Traditions and Ceremonies he reverences, as they are Ant stream from the Spring of Original Purity, not to the Neceffity but of Difcipline. He detefteth Parity in Church or Common-weal ing to Anarchy. He dares not swear against his Confcience, nor cit Obedience to occafional Ordinances. He thinks no Authority, or greater than that to whom he hath made a judicial Vow, can d He is Loyal, for Confcience fake, to his Soveraign; Charitable fake, to his Neighbour; and dares not do that unto another, he contented should be done unto himfelf; much lefs rob his Sovere Birth-Right, or deface God's Character. He thinks Dixi vos Dii fupremely to his Sovereign, minifterially to his Subjects. He dares VOL. III. Eee