further reinforcements sent after him, as fast as they could be fitted out. Accordingly Sir Arthur set sail, and on the 20th July arrived at Corunna, where he found tidings of the recent defeat which Cuesta and Blake had sustained at Medina del Rio Seco. It was such a reverse as was to be expected in the outset of such a war. The French used their victory cruelly, and committed the most atrocious excesses afterwards. This disaster had not in the slightest degree dispirited the Galicians: when the English offered their assistance, they assured Sir Arthur that they were in no need of men, and that his army could nowhere be so usefully employed as in acting against Junot and clearing Portugal of the enemy. They represented the enemy's force as not exceeding 15,000 men, and said that the Portuguese had already assembled an army of 10,000 at Porto.

To Porto the expedition proceeded; and Sir Arthur, after a conference with the Bishop, leaving the transports, went on to confer with Admiral Cotton off the Tagus. It was impossible to effect a landing there: Mondego Bay, therefore, was chosen, and Sir Arthur, having sent instructions to General Spencer to join him, met his transports on the 30th. There he received dispatches from home, informing him that reinforcements of 5000 men under General Ludlow were on their way, and that 10,000 more would speedily be sent under Sir John Moore. This general was his superior officer; but the command in chief would be vested in Sir Hew Dalrymple, who was to come from Gibraltar, and Sir Harry Burrard was to be second in command. There was, however, yet time for him to strike the blow before they should arrive to supersede him, and nothing could be more prosperous than the news from Spain: the French squadron at Cadiz had been taken possession of by the Spaniards, and Dupont, with his whole army, made prisoners in Andalusia. Buonaparte had never before received such a blow; the loss of men, indeed, was easily reparable, but the reputation of his armies was wounded, the Invincibles had been put to shame, the spell which palsied the nations was broken: another such catastrophe might stir up the north of Europe to imitate the glorious example of the Peninsula, and what was to preserve Junot from the fate of Dupont? With this prospect, Sir Arthur Wellesley, having been joined by General Spencer, began his march from Coimbra towards Lisbon.

The disposition of the Portuguese was excellent. The events of their insurrection against the French were little known at the time, and have not yet been detailed in any language except their own. It was a general and simultaneous movement of the people, which, under all circumstances, Sir Arthur Wellesley thought even more extraordinary than that for which the Spaniards deserved and obtained universal sympathy and admiration; it was made against far greater disadvantages; and while the British were on the coast an enemy's detachment was ravaging Alemtejo under General Loison, a man who, in an army infamous for its excesses, was distinguished for his love of plunder and of blood. On the 29th of July he sacked the city of Evora, and in the carnage which ensued, the clergy were marked out as especial objects of vengeance, and hunted like wild beasts. Wherever he went his soldiers were let loose to burn, to pillage, and to destroy; but these cruelties served to repress the people only while he was present, and left them more eager and more insatiate for vengeance. This spirit was so general, and such precautions were taken by the government of Coimbra and Pombal, that the French for a long time obtained little information concerning the British troops. At the first rumour, however, Loison hastened from Alemtajo, and, crossing the river, took a position between Thomar and Santarem; and Laborde, who had the reputation of being the best general in that army, with Generals Thomières and Brennier under him, entered Alobaça with a strong detachment, and pushed his advanced posts as far as Aljubarrota. The enemy were perfectly well acquainted with the country; in these points they were always as well informed, as we till of late were ignorant. They fell back as the English advanced, and took post upon the heights of Roliça, a village about two leagues south of Obidos, remarkable as the first ground whereon the British and French were opposed to each other in the Peninsular war. Laborde had about 5000 men; Loison, with an equal force, was expected to join him on the evening of the 17th. Sir Arthur Wellesley was informed of this, and made his attack in the morning. The enemy had chosen his ground well; it consisted of narrow passes and strong heights. Dispositions were made for turning his left by a column of 1200 Portuguese, and his right by Major-general Ferguson, who had also to watch the motions of Loison; but the main attack was

made boldly upon the front and strength of the position, where the principal column, under cover of some olive and cork-trees, was enabled to approach and deploy without much loss. The way was up ravines, made by the rains, in some places overgrown with shrubs, in others impeded with crags, and hitherto only thought practicable for goats. The middle pass appeared the least difficult, and here the assailants suffered their severest loss: for near the top of this pass there was a small opening in the form of a wedge, which at the point nearest the English was overgrown with myrtle, arbutus, and those other shrubs which render the wildernesses of this part of Portugal so beautiful. Here the French posted an ambush of riflemen, and here Colonel Lake led his regiment, instead of sending forward to explore the ground as the pass opened: the French let half the regiment enter, and then fired upon them when they were in close column. Colonel Lake fell; a severe loss was sustained, but the men pushed forward and won the pass. Here the 29th and 9th Regiments found themselves for a considerable time unsupported, and the enemy charged them thrice with great resolution, but were as often repulsed. The skill of the French was indeed as clearly proved that day as their inferiority to the British soldiers in those moments when every thing depends upon native courage. During a contest which began at nine in the morning and was not concluded before five in the afternoon, they retreated with admirable order from one difficult position to another, losing none of the advantages which the ground offered, of which it was not the least that the English were never able to avail themselves of their numerical superiority, the number actually engaged being far less than that of the enemies whom they defeated. They repeatedly attempted to recover what they had lost, and when this hope was abandoned they effected their retreat in good order; for as Sir Arthur Wellesley wanted cavalry, and troops and cannon could not be brought up the passes with the requisite speed, there was no pursuit. Our loss was less than 500 men killed, wounded, and missing; that of the French was supposed to have trebled it, and of their five pieces of cannon three taken. The battle, though neither in its scale nor its consequences of much importance, becomes interesting, as the first in this long struggle, and because in this trial the British evinced that superiority in what may be termed national courage, which

they maintained in every engagement from that day till they closed their triumphant career before the walls of Toulouse.

On the same day that the battle of Roliça was fought, the Portuguese by an enterprise, conducted with equal bravery and good fortune, recovered the important city of Abrantes, where Loison had left a garrison of 200 men. That general, as well as Laborde, now fell back to join the main force of the French, which Junot was collecting about Torres Vedras.

Sir Arthur Wellesley meantime was informed that Generals Ackland and Anstruther, with their brigades, were off the coast; and he moved to Vimeiro to protect their landing. The larger reinforcements under Sir Harry Burrard and Sir John Moore, having been delayed by contrary winds, were sixteen days from Portsmouth before they made Cape Finisterre: their instructions were, not to go to the south of Porto without obtaining information. Sir Harry, therefore, removed to the Brazen sloop, with some of his staff, and leaving the convoy, proceeded first to the Douro, then to the Mondego. Here he found letters from Sir Arthur, recommending that the troops should land here, and march upon Santarem in order to cut off the retreat of the enemy in that direction; but the letter added that they must carry their own bread, for the resources of the country were not to be relied on. Upon weighing this difficulty, and the possible danger of not being in sufficient strength to resist the enemy if they should retire with their force upon that point, Sir Harry Burrard determined not to follow this advice, and continued his course southward. This was on the 18th: the next day he obtained intelligence of the battle of Roliça, and then dispatched an officer to Sir John Moore, directing him to land in the Mondego, and proceed according to circumstances and his own judgment. Moore accordingly reached the Mondego on the 20th, began to disembark, but presently he received counter-orders to follow Sir Harry, who had changed his mind, and was proceeding to the Maceira, where he arrived on the evening of the 20th. While the English troops were thus divided, Junot had collected his forces; he himself, with the advanced guard, took post in front of Torres Vedras, and the main body, under Laborde and Loison, were strongly posted behind the town. They covered the country with their cavalry, of which they had about 1300, and Sir Arthur could only learn that their position was

very strong, and their whole strength assembled there. His own plans were speedily formed; Sir Charles Stuart (a man whose eminent military talents were never allowed an adequate field wherein to display themselves) had carefully surveyed this part of the country while he commanded the British troops in Portugal, for it had not escaped him that upon this ground, in case of serious invasion, the kingdom must be won or lost. His maps and topographical accounts were in Sir Arthur Wellesley's possession. The French either did not understand the advantages which the ground offered them, or they believed that a defensive system was not practicable on their part, because of the disposition of the people. Sir Arthur determined to push his advanced guard to Mafra on the following morning, turning the enemy's position by this movement; and he then hoped to enter Lisbon in pursuit of the retreating enemy. Having laid down this plan, and issued orders for putting it in execution on the morrow, he heard of Sir Harry's arrival, and going immediately on board to communicate with him, he explained his intended measures.

But the new commander was more impressed with the difficulties to be encountered, than encouraged by the success which had hitherto attended the movements of the army. The strength of the enemy's cavalry, and their own want of that important arm of war, kept the British troops at present close to their encampment; and the farther they might advance from the ships (upon which they depended for bread), the more severely would this inferiority be felt. The artillery-horses were inefficient; they were cast-off cavalry, purchased in Ireland, the old and the blind, and the lame; some of them had already died of age, and others, though carefully fed, had sunk under what would have been easy work for horses in good condition; nearly a sixth part had thus perished upon the way, and of those which were left many were not worth the forage which they consumed. Under these circumstances, the decision which he was now called upon to make appeared to Sir Harry Burrard most serious in its consequences; and should the army be checked in advancing, he thought it impossible to calculate the disasters to which it might be exposed. He was of opinion, therefore, that they ought to wait for Sir John Moore's division. Sir Arthur represented that at least ten days must elapse before these troops could land and become ser