"7. That all seamen, soldiers, servants and other laborers and suspected persons, who shall travel in and through this province without a pass from one or more justices of the peace of this or other neighboring provinces, signifying that he, she or they are free persons, it shall and may be lawful for any constable or other person or persons whatsoever, to take up all such vagrant persons traveling without passes as aforesaid, and him, her or them to carry before any justice of the peace of this province, who shall strictly examine all such persons so brought before him, and all such as can give no account of themselves, and the causes and reasons of their traveling, shall be by said justice committed to the common gaol of the county where taken up, there to remain till thence delivered by order of their captain, master, mistress or other due course of law.* Any boatman transporting such persons without passes, or any inn keeper who entertained them, forfeited forty shillings. So also, in 1730, retailers of strong liquors were forbidden to sell to servants, or "shall permit any servant or servants to sit, drink or tipple without leave of the master." In 1686 the captors of runaway servants could claim twenty shillings from the master or mistress and "six pence for every mile he or she shall be at the pains and trouble to secure and bring such servant back." The laws of 1682 provided, that "all servants above the age of one and twenty years, transported or to be transported into this province without indentures or other agreements, shall serve four years to commence from the time the ship shall be entered in the said province," and all under twenty-one were to be brought into court, where the length of service was to be determined. But probably a statute like the following † did much in the Proprietors' times, as it would at present, "for the prevention of differences betwixt masters and servants:" "XXV. At the expiration of his or their service, his or their master, mistress or agents shall furnish the aforesaid servant or servants and each of them respectively with two suits of apparel, suitable for a servant, one good falling ax, a good hoe and seven bushels of good Indian corn.‡ "If a man or woman maim or smite the eye of his or their man or maid servant, being a white servant, so that it perish, or smite out the tooth of his or their man or maid servant, such servant shall go free. If the master or mistress, or agent to such, immoderately correct their servants, they shall be punished for the same by the next sessions of the county court where the fact ariseth or doth appear. "XXVI. That all masters or mistresses having negro slaves or others shall allow them sufficient accommodation of victuals and clothing." We conclude this lengthy historical review of legislation directly or indirectly affecting the wage earners, past and present, of New Jersey, with the opinion in the South Jersey "shinplaster" case referred to above. THE UNITED STATES v. WOODWARD WARRICK, SURVIVING PARTNER, ETO. [United States Circuit Court, District of New Jersey, filed October 12th, 1885.] BRADLEY AND MCKENNAN JJ. A writ of error to the District Court has been brought by each party in this case. The plaintiff recovered a judgment for $163 31, but being dissatisfied with the smallness of the amount, brought its writ to secure a reversal on that ground. The defendant brought his writ for a reversal of the entire judgment. The action was brought by the United States to recover taxes alleged to *Our present tramp laws seem to be modeled after this section. For most cases of vagrancy perhaps, they are well enough; but when it comes to punishing the unfortunate with the lazy and vicious, it reverses the good old legal maxim, that it is better for nine guilty persons to escape than that one innocent man shall suffer. Leaming & Spicer, 1682-1702, chapter 8. For West Jersey the law read: "Ten bushels of corn, necessary apparel, two horses and one axe." be due from the defendant and his former partner, constituting the firm of Warrick & Stanger, for using and paying out their notes as currency. The tax was claimed under and by virtue of the nineteenth section of the act entitled "An act to amend existing customs and internal revenue laws and for other purposes," approved February 8th, 1875, (18 Statutes, 311,) which section is as follows: That every person, firm, association other than national bank associations, and every corporation, State bank or State banking association, shall pay a tax of ten per centum on the amount of their own notes used for circulation and paid out by them." Warrick & Stanger were glass manufacturers at Glassboro, Gloucester county, NJ., and in 1877 and subsequent years issued their notes in various amounts from five cents to five dollars each, in payment of wages due to their hands, which notes were in the following form: The notes were in printed form, except the date, number and signature, were on bank paper and had the appearance of notes intended for circulation from hand to hand. They were issued to the amount of $3,561.75 in various denominations, and when redeemed were continually re issued, until the amount paid out from November, 1877, to March, 1880, reached the sum of $57,471.51. The average amount outstanding at any one time was about $2,300. Evidence was given tending to show that these notes circulated in the community as money, being used not only in purchasing goods at the store of Warrick & Stanger, but in transactions and dealinge between other persons. The court below left it to the jury to determine whether the notes were in fact used for circulation as money in the community, and whether the defendants, in paying them out, knew that they would be so used. Amongst other things, the judge in his charge used the following language: "We cannot properly affirm that the true nature of the issue can only be determined by considering what was said by the maker when they were paid out. We must take notice how they were used by the workmen and the community with the knowledge of the defendant. We must ask, were they in fact used for circulation, and did the defendant know when he paid them out that they would be thus used? If he did, does not the law necessarily infer that he intended them to be thus used when he paid them out? That is for the jury to say." The defendants' counsel contended, and asked the judge to charge that, in order to render the defendants liable to the tax it should be shown that they intended to put the notes in circulation as money, and paid them out for that purpose, and that their declarations when they paid out the notes were the proper and only evidences of their intention. The judge charged that it must be shown that it was one of the purposes of the defendants in paying out the notes to put them in circulation, and he told the jury that in order to render a verdict for the plaintiff, they must be satisfied that the notes were paid out with the intent that they should be used for circulation, but declined to charge that the declarations of the defendants were the only evidence of such intention. As already shown, he charged that paying out the notes knowing that they would be used and circulated as money was evidence from which the jury might infer the intention to pay them out for that purpose. We do not well see how the defendants could have reasonably asked a more favorable charge. Other specific charges on this branch of the case were requested, but it is not necessary to enumerate them. We are satisfied from the general character of the evidence, and from the form and appearance of the notes, that it was fairly left to the jury to determine whether the notes were used for circulation as money, and whether the defendant and his partner issued them for that purpose. Another point was that notes under the amount of one dollar were not taxable under the law. But we see nothing in the language of the act to lay a foundation for any such distinction. The suggestion that the United States or the national banks issued no currency under that amount to which the notes of the defendant could come in competition, has very little pertinency in view of the clear terms of the act, and the suggestion may be met, if necessary to meet it, by the counter suggestion that the government does issue specie currency of various denominations less than one dollar. As to the amount of the tax (supposing a tax to be due), the plaintiff contended that it was ten per cent of the whole amount of notes paid out by the defendant and his partner, without regard to the fact that the same notes were re issued after being taken up and paid; whilst the defendant contended that the amount of tax was only ten per cent. of the notes that were executed and used, no matter how often they may have been paid out. If the plaintiff was right, the whole amount of notes paid out was $68,474.51, and the tax amounted to $6,847.45. If the defendant was right, the amount of notes executed and used was only $3,561.72, and the tax amounted to only $356.17. The judge charged the jury in accordance with the views of the defendant, and a verdict was rendered for the latter sum with interest. It is for this portion of the charge that the plaintiff has brought its writ of error. We have carefully examined the language of the act, and feel compelled to say that on this point we think the court below erred. We think that every issue of the notes, whether the original issue or a re-issue, was a new issue thereof, and became a part of "the amount of their own notes used for circulation" by the defendants. If instead of using the old notes, already redeemed, the defendants had issued new ones, there can be no doubt that they would have been taxable. But how could it differ in principle or reason of the thing whether they used old notes or new ones? A note redeemed ceases to be a note; it is of no more validity than a blank piece of paper; if it be re-issued it becomes a new note to all intents and purposes. After a careful examination of the whole record, we think that none of the defendants' assignments of error are tenable; but that the plaintiff's assignment is well taken, and that, for this cause, the judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted. |