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it, in order to make war by sea and land against all who should refuse to agree to it. We have already said that Sparta herself proposed these conditions.* All the other cities of Greece, or at least the greatest part of them, rejected so infamous a treaty with horror. However, as they were weakened and exhausted by domestic divisions, and not in a condition to support a war against so powerful a prince, who threatened to fall with all his forces upon those who should refuse to come into this peace, they were obliged against tueir will to comply with it; except the Thebans, who had the courage to oppose it openly at first, but were at length reduced to accept it, with the others, by whom they found themselves universally abandoned.

Such was the fruit of the jealousy and divisions which armed the Grecian cities against each other, and was the end proposed by the policy of Artaxerxes, in distributing sums of money among the several states; invincible in arms, and by the sword, but not by the gold and presents of the Persians; so much did they differ in this respect from the character of the ancient Greeks their forefathers.

To comprehend rightly how much Sparta and Athens differed from what they had been in former times, we have only to compare the two treaties concluded between the Greeks and Persians; the former by Cimon the Athenian, under Artaxerxes Longimanus, above sixty years before, and the latter by Antalcides the Lacedæmonian, under Artaxerxes Mnemon. In the first, Greece victorious and triumphant, assures the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks, gives laws to the Persians, imposes what conditions she pleases, and prescribes bounds and limits, by prohibiting them to approach nearer to the sea with their troops than the distance of three days march; or to appear with vessels of war in any of the seas between the Cyanean and Chalidonian islands; that is to say, from the Euxine to the coasts of Pamphylia. In the second, on the contrary, Persia, grown haughty and imperious, takes pleasure in humbling its conquerors, in depriving them, with a single stroke of the pen, of their empire in Asia Minor, in compelling them to abandon basely all the Greeks established in those rich provinces, to subscribe to their own subjection, and to confine themselves in their turn within the narrow bounds of Greece.f

From whence can so strange an alteration arise? Are there not on both sides the same cities, the same people, the same forces, and the same interest? No doubt there are; but they are not the same men, or rather they have no longer the same principles of policy. Let us recall those happy times of Greece, so glorious for Athens and Sparta, when Persia came pouring like a deluge upon this little country with all the forces of the east. What was it that rendered the two cities invincible, and superior to such numerous and formidable armies? Their union and good understanding. No dissention between the two states, no jealousy of command, no private view of interest; in fine, no other contests between them but of honour, glory, and the love of their country.

To so laudable an union may be added an irreconcileable hatred for the Persians, which became a kind of nature in the Greeks, and was the most distinguishing character of that nation. It was a capital crime, and punished with death, only to mention peace, or propose any accommodation with them; and an Athenian mother was seen to throw the first stone at her son, who had dared to make such a motion, and to set others the example of stoning him.‡

This strict union of the two states, and declared abhorrence of the common enemy, were a long time the potent barriers of their security, rendered them invincible, and may be said to have been the source and principle of all the glorious successes which raised the reputation of Greece to so high a pitch. But by a misfortune common to the most flourishing states, those very successes became the cause of its ruin, and prepared the way for the disgraces it experienced in the sequel.

A. M. 3617. Ant. J. C. 387. Xenoph. 1.v. p. 548-551.
Isoc. in Panegyr. p. 143

t Diod. 1. xii. p. 74, 75

These two states, which might have carried their victorious arms into the heart of Persia, and have attacked in their turn the great king even upon his throne; instead of forming in concert such an enterprise, which would at once have crowned them with glory, and laden them with riches, have the folly to leave their common enemy at repose, to embroil themselves with each other upon trivial points of honour and interests of small importance, and to exhaust the forces ineffectually against themselves, which ought to have been employed solely against the barbarians, who could not have resisted them. For it is remarkable, that the Persians never had any advantage over the Athenians, and Lacedæmonians, while they united with each other, and that it was their own divisions only which supplied them with the means to conquer both alternately, and always the one by the other.*

These divisions induced them to take such measures as neither Sparta nor Athens would ever have otherwise been capable of. We see them both dishonouring themselves by their mean and abject flatteries, not only of the king of Persia, but even of his satraps: paying homage to them, earnestly soliciting their favour, cringing to them, and even suffering their ill humour; and all this to obtain some aid of troops or money, forgetting that the Persians, haughty and insolent to such as seemed afraid of them, became timorous and mean to those who had the courage to despise them. But, in fine, what did they gain by all these mean condescensions? The treaty which gave occasion for these reflections, and will for ever be the reproach of Sparta and Athens.

SECTION VI.-WAR OF ARTAXERXES AGAINST EVAGORAS.

WHAT I have said upon the facility with which the Greeks might have rendered themselves formidable to their enemies, will be more evident, if we consider, on one side, the diversity of people, and extent of country, which composed the vast empire of the Persians, and, on the other, the weakness of the government, incapable of animating so great a mass, and of supporting the weight of so much business and application. In that court, every thing was determined by the intrigues of women, and the cabals of favourites, whose only merit often consisted in flattering their prince, and soothing his passions. It was by their influence officers were chosen, and the first dignities disposed of; by their opinion the services of the generals of armies were judged, and their rewards decided. The sequel will show, that from the same source arose the insurrection of provinces, the distrust of the greatest part of the governors, the discontent and consequent revolt of the best officers, and ill success of almost all the enterprises that were formed.

Artaxerxes, having got rid of the care and perplexity which the war with the Greeks had occasioned, applied himself to the terminating that of Cyprus, which had lasted several years, but had been carried on with little vigour, and turned the greatest part of his forces that way.

Evagoras reigned at that time in Salamin, the capital city of the isle of Cyprus. He was descended from Teucert of Salamin, who at his return from Troy built this city, and gave it the name of his country. His descendants had reigned there from that time; but a stranger of Phoenicia, having dispossessed the lawful king, had taken his place, and to maintain himself in the usurpation, had filled the city with barbarians, and subjected the whole island to the king of Persia.f

Under this tyrant Evagoras was born. He had been carefully educated, and was distinguished among the youth by the beauty of his countenance, the vigour of his body, and more by the modesty and innocence of his manners, which were the greatest ornaments of that age.§ As he advanced in years, the greatest virtues, valour, wisdom, and justice, were observed to brighten in him. He afterwards carried these virtues to so conspicuous a height, as to give jealousy

Isoc. in Panegyr. p. 132-137. This Teucer was of Salamin, a little island near Athens, Isoc. in Evag. p. 380.

In Panath. p. 524, 525.

celebrated for the famous battle under Xerxes Et qui ornat ætatem, pudor-Cic.

to those who governed; who perceived justly that so shining a merit could not continue in the obscurity of a private condition; but his modesty, probity, and integrity, re-assured them, and they reposed an entire confidence in him, to which he always answered by an inviolable fidelity, without ever meditating their expulsion from the throne by violence or treachery.

A more justifiable means conducted him to it, Divine Providence, as Isocrates says, preparing the way for him. One of the principal citizens murdered the person upon the throne, and had contrived to seize Evagoras, and to rid himself of him, in order to secure the crown to himself; but that prince escaping his pursuit, retired to Solos, a city of Cilicia. His banishment was so far from abating his courage, that it gave him new vigour. Attended only with fifty followers, determined like himself to conquer or die, he returned to Salamin, and expelled the usurpers, though supported by the credit and protection of the king of Persia. Having re-established himself in Salamin, he soon rendered his little kingdom most flourishing, by his application to the relief of his subjects, and by protecting them in all things; by governing them with justice and benevolence; by making them active and laborious; by inspiring them with a taste for the cultivation of lands, the breeding of cattle, commerce, and navigation. He formed them also for war, and made them excellent soldiers. He was already very powerful, and had acquired great reputation, when Conon the Athenian general, after his defeat at Egospotamos, took refuge with him; not thinking it possible to find a safer asylum for himself, nor a more powerful support of his country.* The resemblance of their manners and sentiments soon made them contract a strict amity with each other, which continued ever after, and proved equally advantageous to both. Conon was in great credit at the king of Persia's court, which he employed with that prince, by the means of Ctesias the physician, to accommodate his differences with his host Evagoras, and happily effected it.t

Evagoras and Conon, with the noble design of subverting, or at least of reducing the great power of Sparta, which had rendered itself formidable to all Greece, concerted together the means for the attainment of that end. They were both citizens of Athens; the latter by birth, and the other by right of adoption, which his great services and zeal for that republic merited. The satraps of Asia saw with pain their country ravaged by the Lacedæmonians, and found themselves in great difficulties, from not being in a condition to resist them. Evagoras remonstrated to them, that it was necessary to attack the enemy as well by sea as land; and he did not contribute a little, by his influence with the king of Persia, to Conon's being appointed general of his fleet.‡ The celebrated victory over the Lacedæmonians at Cnidos was the consequence, and gave the mortal wound to that republic.§

The Athenians, in acknowledgment of the important services Evagoras and Conon had rendered them with Artaxerxes, erected statues in honour of them.] Evagoras on his side, extending his conquests from city to city, endeavoured to make himself master of the whole island. The Cypriots had recourse to the king of Persia. That prince, alarmed by the rapid progress of Evagoras, of which he apprehended the effects, and conscious of what importance it was to him to prevent an island's falling into the hands of an enemy, so favourably situated for holding Asia Minor in awe, promised them an immediate and powerful support, without declaring openly however against Evagoras. T

Being employed elsewhere by more important affairs, he could not keep bis word with them so soon as he expected, and had engaged. The war of Cyprus continued six years, and the success with which Evagoras supported it against the great king, ought to have banished from the Greeks all terror of the Persian name, and united them against the common enemy." ** It is true, the

A. M. 3599. Ant. J C. 405. Isocrat. in Evag. p. 393, 395.
A. M. 3606. Ant. J. C. 398.

Pausan. 1. i. p. 5.

Ant. J. C. 399

† A. M. 3605.
A. M. 3610. Ant J. C. 391.
Diod. 1. xiv. p. 311.

**A. M. 3614. Ant. J. C. 390. Isocrat. in Pancg. p. 135, 136.

succours sent by Artaxerxes till then were very inconsiderable, as they also were the two following years. During all that time, it was less a real war, than a preparation for war: but when he had disengaged himself from the Greeks, he applied to it vigorously, and attacked Evagoras with all his forces.*

The army by land, commanded by Orontes, his son-in-law, consisted of three hundred thousand men, and the fleet of three hundred galleys; of which Tiribasus, a person of the highest rank and greatest reputation, was admiral Gaos, his son-in-law, commanded under him. Evagoras on his side assembled as many troops and ships as he could; but they were a handful in comparison with the formidable preparations of the Persians. He had a fleet of only ninety galleys, and his army scarcely amounted to twenty thousand men. As he had abundance of light vessels, he laid snares for those that carried the provisions of the enemy, of which he sunk a great number, took many, and prevented the rest from arriving; which occasioned a famine among the Persians, attended with violent seditions, which could only be appeased by the coming of fresh convoys from Cilicia. Evagoras strengthened his fleet with sixty galleys which he caused to be built, and fifty sent him by Achoris, king of Egypt, with all the money and corn he could have occasion for.

Evagoras with his land forces immediately attacked a part of the enemy's army which was separate from the rest, and entirely touted it. This first action was soon followed by another at sea, in which the Persians were worsted for some time, till animated by the warm reproaches and remonstrances of their admiral, they resumed courage, and obtained a complete victory. Salamin was immediately besieged by sea and land. Evagoras, leaving the defence of the city to his son, Pythagoras, quitted it in the night with ten galleys, and sailed for Egypt, to engage the king to support him vigorously against the common enemy. He did not obtain from him all the aid he expected. At his return, be found the city in exceeding distress; and finding himself without resource or hope, he was obliged to capitulate. The proposals made to him were, that he should abandon all the cities of Cyprus except Salamin, where he should content himself to reign; that he should pay an annual tribute to the king, and remain in obedience to him, as a servant to a master. The extremity to which he was reduced obliged him to accept the other conditions, hard as they were; but he could never resolve to comply with the last, and persisted always in declaring, that he could only treat as a king with a king. Tiribasus, who conmanded the siege, would abate nothing of his pretensions.

Orontes, the other general, jealous of his colleague's glory, had written secretly to court against him, accusing him, among other things, of forming designs against the king, and strengthened his accusation from his continuing to hold a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, and his manifest endeavours to make the chiefs of the army his creatures, by means of presents, promises, and a complacency of manners, not natural to him. Artaxerxes, upon these letters, believed he had no time to lose, and that it was necessary to prevent a conspiracy ready to break out. He despatched orders immediately to Orantes to seize Tiribasus, and send him to court in chains, which was instantly put in execution. Tiribasus, upon his arrival, demanded to be brought to a trial in form; that the heads of the accusation should be communicated to him, and the proofs and witnesses produced. The king, employed in other cares, had no leisure at that time to take cognizance of the affair.

Orontes in the mean time, seeing that the besieged made a vigorous defence, and that the soldiers of the army, discontented with the removal of Tiribasus, quitted the service, and refused to obey him, was afraid that affairs would take a bad turn with regard to him. He therefore caused Evagoras to be spoken to privately; the negotiation was resuined; the offers made at first by the latter were accepted; and the mortifying article, which had prevented the conclusion of the treaty, retrenched. The siege was raised in consequence. Evagoras continued king of Salamin only, and engaged to pay an annual tribute.}

A. M. 3613. Ant. J. C. 386. Diod. I. xv. p. 323-333.

† A. M. 3619. Ant. J. C. 385.

It appears that this prince lived twelve or thirteen years after the conclusion of the treaty; for his death is dated in the year of the world 5632. His old age was attended with a happiness and tranquillity never interrupted with sickness or disease, the usual effect of a sober and temperate life. Nicocles his eldest son succeeded him, and inherited his virtues as well as his throne. He celebrated his funeral with the utmost magnificence. The discourse entitled Evagoras, composed by Isocrates, to inspire the young king with the desire of imitating the example of his father, and from which I have extracted the subsequent eulogium, served for his funeral oration. He also addressed another tract to Nicocles, which bears his name, wherein he gives him admirable precepts for governing well. I shall perhaps have occasion to speak farther of them afterwards.

EULOGY AND CHARACTER OF EVAGORAS.

THOUGH Evagoras was king of only a small state, Isocrates, who was well able to judge of virtue and merit, compares him with the most powerful monarchs, and proposes him as the perfect model of a good king; convinced that not the extent of provinces, but extent of mind and greatness of soul, constitute great princes. He does in fact point out to us many qualities truly royal in him, and which ought to give us a very high idea of his merit.*

Evagoras was not of the number of those princes who believe, that to reign, it is sufficient to be of royal blood and that the birth which gives a right to the crown, gives also the merit and qualities necessary for wearing it with honour. He did not imagine, that it could be supposed, as every other condition and station of life made a kind of apprenticeship necessary to its success, that the art of reigning, the most difficult and important of all, should require no pains and preparation for its attainment. He came into the world with the most happy dispositions: a great fund of genius, an easy conception, a lively and instant penetration which nothing escaped, a solidity of judgment that inmediately resolved what was necessary to be done qualities which might seem to dispense with all study and application; and yet, as if he had been born without talents, and found himself obliged to supply by study what he might want by nature, he neglected no means for the embellishment of his mind, and devoted a considerable part of his time to improve himself, by reflecting, meditating on, and consulting the judgment and merit of others.

When he ascended the throne, his greatest care and application was to know mankind, in which the ability of a prince, and of those who are at the head of affairs, principally consists. He had no doubt prepared himself for that science by the study history, which gives a kind of anticipation of it, supplies the place of experience, and teaches us what the men are with whom we live, by what they have been in other ages. But we study men quite differently in themselves; by their manners, characters, conduct, and actions. The love of the commonwealth rendered attentive to all persons who were capable of serving or injuring it. He applied himself to the discovery of their most secret inclinations and principles of action, and to the knowledge of their different talents and degrees of capacity, in order to assign to each his proper post, to bestow authority according to merit, and to make the private and public good promote each other. He neither rewarded nor punished his subjects, says Isocrates, from the report of others, but solely upon his own knowledge and experience of them; and neither the virtues of the good, nor the viccs of the bad. escaped his inquiry and penetration.

He had one quality very seldom found in those who possess the first rank in authority, especially when they believe themselves capable of governing alone; I mean, a wonderful docility and attention to the opinion of others, which arose from a diffidence in his own abilities. With his great qualities, he did not seem to have occasion for recourse to the counsel of others, and nevertheless made no resolution, and formed no enterprise, without having first consulted the wise

• Isocrat. in Evag.

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