not, be true; and, as we shall have occasion to show, there are circumstances which disturb, to some extent, the equal operation of this tax.

And here we may notice some of the objections to this compound system of poll and property taxation. Poll-tax payers vote directly upon the public appropriations; yet they have no personal interest whatever in the amount of expenditures. No matter whether a proposal to expend money is wise and necessary, or frivolous and wasteful, the poll-tax payer can vote for it with entire impunity. It is nothing to him whether the sum be one thousand or ten thousand dollars. Indeed, the influence of poll-tax payers is often in favor of the most lavish expenditures. A new road, for example, is proposed in town meeting. It may be quite unnecessary, and ought not to be made; but the poll-tax payers, a large share of whom are laborers, will be immediately benefited by the demand that will be made for labor, and will be very likely to go in favor of it. It needs no argument to show the bad effects of such a state of things, regarded only in an economical point of view. If men may vote away money in the payment of which they have no interest, is it likely to be done to the advantage of the public interests? Is it not certain that there will be unwise and reckless expenditures?

This false position of the poll-tax payer has attracted the attention of those who are narrowly watching the effects of equality of suffrage without equality of taxation. The result of popular votes during the civil war, by which immense, and often quite unnecessary, burdens were imposed upon towns, has caused no small anxiety amongst those who have noticed the natural consequences of giving to a class numerous and powerful, at the ballot-box, the power to impose taxes upon the public, from which they are themselves. , exempt.

On the other hand, the poll-tax payer, while he contributes heavily towards the national expenditures through cus

toms and excise, has no direct vote in regard to them. He can vote where his own interest would lead him to vote wrong, but has no power to vote directly where his interest would lead him to vote right.

The income-tax principle, if universally adopted, while it would doubtless relieve poll-tax payers of their present taxation, would, at the same time, bring their interests into harmony with those of property-tax payers, and thus promote the general welfare of the public.

The property and poll tax being the two modes* by which all revenues are raised by the individual States, we will look for a moment at their operation as between the different classes upon which they are imposed. To do this, we refer to a valuation and tax list before us, and find the following examples.

The poll-tax is one of the oldest and most general of all taxes imposed by State authority. In Massachusetts, "every male inhabitant over twenty years of age is included, except persons who, by reason of infirmity and poverty, are, in the judgment of the assessors, unable to contribute fully to the public charges."

It hardly need be said, that this form of taxation is not in accordance with the maxims laid down by Adam Smith; those who pay it not having equal ability, or enjoying “an equal revenue." It is a tax founded on no sound principle whatever; and, if it were, the only tax imposed would be as unjust as a tax could well be. It forms, however, only a part of a system which must be looked at in all its bearings, in order to form a correct judgment of the operation of the particular tax, which by law is a limited one, deter

* States have, in some cases, derived a revenue from a tax upon banks. In Massachusetts, it was for many years the greatest source of income; so great, indeed, as to render any direct State tax unnecessary. Licenses have also been granted, by State authority, in some instances; but the amount received in any other mode, except by direct taxation, is too small to affect essentially the public burdens. The establishment of the national-bank system has cut off bank taxation from the States as a source of revenue.

mined by State legislation. In Massachusetts, the maximum poll-tax is now fixed at "not over two dollars," but may be, as it has been, changed from time to time. It has never, we believe, been higher than at present.

$19.25

Average property, $1,661. Average tax, $19.57.

We here find that these small farmers pay $19.57 each, equal to nine and a half times as much as the poll-tax contributors. Does any one suppose that the incomes of the former are nine and a half times as great as the latter? Let us test the question.

Suppose each of these farmers derives a net income of ten per cent on his capital, over all outlays and repairs; and that his labor is worth to him four hundred dollars per anThis is a large allowance :

num.

Now we will assume that the exclusive poll-tax payers have an average income of four hundred dollars. We include in this list not only all common laborers, but all skilled workmen, mechanics, and others, whose labor is worth, under a sound currency, $1.50 to $2 per day; and also all clerks, and other employees, whose salaries are six hundred dollars and under. Then if all these classes aver

age four hundred dollars per year, as no one will dispute, it will appear that the income of the poll-tax payers is charged $2, while these small property-holders are charged $19.57.

Here is a great disparity, but there is no exaggeration in the statement. From the same valuation and tax list, we take three farmers, having about one hundred and twentyfive acres each, with buildings and stock, and find their farms and stock average $3,757; and their average taxes, poll inclusive, amount to $47.03.

On the same calculation as before,

Farm and stock, $3,757, at ten per cent
Value of farmer's own labor

Farmer's total income.

$375.00

625.00

$1,000.00

Then, if the poll tax-payer is charged $2, with an income of $400, what ought the farmer to pay with an income of $1,000? Answer, $5.

Instead, then, of $5, the true proportionate amount, the farmers, as before shown, pay $47.03, or more than nine times as much.* There is no escape from these conclusions; and we appeal with confidence to those best qualified to judge, whether the estimate placed upon the incomes of farmers of the description we refer to is not essentially correct. In whatever way we look at the matter, we cannot fail to see great inequality. But the poll-tax is not only unequal as between those upon whom it is assessed, and whose incomes range from $150 to $600, and also unequal as between this class generally, and all property holders, but it is also very disproportionate to the advantages it confers. Let us see what these are.

1. Entire protection to persons and property.

2. Right of suffrage, and eligibility to office.

3. The most ample means of education in common and

* And the hardship, in this case, is often increased by the fact that the farmer is indebted for a large part of his capital, and paying interest upon it.

high schools, without charge, and a chance for a scholarship, provided by the State, in one of the colleges.

4. Complete maintenance, and the highest scientific treatment, for life, if need be, if himself or any member of his family should be deaf and dumb, or afflicted with blindness, idiocy, insanity, or, last of all, helpless poverty. What individual or corporation could be found to insure a laborer's family against all accidents and deprivations, physical and mental, from every source, through life, for one-half of one per cent on the income of the family head, or for twenty times that sum?

For all this, and much more that might be added, the recipient of a revenue from any occupation, trade, or profession, of any sum not exceeding six hundred dollars, if he has no visible property, pays an annual tax of not over two dollars, or four cents per week! As we have already said, considered in itself, disconnected from other forms of taxation, this is very unequal, and consequently unjust, as between the different classes. The obvious result is to transfer an undue share of the burdens of State, county, and town expenditure from the mechanical and laboring classes to the agricultural; thus promoting the interest of the former at the expense of the latter.

But all this applies, it must be remembered, to taxes imposed under State or municipal authority only, from all which the poll-tax payer escapes entirely by paying two dollars.

Effect of the Two Systems. We are now able to compare the results of the two different systems; viz., national and State taxation. In the national, we find that the greater part of all taxes are indirect: the State and municipal taxes are, with slight exceptions, direct. The former fall almost wholly on consumption; the latter, upon property. The first is unjust to labor, or the non-property-holding classes the other is unjust to capital, or those who hold taxable estate. One operates as an offset to the other.