shall recognize commerce as the great bond of human brotherhood.

But, after all argument has been closed on the principles of protection, we still find one plea remaining. If freedom of intercourse, it is said, were only universal, it would be well; but, since it is not, each nation must protect itself, and do as it is done by.

Let us suppose that England refuses to take our wheat. Would that be a good reason why we should not take iron from her, if we get it so, cheaper than by making it? We have already shown that the protected suffers more than the excluded community. If England should exclude our wheat, whom would she injure? Ourselves somewhat, that is, to the extent of the profits we should have made; herself still more, that is, to the extent of the vastly enhanced cost of the grain. If, in retaliation, we exclude her iron, whom do we injure? Her somewhat; ourselves much more.

Let us examine more in detail the consequences of our exclusion from foreign ports. If partial, we could still, by selling our wheat, get iron cheaper than by making it.

If total, the closing of our markets for wheat could turn our industry towards other forms of production. This would constitute one of the conditions under which manufactures would legitimately arise; and it would be more sensible and healthful than if it came as the result of our own restrictive legislation.

The full consequences of the policy of retaliation would be, each people refusing to receive the products of others, trade annihilated, industry crippled, all nations isolated, with no mutual. interest but robbery and plunder.

We have said, that England, by imposing a duty, say of fifty per cent, on our wheat, would injure us to the extent of our possible profits, and herself to the extent of the enhanced cost of the grain. On a closer inquiry, we shall see that the injury to ourselves is compensated in part; that to herself is aggravated.

The consequence of such a duty would be, that the consumption would fall off in some degree. Her poor would subsist more on potatoes, or other articles cheaper than flour. But, notwithstanding these shifts, it would be found that it cost her laboring population more to live, even though they lived more meanly. Their wages must be raised this is certain. All taxes laid on commodities which the laborer must use have the effect to reduce the quantity or quality of his food to a certain point; but he must live, and his wages must be raised to enable him to do so with the enhanced price of wheat. This would make it more expensive for England to manufacture her goods, and would, in part, so far reduce her ability to compete in the markets of the world. By such a policy, she would weaken her own industry, and to a degree exclude herself from commerce. This would afford another condition. under which manufactures would legitimately arise in this country, whose wheat was excluded.

That this is no impossible supposition, will be evidenced by the condition of England before the repeal of the corn laws. The movement in favor of that great measure originated in Manchester, and was carried, against the nobility and the landed interest, by the resolute efforts of the manufacturing class.

What advantage is there in refusing to buy of a nation because it refuses to buy of us? It is retaliation and revenge, not self-defence or self-vindication. The first historical instance of such retaliatory legislation is the establishment, by the Venetians, of customs duties, to deprive foreigners of the benefit of their trade; in return for which, Charles V. imposed twenty per cent duty on all Venetian merchandise. The most wise and useful economical act of this century was that by which, by the exertions of Mr. Cobden, England and France, so long contending only in exclusions and mutual injuries, threw open their ports to the free entry of hundreds of articles, to the com

mon benefit of both, and to the advancement of good feeling and hearty alliance; a measure, that, between the years 1859 and 1863, increased by seventy-three per cent the trade of Great Britain with France, while proving no less beneficial to the labor of the latter country.

We infer, from all that has preceded, that "protection " is an unfortunate expression. To restrict industry, to put the bad on the level of the good, to remove from industry its only guaranty of a full reward, to contract trade and neutralize the gifts of Nature, is not protection, in any proper sense of the word.

In conclusion of the subject, it may be proper to allude to the great natural characteristics of our national industry. We see that the important fact of our condition is unequalled agricultural power. Possessing such an advantage, with an active, enlightened, and enterprising population, and an industry perfectly untrammelled, we should naturally become the granary of the world, and create, as a certain consequence, the most extensive and powerful commercial and naval marine on the globe. We should secure, by sea and land, a greater power to give help to friends, or hurt to foes, than any other people, and should rapidly attain our best national condition.

We should have, not only the most profitable, but the most salutary industry, as favorable to the acquisition of unlimited wealth as to a sound physical development and high moral culture. We should have manufactures, also, in their spontaneous growth. They would arise they were arising previous to any tariff- as fast as the best interests of the country required them.

States and sections, like New England, would naturally and profitably undertake manufactures, because they have a thinner soil, a denser population, and a larger capital relatively, than others. Such regions would be the workshops of the nation, while the prairies of the West and the rich uplands of the Middle. States would be the nation's farms.

What manufactures arise of themselves should be welcomed, for they come in obedience to natural laws; they are founded on extraordinary facilities, on high natural protection, on local necessities. But we bind the swelling thews of the youth when we endeavor to force on America the industry of Europe. We grow enough every year to cover some of the kingdoms of the old world. Every year's growth stretches over and appropriates some country, fertile as the plains of the Nile, and bearing every manner of precious or useful ore. Here is our destiny. This is our wealth.

It cannot be too often repeated, because it is the great fact in regard to manufactures, that they only need to be "let alone." When a distinguished French minister of finance called the manufacturers of that country to Paris, and asked what he could do for them, they made the wellknown answer, "Laissez nous faire." It is within our personal knowledge, that, when the proposal was made to impose the protective tariff of 1816, the leading manufactures of Rhode Island, amongst whom was the late Mr. Slater, the father of cotton-spinning in this country, met at the counting-room of one of their number, and, after deliberate consultation upon the matter, came unanimously to the conclusion, that they had "rather be let alone." Their business had grown up naturally, and succeeded well; and they felt confident of its continued prosperity, if uninterfered with by government. On the other hand, they argued, that, by laying a protective tariff, the business would be thrown out of its natural channels, and become fluctuating and uncertain. How well founded were these anticipations subsequent events have fully shown.

It will, doubtless, be a matter of profound astonishment to the future historian, that a people who had a free and untrammelled industry, with natural advantages for the most productive agriculture in the world and for the legiti mate growth of every kind of manufacture, should ever

have asked for restrictions upon trade. But, in truth, they did not ask for protection at the outset. It was forced upon them by politicians, irrespective of their wishes, for the avowed purpose of securing a home market for cotton.

All New England was opposed to the policy, and protested against it; yet it was carried. Special forms of manufacturing were brought into existence; and, as these were sickly and needed all the help they could obtain from government, an interested party was formed which clamored incessantly for protection. Yet it was not until the third tariff, that of 1824, had gone into operation, that the Northern and Central States became the partisans of protection. As New England was the last to assent to restrictive legislation, so she will undoubtedly be the first to ask for its abandonment. No policy could be more adverse to her permanent interests. She has great natural advantages for manufacturing. With these, she can carry them on successfully. By high protective duties, other sections of the country, not having the same natural advantages, will be led to introduce the same branches of industry,* and she will find her severest competition at home; while all parts of the nation will be crippled by a false system, equally against the laws of nature and value; since protection, as previously shown, puts the bad on the level with the good, and destroys all natural tests of usefulness in production. It should always be borne in mind, that protective duties must be high enough to enable the home manufacturer to get, at least, average profits; that is, such profits as commodities in general afford. He will not make broadcloth unless it is as profitable as any other branch of trade, manufacture, or agriculture. Nothing short of this is protection; and the duties must be carried upwards, until they arrive at that point in which those who are manufacturing to the greatest disadvantage can make average profits; otherwise there will be a call for higher duties. This is one of the

This is already becoming quite apparent.