for example, on cotton manufactures, the importing merchant would undoubtedly make a much larger profit on these fabrics than he now does. Where he now makes ten per cent. he could then make thirty; and this high rate of mercantile profit would be the first effect of a total repeal of the duties, as we shall more fully explain hereafter. When it is maintained, therefore, that the whole amount of the impost duties cannot be thrown upon the consumers, it is not intended to convey the idea that the importing merchant actually loses a part of the duty which he pays at the custom-house; but that he loses a a part of the extraordinary profits which he would make under a system of free trade-profits which would enable him to give a corresponding increase of price for the cotton and rice with which he purchases foreign manufactures.

As we have already stated incidentally, the benefit which would result to the cotton-planters, from the total repeal of the duties upon the imports received in exchange for cotton, may be regarded as the exact measure of the burthen imposed upon them by those duties. What then, would be the benefit which this repeal would confer upon the cotton-planters? Would it be merely that of enabling them, in common with other consumers, to obtain certain articles twenty or even forty per cent. cheaper? This, as we now propose to shew, would be absolutely trivial, in comparison with the vast advantages which would accrue to them, as producers. It may be safely assumed that the domestic manufactures of iron, of cotton, in its different forms, of wool, and the various other articles protected by the Tariff, amount to at least thirty millions of dollars. The advocates of the Tariff represent them to amount to two or three times that amount. If the Tariff, by which these domestic manufactures are unjustly and unconstitutionally-(as we think)-protected from the competition of those foreign manufactures which are the only beneficial exchanges our planters can receive for their staples, were entirely repealed, is it not apparent that it would seriously, if not ruinously injure the Northern manufacturers as producers? And is it not equally apparent that it would benefit the cotton-planters, as producers, at least to the extent that it would injure their competitors? To whatever extent a protecting duty of forty or forty-five per cent. has the effect of building up and sustaining domestic manufactures, which could not exist without the protection; to that very same extent will the repeal of the duty operate to exclude the domestic manufactures from the market, and substitute in the place of them, those very imports which are received in exchange for our staples. To what extent, then, would the total

repeal of the protecting duties diminish the production of domestic manufactures in the United States? If we were to believe Mr. Davis and other advocates of the protecting system in Congress, or if we were to believe those theorists, who maintain that the whole burthen of the duties fall upon the consumers, and consequently that a repeal of these duties would reduce the price of manufactures forty or forty-five per cent.in either of these cases, we must conclude that the repeal of the protecting duties would utterly destroy the manufacturing establishments in this country. But we will not use a false position against an adversary, though it be his own. The repeal of the duties in question would not break up the domestic factories, as Mr. Davis asserted, nor reduce the price of manufactures forty or forty-five per cent. as maintained by the aforesaid theorists. It may be fairly supposed, however, that it would diminish the production of domestic manufactures to the amount of fifteen millions of dollars, and it would certainly increase the importation of the rival manufactures which are obtained in exchange for cotton and rice to a still greater amount, for the obvious reason that more imported goods would be consumed at low prices than domestic goods at high prices. Here, then, would be an increased demand for the productions of the agricultural industry of the South-for cotton and rice converted into manufactures-to the amount of, at least, fifteen millions of dollars; and the entire benefit which would result from this increased demand would accrue to the planters, as producers. Who can estimate the increased prosperity which would gladden the staple growing states from this increased demand for their productions? We have been repeatedly told, that our sufferings do not proceed from the Tariff, but from the excessive production of cotton beyond the efficient demand. But is it not evident that this very excess of production, beyond the demand, is produced principally by the restrictions imposed by the Tariff on our rightful commerce? Whatever diminishes the demand for cotton tends as directly to produce a surplus beyond the demands, as an actual increase of production. It is obvious that the entire repeal of the protecting duties would increase the European demand for American cotton from four to five hundred thousand bales. The consequence would be that the supply would be quite inadequate to the demand, probably for several years. During this period the price of cotton would be greatly enhanced in price; and even after the supply should overtake or exceed the demand, and the price should come down to the present standard, the annual income of the staple growing states would be increased to the full extent of the

increased demand for their staples. To this extent the permanent prosperity of the States would be increased, by the repeal of the protecting duties.

But

But let us examine, a little more in detail, the manner in which the repeal of those duties would operate, first upon the different classes and sections of the Union, and secondly upon the value of cotton. The most palpable of all the effects of the repeal would be the substitution, or more properly, the restitution, of fifteen millions of manufactures, the product of Southern capital and labour, in the place of the same amount of manufactures, the product of Northern capital and labour. As these latter manufactures were forced into the place of the former, by the unjust and unconstitutional agency of the government, their displacement would be nothing more than a tardy restoration of rights long usurped by our oppressors. be this as it may, it is certain that the classes and sections of the Union that would be most affected by the repeal, would be the Northern manufacturers, who would be greatly damageddamnum absque injuria-and the Southern planters, who would be immensely benefited without violating, in a solitary respect, the rights of any other class of the community. The consumers (whom we are taught to regard as the only persons interested) would stand by, comparatively, disinterested spectators, while the manufacturers would make the very welkin ring with their clamorous complaints, and the planters would illuminate the heavens with bonfires.

But what, let us inquire, would be the effect produced upon the value of cotton, by the repeal of the protecting duties? We use the term "value" in its strict philosophical sense, and not as synonymous with "price." As we have incidentally hinted before, the value of cotton is precisely equivalent to the value of the manufactures which can be obtained for it. And although the planter may have parted with all right in it, long before it is exchanged for these manufactures, yet as the person who actually makes the exchange can afford to give for the cotton, a price exactly proportioned to the value of the goods he obtains for it, the value of these goods necessarily determines the value of the cotton to the planter, or the price which the first purchaser can afford to give him for it. If we show therefore, that the intrinsic value of these manufactures, into which our cotton is converted by exchange, would be enhanced by the repeal of the duties now laid upon them, we shall at the same time show, an equivalent increase in the value of cotton; these being essentially equivalent and convertible values. What, then, would be the effect produced, by a total repeal of the duties on cotton

and woollen manufactures, on the value of these manufactures, to the persons who should sell them in the United States? Let us suppose, to present a plain illustration of the question, that the merchants engaged in this branch of trade, should immediately on the repeal of the Tariff, invest ten millions of dollars worth of cotton in the aforesaid manufactures. They would cost no more in Liverpool or Manchester than they did before the repeal, and as the duty they formerly paid was to those who brought them into the market of the United States, a part of the cost of production, it would follow that the aggregate cost of production would be four millions of dollars less, after the repeal of the duties, than before, assuming the duties to average forty per cent. Can it be believed, that a change of things which would diminish the cost of producing imported cotton and woollen manufactures forty per cent.* or which is the same thing-of obtaining and bringing them into this market-would not increase the value of those manufactures to the persons importing them? It must be borne in mind that the demand for these articles would most assuredly not be diminished by the repeal of the duties, and that the supply would not be increased, except so far as it consisted of these imported manufactures. We may assume that two thirds of the consumption of the country, consists of domestic manufactures, and it is obvious that there will be no increase, or tendency to increase, in this part of the supply. The cost of producing domestic manufactures, would be in no degree diminished by repeating the duties on their imported rivals; and of course the domestic manufactures could not afford to sell their fabrics any cheaper than before. In this state of things can any one seriously imagine, that the price of cotton and wollen manufactures would fall forty per cent. in consequence of the repeal of that rate of duty on one third part of the supply? By tracing out the operation it will be seen to be impossible. It is true, those who import cotton and woollen manufactures, could afford to sell them forty per cent. cheaper than they could before the repeal, but it is equally true that the domestic manufacturers, who supply two thirds of the national consumption, could not afford to sell their fabrics any cheaper. The price of cotton and woollen manufactures generally, would be governed more by what the Northern manufacturers could afford to take, than by what the importers could; in the proportion that the supply furnished by the former exceeded that furnished by the latter. It

We have all along spoken as if taking off and adding on a given per cent. were corresponding operations. They are not so, but as it does not change the argument, we have done it for the sake of simplicity.

would result, upon plain and obvious principles, that the aggregate diminution of the price of all the manufactures consumed, imported and domestic, would be precisely equal to the aggregate diminution of the cost of production. We have seen that the aggregate diminution of the cost of production-being confined to the ten millions of imports-would be only four millions of dollars; but as there are twenty millions of domestic manufactures to be taken into the estimate, it follows, that the cost of producing the whole thirty millions would only be diminished thirteen and one-third per cent. amounting to four millions precisely. The price of cotton and woollen manufactures would consequently fall only thirteen and one-third per cent. in consequence of the repeal of the duties upon the portion of them we import. How, then, would the value of imported manufactures be affected by the repeal? That value would be increased precisely twenty-six and two-thirds per cent.; for as the cost of their production would be diminished forty per cent. by the repeal of the duties, and their selling price only thirteen and one third, the difference clearly indicates the increase added to their value. And this is exactly the increase that would be added to the intrinsic value of cotton.

To suppose that the repeal of the protecting duties would diminish the price of manufactures forty or forty-five per cent. (a diminution equal to the average of the duties repealed) would be to take it for granted, that the domestic manufacturers would forthwith reduce their profits, according to the notion of a certain member of Congress, two hundred per cent.; that is to say, those who now make a profit of twenty per cent. would agree to carry on their business at a profit of twenty per cent. less than nothing. It is certain that these manufacturers would abandon their business, unless they could get within ten or fifteen per cent. of the price they formerly obtained for their goods. In either event, imported manufactures would not fafl any thing like in proportion to the duties repealed, For, if the domestic manufacturers should abandon their business, the supply of manufactures would be so greatly below the demand, that this circumstance alone would keep up the price of imported manufactures very nearly to what it was before the duties were repealed. On the contrary, if the domestic manufacturers continued their business, receiving within ten or fifteen per cent. of their former prices, it would follow of course, that the importers would receive the same price for their imports. Pursuing the idea that the repeal of the duties of importswould be to all intents and purposes diminishing, to that extent, the cost of their production to the American importer, we