Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin AmericaColumbia University Press, 07.03.2001 - 398 Seiten When is military force an acceptable tool of foreign policy? Why do democracies use force against each other? David R. Mares argues that the key factors influencing political leaders in all types of polities are the costs to their constituencies of using force and whether the leader can survive their displeasure if the costs exceed what they are willing to pay. Violent Peace proposes a conceptual scheme for analyzing militarized conflict and supports this framework with evidence from the history of Latin America. His model has greater explanatory power when applied to this conflict-ridden region than a model emphasizing U.S. power, levels of democracy, or the balance of power. |
Inhalt
3 | |
2 Latin Americas Violent Peace | 28 |
Analyzing Latin Americas Violent Peace | 53 |
3 The Myth of Hegemonic Management | 55 |
4 Democracy Restrained Leadership and the Use of Military Force | 84 |
5 The Distribution of Power and Military Conflict | 109 |
Illustrations from the Beagle Channel Dispute | 132 |
Suggestions from the EcuadorPeru Dispute | 160 |
Conclusion | 191 |
Prospects for Diminishing Its Use | 193 |
Argentine and Chilean Behavior in the Beagle Dispute 19771984 | 210 |
Notes | 213 |
263 | |
287 | |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America David R. Mares Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2001 |
Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America David R. Mares Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2001 |
Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America David R. Mares Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2001 |