idea will ever arise in his mind.Let him see that all public grants are for public purposes, and to promote general intercourse, and you encourage him to bear up against his burdens. His lordship was glad to bear testimony, that he no where found, accompanying the most disgraceful outrages, any thing like a conspiracy against the government, or a correspondence with that great bad power, whose state was fallen, he hoped, never to rise again. His lordship directed the most particu. lar attention of the grand jury to the subject of private distillation

an evil which struck at the revenue, which it defrauded to the amount of two millions of money in the year; at the comforts of all classes of life, by rendering it necessary to resort to other sources of taxation in order to meet the losses occasioned by this fraud; and at the morals of the poor, who were become so perfectly familiarized

with perjury in defending themselves and their neighbours against prosecutions for this offence, that all the sanction of an oath was obliterated in the districts where it was practised. His lordship again adverted to the situation of the lower orders, and the ample means possessed by the higher classes of ameliorating their condition; and of rendering them at home as valuaable for the domestic virtues of peace and industry, as they were eminent and exemplary in every other country for their bravery, their generosity, and their talent. Unfortunately, said his lordship, hitherto there had been a concurrence of too many causes to brutalize the Irish character, and we think ourselves justified in treating them as brutes. Instead of feeling surprise at finding them so wild, so thoughtless, and so ungovernable as they were, the wonder seemed to be that their character was not worse.

IN

N the great and unparalleled drama which was to decide the fate of Europe, there were two momentous pauses, during which all who felt an interest in the peace, independence and happiness of this most valuable portion of the world could not but experience considerable uneasiness and alarm:-we allude to the pause which took place after the expulsion of the

French from Russia; and to the subsequent pause that took place when the French were driven across, the Rhine into their own country.

Many, who were deemed wellinformed, cool, and even impartial judges, were of opinion that, after the most disastrons and disgraceful campaign in Russia, Bonaparte would never be able again to face the allies, but must rely on

tirely on their forbearance, if he continued in possession of the French throne. This opinion they grounded on several circumstances: they argued, that as Bonaparte possessed a hold on the French nation solely through their national vanity and love of military reputation and dominion, as soon as he had experienced disgraceful defeat to such a degree as he had done in Russia, he would necessarily lose the support and zeal of the French nation; and moreover, that, even if he did not lose this support and zeal, he would be totally unable to replace the army which he had lost in Russia; while the allies, on the contrary, accumulating numbers as they advanced through Germany, would be more than ever a match for France. When, however, Bonaparte did succeed in collecting a large army, and advanced into Saxony and Prussia, while the allies, apparently, were far behind him in military force, apprehension was again excited, that he would recover his ascendency, and that the slavery and misery of Europe would be riveted in stronger chains than those which before existed. And it is indeed probable, that, if Bonaparte had learnt experience by his Russian campaign, if he had learned to soften the obstinacy and countroul the impetuosity of his character, he might have regained his superiority. But he had only become more obstinate and impetuous by defeat; and acting at Dresden and Leipzig exactly in the same manner in which he had done in Russia, he experienced the same fate his second army was annihilated; Germany, Holland, the Netherlands, and Italy, were freed: he was deserted by one of his most celebrated generals, whom he had raised to the throne of Naples; and

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the close of the year 1813 saw him, stript of military power and in a great degree of military reputation, confined within the limits of ancient France.

Still it was to be apprehended that, before he was finally and completely subdued, the struggle would be arduous and dreadful; he might revive, like Antæus when he touched his native earth; and within France itself, the allies might again experience all those calamities and disasters which they had experienced at the commencement of the revolution. This, however, evidently depended upon several circumstances; particularly on the conduct of Bonaparte himself, on the disposition of the French nation towards him, and on the behaviour of the allies. If Bonaparte moderated his ambition-if he displayed a readiness to restore the blessings of peace to France-only called upon them to continue the war till an honourable peace might be obtained-he might, perhaps, could they be convinced of his sincerity, have roused the French nation to fresh exertions. But, on the other hand, it was to be considered that France was exhausted in every respect; she was stripped almost entirely of her military population; the war, hitherto little burdensome to her in a pecuniary point of view, was now coming within her own territories, and therefore must be supported by herself; while past experience forbad the French people from giving any credence to the protestations of Bonaparte, that he now was desirous of peace. Most, however, depended on the behaviour of the allies: if they acted as they had done at the commencement of the revolution; if it was apprehended in France, that they wished to force the old dynasty

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upon them, or to restore the confiscated and sold property of the emigrants, it was naturally to be expected that the French, notwithstanding all their sufferings, would rally round Bonaparte; and the consequences of a whole nation rising up in arms, especially such a nation as the French, had already been wofully experienced. The campaign of the year. 1814 was therefore looked forward to with great interest, not unmingled with apprehension. In the opinion of some, the allies tarried too long after the battle of Leipzig before they advanced towards France: but it ought to have been recollected, that in the campaign they had suffered much; that they were now about to carry the war into the country of an enemy; and that therefore many preparations as well as well disposed and combined plans were indispensably necessary. At length, on the 20th of December 1813 the allies crossed the Rhine, and entered the French territory, with an invading army of 150,000 men; and the next day they issued a proclamation well calculated to answer the purposes of their invasion: in this proclamation they declared that, though victory had conducted them into France, they had not come to make war upon her; their wish and object were, simply, to repel far from them the yoke that the French government endeavoured to impose on their respective countries; countries which possessed the same rights to independence and happiness as France. As conquest and splendour were not their objects, they therefore called upon the magistrates, land owners, and cultivators, to remain at their homes; as the progress and stay of the allied armies would be characterized by the

maintenance of public order, respect to private property, and the most severe discipline: notwithstanding all they had suffered, they were not animated by a spirit of vengeance; they knew how to distinguish and separate the ruler of France from France herself; to him they attributed all their calamities; and not even were they disposed to retaliate on the French nation any of those calamities which the revolution had brought on Europe. While Bonaparte never made war but for the purpose of conquest, and to gratify his ambi tion, other counsels presided over the allied monarchs: they indeed were ambitious; they indeed sought glory: but their ambition and glory were of a very opposite character from those of Bonaparte; the only conquest which was the object of their ambition and glory was that of peace; but not such a peace as Bonaparte had often mocked Europe with; but a peace which should secure to their own people, to France and to Europe, a state of real repose. "We hoped to find it before touching the soil of France; we come hither in quest of it!"

Much was naturally expected from this proclamation; especially if the allies, on their first entrance into France, acted strictly and conscientiously up to the spirit of it. They had been accused of dilatoriness in their motions: but no sooner had they crossed the Rhine, than this accusation could no longer justly be made. Marshal Blucher's army crossed this river in three columns; general St. Priest at Coblentz, who made himself master of that town, and took 500 prisoners generals Langeron and D'Yorck passed at Caub, and took Bingen, forcing a strong position,

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and defeating a corps of the enemy; and general Sacken passed at Manheim, and drove the enemy from an entrenched position. The whole amount of Blucher's army was 80,000 men; while at the same time Brabant was entered by. an army of 50,000 men, to co-operate with which a considerable force was sent from England. But it was not only with her troops and money that this country was determined to assist the allies in their glorious purpose of restoring peace and tranquillity to Europe: as it was natural to suppose that the downfall of Bonaparte, or, if he displayed a sincere desire for peace, a treaty with him would take place, it was proper, in either case, that Britain, who had done so much, and who was so much interested in the result, should have a person well acquainted with her real in terests, present with the allied armies. Lord Castlereagh was accordingly selected for this purpose; and we shall afterwards have abundant proofs, that no other person could have been selected, better qualified for this high and arduous mission.

Let us now turn our attention to Bonaparte in Paris. He still remain ed there, notwithstanding the sacred territory of France was invaded; nor was there any evidence that he was effectually preparing to meet the allied armies: he did not even boast of his means: it was indeed stated that there were 12,000 men at Metz, but that was the largest number stated to be any where, except at Paris. Indeed he seemed to be reduced to the necessity of adopting language, in his address to the French nation, very different from that which he had formerly employed;" Bearn, Alsace, Franclie Comté, are invaded.

Notwithstanding, however, this change of tone in Bonaparte, he found the French nation very reluctant in coming forward against the allies; and the regular armies which still remained to him were by no means equal to cope with them: they therefore advanced into France with little or no opposition or resistance. By the middle of January, part of the allied army occupied Langres, an ancient and considerable town 100 miles within the French frontier: until the allies reached this town, there was not a shot fired at them by any but the military; but here the inhabitants fired at them, though without effect. The principal French armies which Bonaparte had been able to collect, were under the command of marshals Victor and Marmont: the former advanced into Alsace, where he met the Bavarians under general De Wrede: the French, however, were compelled to evacuate this province, and, being pursued by the Bavarians, they were brought to action in Lorraine; the engagement was severe, and long con tested: but at length the French were defeated with great loss, and retreated on Luneville. The Cossacks, according to their usual custom, were greatly in advance, and by the middle of January had pushed on between Epinal and Nancy. That these troops should have been able to come so near Paris, is a convincing proof of the inadequacy of Bonaparte's means effectually to repel the allies. The second French army, under the command

command of Marmont, was ordered to oppose the advance of Blucher; but neither in relative force nor equipment was it equal to this object. Marmont therefore retreated before the Prussian general to the Saare, behind which river, and within the frontiers of Old France, he took up a position: his retreat was much harassed on one flank by count Sacken, who occupied Worms, Spires, and Deux Ponts; while on the other flank he was approached by general D'Yorck, who occupied Treves and SaarLouis. From this sketch it is evident, that even within a month after the allies had crossed the Rhine they had approached with in no considerable distance of Paris, while the French armies which Bonaparte had hitherto been able to collect were by no means adequate to resist them.

Before the end of January the situation of Bonaparte was still more desperate and degrading: at that sime, Marmont had fed to Verdun; Victor to Commercy; Mortier to Chaumont, and Mac donald to Namur; while the allies occupied Lorraine, as far as the Meuse all Alsace, Franche Comté, and great part of Burgundy. Under these circumstances Bonaparte still remained at Paris; and, being unable to rouse the French nation, at last determined to sue for peace. The allied sovereigns had taken up their headquarters at Chatillon; and thither Caulincourt was ordered by Bonaparte to proceed, to negotiate a peace: but as lord Castlereagh had not yet joined the allied sovereigns, the French ambassador was obliged to await his arrival.

In consequence of the rapid advance of the allies, and the total indifference of the French nation to

the apparently approaching fate of Bonaparte, the Bourbon family naturally began to be reanimated with the hopes that they would at last be restored to their country. The allies, indeed, had carefully abs. tained from even intimating to the French nation that they wished the restoration of the Bourbons; on the contrary, at this period there was reason to believe that they were willing to treat with Bonaparte. The English government, though more averse to make peace with him, yet were not disposed to go against the plans of the allies; but it was generally believed that the prince regent was strongly inclined to support the cause of the Bourbons. Louis the XVIIIth him self was unable, from age and infirmity, to take an active part in the restoration of himself and family but Monsieur, the duke d'Angoulême, and the duke de Berri, more young, active, and en- ' terprising, embarked for the continent towards the end of January.

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In the midst of these difficulties and dangers, Bonaparte still re, mained at Paris. His stay there was accounted for in different ways: some were disposed to think that he was so completely bewildered and astounded at the imminence and magnitude of his danger, as to be totally deprived of all his faculties; others conceived that he was engaged at Paris in preparing those measures that would effectually serve to defeat the allies; and in this idea they were confirmed by the recollection, that on former occasions he had been silent, and apparently inactive, at the very period when he was about to burst forth with renewed energy. The truth probably was, that he was afraid to leave Paris: he well knew that at this city the seeds of