MacMahon, upon whom now devolved the supreme command, true to the irresolute disposition of his character, continued to pursue the same wavering line of action that lost to him the great battles of Weissenburg and Woerth.

A Moltke, or, indeed any general possessed of the slightest. knowledge of what strategy really is, would at once have broken up his camp, and with the resolve of a true soldier dashed on at once for Paris, and there, beneath the walls of that stronghold, have fought the only battle that at such a crisis as this could by any possibility hold out the shadow of success. He would thus, at least, have a place of safety to flee to in case of defeat, and more than this, he would have saved his country from one of the most humiliating disasters that ever befel a great military nation.

We believe there is no longer any doubt as to the demoralisation at a very early date of no small portion of the grand Army of the Rhine, the natural result of having been subjected to the humiliation of continued ill-success in the field. Still that portion of it that did fight, must have fought manfully, when we remember that it took three desperate battles to bring home to that portion of it under the command of Marshal Bazaine the fact that they were actually shut up, as it were, in a trap at Metz. The same may be said of Marshal MacMahon's soldiers, who must have dared the issue of at least four or five battles before they were hemmed in and forced to take refuge within the walls of Sedan. Surely, after such a week of battles as this, such a display of heroism-unhappily thrown away as to any successful result-the Government of France, such as it is, ought to be aware that any further resistance is useless, and that its chance of saving the country from still greater calamities must be to accept the arbitrement of battle, and make the best terms it can with a conqueror so just and humane as the King of Prussia is known to be. Before, however, taking such a step as this, it would redound to the credit of France and the respectability of its Government that there should be an end to the rubbish circulated by the fire-eaters of Paris, and by a Press which, with few exceptions, is without an equal in the vulgarity of its abuse and the gross immorality of its tone. Surely it requires but a very small portion of common sense to know that such bursts of odious ribaldry as are every now and then launched against the Royal Family of Prussia and the whole German people, can have no other effect than to widen still more the breach between the two belligerents, and of rendering any peace that is likely to be mutually satisfactory, more difficult of accomplishment.

In our survey of the events of the war we are forcibly struck by a fatality which seems to have pursued the Emperor and every one in authority under him from the commencement of the war; as if borne onward by an impulse they could not control, they were always sure to do the very thing they ought not to have U. S. MAG. No. 503, Oct., 1870.

done. We have a very remarkable example of this, says a French officer in his letter to a friend in England, while alluding to the late campaign of Marshal MacMahon in which he was one of the principal actors, together with having had the misfortune of being most severely wounded. "We had succeeded," he says, "with a celerity unexampled in the history perhaps of any other people in getting together some two hundred thousand men, well in hand and eager for the fray, making up in spirit and devotion to the sacred calls of our country what they wanted in discipline and a thorough knowledge of the art of war. The Emperor and his generals were in high spirits, and we all felt confident that the turning point in our fortunes had at length set in, and that we had but to march to drive the hated Teutons before us like chaff before the wind."

"In the midst of this universal exaltation," continued our friend in his letter, "a grand Council of War was called, over which the Emperor himself as chief of the State presided. There were three plans laid before the Council, each of which had its peculiar attraction, and merited the most serious consideration. The first and the most popular had for its object to march on Paris without a moment's delay and fight our great battle beneath its walls. The next was equally attractive and full of promise, which was to make a flank movement in the direction of the march of the enemy, and by a system of warfare, half military, half guerilla, harass it in every possible way by well directed attacks, and prevent the possibility of its obtaining the necessary supplies either of the material of war, men, or provisions."

"At this stage of the discussion," according to the account of the French officer, "the Emperor suddenly started up from one of his dreamy reveries exclaiming, in a voice trembling with emotion, 'What! marshals and generals of France, has it come to this would you leave our poor comrade Bazaine and his gallant followers to die of starvation within the pestilential walls of a dreary fortress. Forbid it chivalry! forbid it Heaven!' was enough, we were all Frenchmen. I need then scarcely say that these generous words drew forth repeated shouts of applause. In an instant we forgot his shortcomings he was again a Buonaparte, and nothing else was now heard or thought of but forward to Metz, Metz for ever."

It

Here we must stop, the remainder of our poor friend's letter, so full of lamentations at what happened would not be of sufficient importance to interest the general reader. We shall therefore end by saying that the picture he gave of the demoralization of the French Army at Sedan, must have been without a parallel in history. He also tells us that the exasperation of the soldiery against the Emperor-who they openly accused as the author of all their misfortunes, had got to such a pitch of madness that, had he not taken himself away just in the nick of

time, they would indisputably have torn him from limb to limb.

Another letter of a French officer from the seat of war confirms what had been already hinted at by our own correspondent; namely, that the march on Metz originated with the Minister of War, Palikao, and in this way. Aware of the state of excitement in Paris he sent a secret dispatch to the Emperor advising him, if he valued the continuance of his throne and dynasty, not to attempt to march on Paris, which could have no other termination than to affect a fraternization between the military and the people and with it the establishment of a Republic.

This writer also establishes as a fact what we have frequently heard mentioned in the German official accounts, respecting the utter incapacity of nearly the whole of the superior officers in command of the French Army of the Rhine. He also says their ignorance and want of the merest rudiments of education was such that not a few of those taken prisoners by the Germans were incapable of signing their names. With such men in command, can we wonder at the demoralization and want of discipline in the common soldier, or that an entire army as at Sedan should have delivered themselves up as prisoners of war. "As a proof of this, I witnessed at Sedan," continues the same writer," an entire regiment of infantry throw down their arms at the mere charge of a troop of Uhlans." With such accounts as this coming from French officers well known for their bravery and honourable feeling, can we wonder any longer that Germany and Belgium are filled to overflowing with French prisoners, and now having got at last. an official account from Berlin respecting the Sedan catastrophe, we cannot do better than insert the catalogue for the benefit of our readers.

We extract the report from the official organ of the Government, the Berlin Moniteur, and which may be depended upon as strictly correct. A document which must be interesting to all time, informing us as it does of events almost unique in the history of war, as the capture of an Emperor on the field of battle with the whole of his army and the material of war. It appears that the Crown Prince of Saxony, whose division bore the brunt of battle during a day so glorious to the arms of the Fatherland, made eleven thousand prisoners, besides the capture of twenty-five guns, seven mitrailleuses, two flags, and one eagle. If we add those of the Bavarians and Prussians, the total number of prisoners will amount to not less than twenty-five thousand, without mentioning the fourteen thousand who were found more or less disabled by their wounds in and around Sedan. With the capture of that town the German victors got the whole of the war material into their hands, consisting of four hundred guns, seventy mitrailleuses, and one hundred and eighty-four large fortress guns.

In round numbers, the list of the prisoners made and their

rank in the army stand in the report as follows. Thirty-nine generals, two hundred and thirty staff officers, and two thousand and ninety-five line officers, exclusive of five hundred officers of every grade discharged on parole. Of the private soldiers, their number alone amounted to eighty-four thousand four hundred and thirty-three. Independent of the twenty thousand killed and wounded, twenty-eight thousand were made prisoners on the field of battle, making altogether a grand total of one hundred and thirty-seven thousand, if we include the five thousand that escaped into Belgium. Finally, if we add those who have been made prisoners previous and subsequent to this battle, there are now in Germany and Belgium the enormous amount of two hundred and thirty thousand French prisoners.

THE CAVALRY OF THE FUTURE.

BY AN EX-HUSSAR.

Mr. Wendall Holmes has wittily remarked that “ as nations lengthen their boundaries, they shorten their weapons," and this is a notable fact, so far as infantry is concerned, whose weapons have shortened considerably since pikes ten feet long were in vogue, until now when it has been contemplated to do away with the bayonet. The saying, however, does not apply with equal force to the cavalry, which have advanced from the long muskets and short swords in use two centuries ago, to the short breechloaders, long swords, and longer lances of the present day. Not that the cavalry drill has improved so much in the couple of hundred years, for in a drill book of that date now before me, I perceive that the drill has but little altered since that time, when they had just found out a doubtful improvement in the wheeling of their squadrons. At page 26* it states that "there is an alteration in the manner of wheeling of horse. The practice now is, when a squadron of horse is commanded to wheel to the right; that the right hand men keep their ground, only turning their horses' heads to the right while the left comes about; whereas formerly the right hand men closed to the left; by which the ranks were apt to be put out of order." Strange to say we have but lately reverted to the moveable pivot when wheeling, as cavalry officers find that a stationary pivot flank in manoeuvring causes a subsequent loss of interval which is not easily recovered.

That the present is a fit time for inquiring into the organization of our army I think most will allow, and I think they will also admit that of the three arms of which it consists, the one that needs most looking to, is the cavalry, which in the march of improvements that has taken place of late years, cannot be

Military Discipline; or, the Art of War." London, 1688.

said to have kept abreast of either artillery or of infantry. Why such should be the case it is useless here to inquire, my object being to look towards the future not the past, and therefore shall make no further reference to times gone by than I am absolutely compelled to do.

It is the fortune of each successive generation to be able to take lessons from the mishaps of its predecessors; so it is also the luck of nations at peace to derive benefit and instruction from the hard-earned experiences of others which may be at war, and as in all ages there have been wars, our knowledge of aggressive weapons and how to use them effectually increases, while the modes of conducting armies into the field, and manoeuvering them there keep changing, tactics and strategy having to conform to the greater superiority of the weapons now employed.

The tactics of cavalry lies, however, in such simple formations, (as advances in line, line from column, and column from line, to the front or flank), made with rapidity, that I will confine myself to these strictly essential and elementary manœuvres ; a description of the weapons and how to use them, the dress of the dragoon and the equipment of his horse, the duties of outposts, scouts and foragers. It should, however, be borne in mind that the success of every operation in war depends upon the confidence which the troops have in their leaders, a confidence which can only be acquired by the examples the leaders give whenever the danger is common to all, and by showing in camp and quarters an unceasing solicitude and attention to the many wants and requirements of the men under their command.

But if officers are expected to do so much for the men, surely something is required from the men in return, and that something is obedience, knowledge of their duties, and a wish to excel in the performance of these duties, general intelligence, together with a desire to resemble what Sir Charles Napier said when he remarked that "all soldiers were gentlemen by their profession," a position none, especially cavalry men, need forfeit but by their own misconduct.

It is worthy of remark, however, that the improvement in arms has not in all cases modified the old system of fighting, that is getting to close quarters, as we find that in nearly the first battle between the French and the Prussians in the present war, one party should have charged and defeated the other by using the bayonet and clubbing their muskets, and that Prussian Cuirassiers should attack and take a village held by French infantry. But the most gallant action on record is that of the 7th Cuirassiers at Saarbruck, who charged two regiments of French infantry. Cutting their way through, they found themselves opposed to a battery of six guns, which they took; the Prussian Cuirassiers were then charged by two regiment of French Carabineers, when wheeling outwards they met their new foes so vigorously that