ON THE

IMMORTALITY of the SOUL.

AN

ESS A Y

The Stars fhall fade away; the fun himself Grow dim with age, and nature finks in years; But thou shalt flourish in immortal youth, Unburt amidst the warring elements,

The wrecks of matter, and the crush of worlds.

W

Mr. Addison's CATO.

HOEVER will turn his intellectual eyes inwardly, and make his mind the fubject of its own attention, will eafily discover traces of energy and grandeur beyond all that can strike the corporeal fenfes : And in proportion as the mind is successfully cultivated, all her inimitable graces arife in number and brightnefs. Modifications of found and colour, fymmetry and order of P

parts,

parts, proper difpofitions of light and shade, arè only faint imitations of this internal beauty; and owe their brighteft charms to the tendency they have toward elevating the mind above them, to the contemplation of her own majestic form.

Is it not then natural, and highly agreeable to all our experiences, to imagine, that this fair structure, this fupremely amiable beauty, fhall be more permanent than thofe of an inferior kind? What a different appearance would the whole conduct of nature affume, if the expreffed no more value for those of her works which feem to bear the highest impreffions of her art, than for those which, in proportion, appear only the product of a carelefs hand? Can we then be eafily led to think, that the Soul, which of all the known productions of nature, feems to be her favourite child, fhall only be coeval with the flowers of the field, or the fading colours of the rainbow? And as the hope, that nature will proportion the duration of this beauty to its worth, at first view appears probable; fo it is attended with advantages which render it highly worthy of indulgence. And though the ftoical notion in all its ftrictness be admitted, "That we ought to hope for nothing out of our "own power, and that immortality is one of the (a)

Ta on iQ μv;" yet we are in no danger of being difappointed. For if the opinion is true, then shall the virtuous become poffeffed of all they hoped for: But if otherwife, as we do not furvive our lofs, fo we must be abfolutely infenfible of it.

(a) Things not in our power, Vid. Epic. Man.

Befides,

Befides, it hinders not in the least our pursuing virtue as its own reward; for as exiftence in itself is indifferently capable of pleasure and pain, according to its different circumstances, it can never be defired merely for its own fake. The inftinct of felf-prefervation is blind, and void of reflection; we therefore wifh to exift, because existence is neceffary to enjoyment. And as the poffeffion of virtue is perhaps the only real enjoyment, the defire of Immortality is, or ought to be, that of the eternal poffeffion of virtue. The only dangerous extremes, towards which the opinion of a future ftate can tend, are, either when ideas of that state inflame the mind with fuch defires to change her fituation, as render her careless and impatient of life, or cloud her with superstition and horror. But if we would duly regulate our paffions, we ought to confider, that in none of thefe cafes are we fit for the state we may thus pursue of avoid. Nothing is more just than that antient maxim, "That we

ought to go out of life as from a plentiful enter"tainment, without fatiety or regret." As our minds advance in fuch a temper, we may begin to entertain the defire of Immortality; and try how far our expectations are ill or well founded. But in this fearch, as in all other matters of fact, it is to be feared, that we must be content with evidence inferior to demonstration, though fufficiently ftrong to gain our affent, and influence our courfe of

action.

As the object of our inveftigation is the Soul, it is natural to examine what prefages of her duration may be discovered in her natural qualities; what

in those which are called moral, and their relation

be ex

to the universe in general; and what may pected from the goodness, wisdom, and justice of her Creator.

One obvious quality of the Soul, is that of fpontaneous motion (a); every man feels in himself a free principle of activity, the motions of which neither begin from any thing external, nor are continued by it; but are effentially inherent in the Soul itself. It must be confeffed, that we are firft excited to action by perceptions of pleasure and pain, or by judgments formed in confequence of them: But thefe perceptions or opinions cannot be faid to act on the mind as one part of matter acts upon another: For whatever the fubftance of the Soul be, yet its ideas must be immaterial (b); and to fuppofe an immaterial thing to act by contact or impulfe, is abfurd. When one body impels another, there is nothing requifite to move the body impelled, but the impulfe itielf: But when any pleafing or painful perception (which we may compare to the Vis impreffa) awakens the attention of the mind; fhe in moft cafes looks round her, fhe deliberates whether a change of ftate is proper, or the prefent more eligible, and moves or refts accordingly. Whence it is plain, that any perception in the mind contributes no further to action, than by exciting the active powers; whereas matter blindly and obftinately continues in that state in which it is, whe ther of motion or reft, till fome other adequate cause changes it. For fuppofe reft to be the state

(a) The Immortality of the Soul proven from felf-motion. (b) See Wollaston on Nat. Religion.

of

f

of any body, some external force will be requifite to put it in motion; and, in proportion, as that force is great or fmall, the motion will be fwift or flow. But if this body did not continue pertinaciously in its former ftate, no external force would be requifite to change it; nor, when changed, would different degrees of force be neceflary to move the body in different degrees of velocity. And, on the contrary, when motion is impreffed on any body, to bring it to reft, fome force ab extra must always be applied, and that too in proportion to the intended effect. Nor is this refiftance difcovered in bodies only when moved in particular di❤ rections; for 'tis found not only to bear proportion to the Vis impreffa, but likewife to the quantity of matter moved; i. e. to the quantity of its solid extended parts. But if it were poffible to abstract from matter the qualities of folidity and extenfion, the matter, whence thefe qualities were abftracted, would no longer refift; and confequently resistance is the neceffary refult of them, which therefore in all directions must be the fame. Again, if the degrees of refistance in any body be in proportion to the Vis impreffa, it will follow, that when that body is confidered in any particular ftate, whether of motion or reft, the degrees of refistance will either indefinitely multiply or decrease, according to all poffible degrees of the moving force. But when the fame body is confidered abfolutely, or without fixing any particular state, the refiftance is immutable; and all the degrees of it, which that body would exert upon the acceflion of any impreffed force, must be conceived as actuaily in it. P 3

Nor