A SPEECH, delivered by the Author, before an AMICABLE SOCIETY. at Edinburgh.

Mr. PRESIDENT,

ERE an orator to draw any advantage to his

WERE character from the cause he pleads, few op

portunities could be more favourable to fuch a defign than the present: but unhappily for me! in proportion to the excellency of the fubject treated, it is expected, that the fentiments and ftile fhould rife in dignity and juftness; yet, however unequal to my present task the execution may be, I flatter myself that the subject will still be thought worthy your attention. As advancement in knowlege and virtue is the moft worthy pursuit of intelligent beings; fo it is the moft ftriking and amiable recommendation to our esteem, where-ever we behold it: This is the noble end which friendship proposes; this the generous spirit which animates the prefent Society.

Friendship may be defined "a fentiment of high

approbation entertained by two or more perfons, "begun and continued by a confcioufnefs of virtue "in each; heighten'd and improved by familiarity, "and a mutual intercourse of kind offices." Other circumstances there are (fuch as equality of age and ftation, fimilarity in temper and opinion, unity

of tafte and genius) which may contribute much to this connection: But thefe are too numerous and too little effential to friendship, to be either eafily comprehended in any general definition, or abfolutely neceffary to conftitute it.

It has been a fubject of warm difpute for many ages, Whether friendship arifes from selfish re"gards; from a fenfe of indigence and weakness in

particulars; and from the acceffion of strength

and influence which may accrue to them, by "their union with others." Is it neceffary that this. fhould fall under our present confideration? Nay, may it not be further asked, Whether reason is a proper and immediate judge of this cafe? Does not every man's heart, at first view, pronounce fuch an opinion equally abfurd and unworthy of human nature? Can we readily confefs, that, even in the 'animal world, we recognize amiable instincts and tender fentiments, which cannot poffibly be fuppofed to arife from felfish motives; and yet deny the fame beautiful conftitution in the human nature, which is allowed more like God himself than any other that falls under our obfervation?

Tis acknowleged, that inferior ranks of being are more swayed by impulfe and appetite than we, that their attention is almost wholly ingrofs'd by prefent gratification; and that they are little, or not at all, capable of reasoning from analogy and past experience; or of judging, by an induction of fimilar circumftances, of future events. Thofe inftances of feeming forefight which may be difcovered in ants and bees, are feldom attributed to reflection, and a confcioufnefs of approaching win

ter:

ter: Yet, it would feem from thefe, gentlemen, that all their actions must be refolved into views of future interest and pleasure. Excellent reafoning this, and worthy the most fublime philofophy! When we would detract from animal nature, we deny them the fmalleft dawn of reafon: When we would obliterate every thing lovely or graceful in our own, we affert, that no fenfible being can act but from diftant and interefted views.

The hen is, by one of our best authors, faid to be among the most stupid animals; yet when the refigns the free poffeffion of the fields and air, when with the most tender affiduity, fhe confines herfelf to one place and fituation, when the continues indefatigable in her task, notwithstanding cold and other hardships; when the facrifices her strongest and most favourite appetites to the production and nourishment of her young: All this we muft, no doubt, imagine, arifes from her fage conclufion, that, in the fpace of three weeks fhe fhall have the pleasure to fee a race of beings produced, which will pick up food for her, and protect her in her old age, Nay (fince in complaifance to our hypothefis, we have dignified her with no mean portion of reafon) may we not fuppofe further, that the confiders them as the heirs of her fortune, and deftin'd to the important task of propagating her name and pofterity?

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But not to dwell too long on this circumftance: If we will confult the unprejudiced fentiments of. our hearts, are we not confcious of loving fomething ultimately, and for its own fake? Have the moft diffusive benevolence, the most impartial

juftice,

justice, the ftricteft temperance, the most consume mate wifdom, the most invincible magnanimity, no intrinfic charms? Do not the very ideas of characters and intentions (even abstracted from all the circumftances of time, place, and perfon), yield. the mind a pleasure, infinitely fuperior in reality, quantity, and duration, to all the gratifications of felfish affection, tho' their fruition could be united together in the fame inftant? When we form a generous with, or do a liberal action, are we in the leaft conscious of fuch a reflection, as that it may be productive of future benefit or pleasure to us? In inftances of compaflion, when we increase our own neceffities to fupply thofe of the fufferer; or while we fave the lives of others with the imminent hazard, and fometimes at the expence of our own; what future golden expectations can actuate ús? What chimerical profpects, what feas of milk, and thips of amber, carry us on in fuch romantic projects?

Let us then, with candour own, that fuch is the lovely frame of our nature, fuch the benignant conftitution, which we owe to our CREATOR; that we must love virtue and virtuous perfons fimply and ultimately for themfelves. And, though all things in nature have an innate tendency to like things, yet can fhe boaft no attraction fo delightful, fo strong, fo univerfal as this. For of all the defires of the human heart, where it remains untainted by vice, fuch as lead us to virtue and her admirers, are alone infatiable of their objects: Gratification only roufes them to a greater keennefs, and extends them to admit higher degrees of enjoyment.

enjoyment. Hence it is, that as every one is leaft dependent on external advantages, and places all his happiness in his own mind; fuch an one is ever moft remarkable for cultivating friendship with the greatest ardour and fidelity. Benevolence indeed is not entirely confined in its influence and operations to particulars; it makes the univerfal good its proper object; but in friendship it exerts itself with more force and alacrity. For, as rational beings are removed at a greater distance from us, their fituations and difpofitions are lefs ftrikingly perceived by us; and, confequently, the peculiar emotions, that each of these naturally excites, are lefs forcible. But our friends are ftill at hand, and their concerns always obvious to our view. Hence the different affections excited by them carry us more fwiftly into action, and engage us more warmly in it: Thus the union of friendship is little less intimate than that of the foul with the body; each of the parties as it were acquiring new inftruments of perception, and powers of action, from that relation. And it is frequently a queftion with them, whether they are more their own property, or that of their friends. So far is friendship from being a felfifh purfuit, that the advantages arifing from it are its confequences, not its caufes.

Yet, however excellent this Society may be, however agreeable to nature, and however fruitful of all that makes us fecure and happy; there are not wanting, in common life, who make very free with its character; and urge, in juftification of what they fay, the fpecious title of experience. Friendflip, they tell us, is a mere name,

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