LETTER II. HARD hath been the fate of our great Countryman, to fall into the hands of such a Critic and Translator. We have already seen how Mr. De Crousaz hath discharged himself. I now turn to M. l'Abbé du Resnel, whose sufficiency at least equals the malice and calumny of the other; and is attended with just the same issue. I have shewn, in my first Letter, that this noble production of human wit and reason is as singular for its philosophical exactness of method, as for its poetical sublimity of style. Yet hear how our Translator descants upon the matter: "The only reason for which this Poem can be properly "termed an Essay, is, that the Author has not formed "his plan with all the regularity of method which it might have admitted."-And again-" I would not "willingly have made use, in my version, of any other "liberties than such as the Author himself must have "taken, had he attempted a French translation of his own Work; but I was by the unanimous opinion of all "those whom I have consulted on this occasion, and, amongst these, of several Englishmen, completely "skilled in both languages, obliged to follow a different "method. The French are not satisfied with sentiments "however beautiful, unless they are methodically dis"posed; method being the characteristic that distinguishes our performances from those of our neighbours, "and almost the only excellence which they agree to "allow us. That Mr. Pope did not think himself con"fined to a regular plan, I have already observed. I "have therefore, by a necessary compliance with our "taste, divided it into five cantos *." But the Reader will see presently, that our Translator was so far from being able to judge of Mr. Pope's method, that he did not even understand either his subject or his sense, on which all method is to be regulated. For I now come to the Poet's second Epistle. He had * See the English Translation of his Preface. shev n, shewn, in the first, that the ways of God are too high for our comprehension; whence he rightly concludes, that The proper study of Mankind is Man. This conclusion, from the reasoning of the first Epistle, he methodically makes the subject of his introduction to the second; which treats of Man's nature. But here immediately the accusers of Providence would be apt to object, and say, "Admit that we had run into an extree, while we pretended to censure or penetrate the designs of Providence, a matter indeed too high for us; yet have you gone as far into the opposite, while you only send us to the knowledge of ourselves. You "must mock us when you talk of this as a study; for sure we are intimately acquainted with ourselves. "The proper conclusion therefore from your demon"stration of our inability to comprehend the ways of "GOD, is, that we should turn ourselves to the study of "the frame of NATURE." Thus, I say, would they be apt to object; for there are no sort of men more elate with pride than these freethinkers; the effects of which the Poet hath so well exposed in his first Epistle, especially that kind of pride, which consists in a boasted knowledge of their own nature. Hence we see the general argument of the late books against religion turns on a supposed inconsistency between revelation, and what they presume to call the eternal dictates of human nature. The Poet, therefore, to convince them that this study is less easy than they imagine, replies [from 1. 2 to 19] to the first part of the objection, by describing the dark and feeble state of the human understanding, with regard to the knowledge of ourselves: and farther, to strengthen this argument, he shews, in answer to the second part of the objection [from 1. 18 to 31] that the highest advances in natural knowledge may be easily acquired, and yet we all the while continue very ignorant of ourselves. For that neither the clearest science, which results from the Newtonian philosophy, nor the most sublime, which is taught by the Platonic, will at all assist us in this self-study; nay, what is more, that religion itself, when grown fanatical and enthusiastic, 11 will. will be equally useless: though pure and sober religion will best instruct us in Man's nature, that knowledge being essential to religion, whose subject is Man, considered in all his relations, and consequently whose object is God. To give this second argument its full force, he illustrates it [from 1. 30 to 43] by the noblest example that ever was in science, the incomparable NEWTON, whom he makes so superior to humanity, as to represent the angelic beings in doubt, when they observed him of late unfold all the law of Nature, whether he was not to be reckoned in their number; just as men, when they see the surprising marks of reason in an ape, are almost tempted to think him of their own species. Yet this wondrous creature, who saw so far into the works of Nature, could go no farther in human knowledge, than the generality of his kind. For which the Poet assigns this very just and adequate cause: in all other sciences, the understanding is unchecked and uncontrolled by any opposite principle; but in the science of Man, the passions overturn, as fast as reason can build up. Alas, what wonder! Man's superior part This is a brief account of the Poet's fine reasoning in his Introduction. The whole of which his poetical Translator has so miserably mistaken, that, of one of the most strong and best connected arguments, he has rendered it the most obscure and inconsistent, which even the officious Commentator could scarce make worse by his important and candid remarks.-Thus beautifully does Mr. Pope describe Man's weakness and blindness, with regard to his own nature: -Plac'd on this isthmus of a middle state, In In doubt, his mind, or body to prefer, On And as he hath given this description of Man, for the very contrary purpose to which sceptics are wont to employ such kind of paintings, namely, not to deter men from the search, but to excite then to the discovery of truth; he hath, with great judgment, represented man as doubting and wavering between the right and wrong object; from which state there are great hopes he may be relieved by a careful and circumspect use of reason. the contrary, had he supposed Man so blind as to be busied in chusing, or doubtful in his choice, between two objects equally wrong, the case had appeared desperate; and all study of Man had been effectually discouraged. But his Translator not seeing into the force and beauty of this conduct, hath run into the very absurdity I have here shewn Mr. Pope hath so artfully avoided. The Poet says, Man hangs between; in doubt to ACT, or REST. Now he tells us 'tis Man's duty to act, not to rest, as the Stoics thought; and to their principle this latter word alludes, he having just before mentioned that sect*, whose virtue, as he says, is -fix'd as in a frost; Contracted all, retiring to the breast: But strength of mind is EXERCISE, not rest. 1. 92, & scq. But the Translator is not for mincing matters. Seroit-il en naissant au travail condamné? According to him, Man doubts whether he be con demned to a slavish toil and labour, or destined to the luxury of repose; neither of which is the condition whereto Providence designed him. This therefore contradicts the Poet's whole purpose, which is to recommend the study of Man, on a supposition that it will enable him to determine rightly in his doubts between the true and false object. Tis on this account he says, * With too much weakness for the Stoic's pride. Alike in ignorance, his reason such, i. e. the proper sphere of his reason is so narrow, and the exercise of it so nice, that the too immoderate use of it is attended with the same ignorance that proceeds from the not using it at all. Yet, though in both these cases, he is abused by himself, he has it still in his own power to disabuse himself, in making his passions subservient to the means, and regulating his reason by the end of life. Mr. De Crousaz himself had some glimmering of the absurdity of those two lines of the Translator: and because he shall not say, I allow him to have said nothing reasonable throughout his whole Commentary, I will here transcribe his very words: "Ce qui fait encore, que les antitheses frappent au lieu d'instruire, c'est qu'elles sont outrées. L'homme n'ait-il condamné au "travail? Doit-il se permettre la molesse et le repos? "Quel sujet de decouragement ou de trouble, si l'on "n'avoit de choix qu'entre deux partis si contraires? "Mais nous ne naissons ni destinés à un repos oisif, ni "condamnés à un travail accablant et inhumain." 66 Again, Mr. Pope, p. 138. In doubt to deem himself a god, or beast. i. e. He doubts, as appears from the line immediately. following this*, whether his soul be mortal or immortal; one of which is the truth, namely, its immortality, as the Poet himself teaches, when he speaks of the omnipresence of God: Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part. 1 Ep. 1. 267. The Translator, as we say, unconscious of the Poet's purpose, rambles, as before: Tantôt de son esprit admirant l'excellence, Here his head (turned to a sceptical view) was running VOL. XI. on |