valuing reason, how apt are we to overvalue it; we are accordingly surrounded with those, on every side, who lay it down as an undoubted principle, that reason is the highest gift of God. They paint it in the fairest colours, they expatiate in its praise, they make it little less than divine, they describe it as very near, if not quite infallible; able by its own intrinsic light, to guide men into all truth and to lead them into all virtue. Is there no medium between these extremes? There certainly is; but who is there to point it out. I earnestly wish that there was some person better qualified than myself to point it out, and subjoin it to this work. But as I know not who to apply to, I will throw in my mite in endeavouring to point out the medium between undervaluing and overvaluing reason. But before either one or the other can be done, it becomes absolutely necessary to define the term, to fix the precise meaning of the word in question; unless this be done, men may dispute to the world's end without coming to a correct conclusion. This is actually one grand cause of the numberless altercations on this, and many other subjects; disputants who do not define the word or term beforehand, are just as far from an agreement at the end as at the beginning. But to proceed with the subject. The term reason is sometimes used for argument, as in Isaiah, "bring forth your strong reasons," that is, your strong arguments. We understand the word in very near the same sense, when we say he has good reasons for what he does; it seems, then, to imply that he has sufficient motives, such as ought to influence a wise man. But in the present acceptation of the word, we will consider it a faculty of the human mind which exerts itself in three ways: first, by simple apprehension; secondly, by judgment; and thirdly, by discourse. Simple apprehension is barely conceiving a thing in the mind; it is the first and most simple act of the understanding. Judgment, is determining whether the thing before conceived, agrees with it, or whether they differ from each other. Discourse, strictly speaking, is the progress or volition of the mind from one judg ment to another. Taking the word in this sense, let us first impartially consider what it is that reason can do. (And I do not deny but that it can do much, very much, in the affairs of this world.)

To begin our enumeration, of what can reason do, at the lowest point; it can direct servants how to perform the various works wherein they are employed-the farmer in what manner to cultivate his land, to plough, to sow, to reap, to bring in his grain, manage his cattle, and to act with prudence and propriety in every part of his employment-the artificer how to prepare the various sorts of apparel and thousand necessaries of life, not

only for himself and household, but for his neighbour, whether nigh or afar off-the mariner to steer his course over the bosom of the great deep-the lawyer to defend the property of his fellow subject and the physician to heal many of the maladies, to which we are exposed in our present state. It is absolutely necessary for the due discharge of the most important offices of life, such as those of magistrates, whether of an inferior or supe-rior rank; and those of subordinate or supreme governors whether of states, provinces, or kingdoms. All this, considerate mer will acknowledge. No thinking man can doubt, that reason is of considerable service in things relating to the present world. But suppose we speak of higher things, the things of another world: what can reason do here? Is it a help or a hindrance in religion? It may do much in the affairs of men; but what can it do in the things of God? This is a point that deserves to be deeply considered. If you ask, what can reason do in religion? I answer, it can do exceeding much, both with regard to the foundation of it and the superstructure.

The foundation of true religion stands upon the oracles of God. It is built upon the prophets and apostles, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner stone. How necessary then it must be for reason to be in the most highly cultivated state, to enable a teacher to explain to others those living oracles? or is it not even necessary to enable us to understand them ourselves? Is it not reason (assisted by the Holy Spirit) which enables us to understand what the Holy Scriptures declare concerning the being and attributes of God? concerning his eternity, his immensi ty, power, wisdom, and holiness? It is by reason that God enables us in some measure to comprehend his method of dealing with the children of men; the nature of his various dispensa tions, of the old and new covenants, of the Law and of the Gos pel. It is by this we understand (his spirit opening the eyes of our understanding) what that repentance is which is not be repented of; what is that faith whereby we are saved; what is the nature and condition of justification; what are the immediate and hat the subsequent fruits of it. By reason we learn what is that new birth, without which we cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven; and what that holiness is, without which we cannot see God. By the due use of reason we come to know what are the tempers implied in inward holiness: and what it is to be outwardly holy; holy in all manner of conversation: in other words, what is the mind that was in Christ, and what it is to walk as Christ walked.

Many particular cases will occur, with respect to several of the foregoing articles, in which we shall have occasion for all our un

derstanding, if we would keep a conscience void of offence. Many cases of conscience are not to be solved, without the utmost exercise of our reason. The same is requisite in order to understand, and to discharge our ordinary relative duties: the duties of parents and of children; of husbands and wives, of masters and servants. In all these respects, and in all the duties of common life, God has given us our reason for a guide. And it is only by acting up to the dictates of it, by using all the understanding which God has given us, that we can have a conscience void of offence, towards God and towards man.

Here, then, is a large field indeed, wherein reason may expatiate and exercise all its powers. And if reason can do all this in civil and religious things, what is it that it cannot do? Hitherto all prejudice has been laid aside, and the matter weighed calmly and impartially. The same course let us still pursue: let us now coolly consider, without prepossession on either side, what it is, according to the best light we have, that reason cannot do.

I do not believe that reason can produce faith, though it is always consistent with reason; yet I cannot believe that reason of itself can produce faith in the Scriptural sense of the word. According to the Scripture, we understand faith to be an evidence, or conviction of things not seen. We consider it, according to scripture, a divine evidence, bringing with it a full conviction of an invisible eternal world.

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It is true there may be a kind of shadowy conclusion or persuasion of this, which was the case even amongst the wiser heathens, (probably from tradition or from some gleams of light reflected from the Israelites,) but it was little more than mere conjecture. It is not a firm conviction, such as I feel in my own mind, that reason in its highest state of improvement can eyer produce any child of man. The truth of this, I think, I can venture to state, I found from sad experience, many years ago. For, after carefully heaping up the strongest arguments that I could find in either ancient or modern authors, for the very being of a God and (which is nearly connected with it) the existence of an invisible world; I have wandered up and down the Greasy-Creek Old Fields musing with myself, from day to day, and year after year, resolving at times to live the life of a hermit. I was secluded from the human family for weeks together! Seeing no human creature, my attention diverted by no.human voice, and the Bible my constant companion. And yet I could not produce any clear and satisfactory conviction of a God and an invisible world. No; as I mused, the theme was, "what if all these things which I see around me, this earth and the heavens, yea, all this universal

frame, has existed from eternity. And how is it possible for me to be sure this is not the case?" How, (Lord,) I have often cried out in my meditations, shall I be convinced that I am not endeavouring to follow cunningly devised fables? And I have pursued the thought until there was no spirit left within me and I was ready to choose death rather than life. Yea, I have earnestly desired the king that is styled the king of terrors to come and end my trials.

Neither can I believe that reason alone can produce hope in any child of man; that is, scriptural hope; that hope which St. Paul styles in one place, "tasting of the powers of the world to come; " in another, "the sitting in heavenly places with Christ Jesus." That which enables us to say, "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath begotten us again unto a lively hope, to an inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away, which is reserved in heaven for us. This hope can only spring from Christian faith: therefore where there is not Scriptural faith there cannot be Scriptural hope. I do not deny that a self-deceiving enthusiast may work himself into a kind of hope. He may work himself up by a lively imagination, into a sort of pleasing dream. He may as the prophet says, "encompass himself about with sparks of his own kindling. But this is of no great duration; in a little time the bubble breaks. The Scriptural hope can only spring from Scriptural faith. Consequently reason being unable to produce faith, must be equally unable to produce hope. Of this I can venture to speak also from experimental knowledge. Yea, how often did I labour, and that with all my might, to produce this hope that is full of immortality within myself. But it was lost labour. It was no more in my power to produce it, than it was, to touch the heavens with my hands. And as reason cannot produce either faith or hope, neither can it produce the love of God, since it must be from faith and hope alone, that this love can flow. It is evident, then, only when we behold by faith what manner of love the father hath bestowed upon us, in giving his only Son, that we might not perish but have everlasting life, that the love' of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which is given unto us. It is only, then, when we rejoice in the hope of God, that we love him because he first loved us. But what can bare reason do in this matter? It can present us with fine ideas; it can draw a fine picture of love; but this is only a painted fire! and farther than this reason cannot go. I made this trial also; for some years I was continually collecting and reading meditations, sermons, hymns, and the Bible, with all possible seriousness and attention. But I still continued like the bones in Ezekiel's

vision; the skin covered them above, but there was no breath in them.

Once more we may observe, that as reason cannot produce the love of God, neither can it produce the love of our neighbour; that is, a calm, disinterested, generous benevolence to every child of man.

This earnest, steady good will to our fellow-creatures, never flowed from any fountain but gratitude to God our Creator; and if this be the very essence of virtue, it follows that virtue can have no being unless it springs from God; therefore, as reason cannot produce this love, so neither can it produce virtue.

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as it cannot give either faith, hope, love, or virtue, it cannot give happiness; since, separate from these, there can be no happiness for any intelligent creature. It is true that those who are void of virtue may have pleasures, such as they are, but happiness they have not.

I must now take the liberty of speaking a few plain words; first, to those who undervalue reason. Never declaim against this precious gift of God. Acknowledge the candle of the Lord which he has fixed in our souls for excellent purposes. I have' pointed out many admirable ends that it answers; and were it only in the things of this life, of what unspeakable use is even a moderate share of reason in all our worldly employments, even from the lowest and meanest offices of life through all the intermediate branches of business, till we ascend to those of the highest importance and the greatest difficulty. When therefore, we endeavour to depreciate reason we must not imagine we are doing God service; and the least of all are we promoting the cause of God, when we are endeavouring to exclude reason out of religion. Unless we willingly shut our eyes, we cannot but see of what service it is, both in laying the foundation and raising the superstructure. We see it directs us in every point, both of faith and practice; it guides us with regard to every practice both of inward and outward holiness. Do we not glory in this, that the whole of our religion is a reasonable service? Yea, and that every part of it, when it is duly performed, is the highest exercise of our understanding.

I must also add a few words to those who overvalue reason. Why should we run from one extreme to another? Is not the middle way the best? Let reason do all that it can do; employ it as far as it will go. But at the same time let us acknowledge that it is utterly incapable of giving either faith, hope, or love, and consequently of producing either real virtue or substantial happiness. We must expect these from a higher source, even from the Father of the spirits of all flesh. We must seek and