[1755-1774 A.D.] these read out of it. The king was delighted. The Encyclopædia was not allowed but it was tolerated.

Seldom has such a comprehensive work found such a general circulation. Thirty thousand copies constituted the first edition. In 1774, four foreign translations existed. The printing cost 1,158,950 francs, and the clear profits for the booksellers amounted to no less than 2,630,393 francs. For his immense work and for the very great personal danger which he ran Diderot only received 2,500 francs for each volume and besides that 20,000 francs once for all.

66

If we consider the fundamental organisation of this enterprise in comparison with Bayle's great dictionary, it is one of the most striking proofs of how far more bold and courageous the mind had become. Where anxious doubt existed there is now firm conviction. The time for mediation and appeasement is past. In individual concerns there are many concessions and artful reserves, in others on the contrary the attack and advancement are all the more open and relentless. Diderot in his article concerning the Encyclopædia discovers the secret of his tactics, with the unmistakable intention of giving the reader the hints necessary for a right understanding. He says: Every time that national prejudice deserves respect, it must be respectfully exposed in its particular article and with all its retinue of probability and seduction, but the unstable edifice must be overthrown and the vain heap of dust be dissipated, by referring to the articles where solid principles form the basis to opposed truths. This manner of undeceiving men, unfailingly and without any grievous consequences, secretly and silently operates on all minds. It is the art of deriving the strongest results tacitly. If these references in confirmation or refutation are foreseen and skilfully prepared they will make an encyclopædia of a nature to change the popular mode of thinking."

In places where the authorities can the most surely expect insidious positions, there must be clever circumspection, in others more hidden and remote there must be a fight with open visor. For example in "Christianism" there is the doctrine of Inspiration, in "Apparition" refutation of the same; in "Soul and Liberty " the doctrine of the incorporeality and arbitrariness of the soul, in "Naître" various representations of the doctrine of metabolic assimilation and the thereby compulsory corporeality and positiveness of nature.

Contemporaries were right who considered the Encyclopædia the most prominent work of the age. A firm standard had been raised, the signal was given. Gradually but surely, imperceptibly but effectively, the mode of thinking of the new school entered into the dispositions and convictions of men. It was not necessary to agree with all the affirmations of the Encyclopædia, and yet its negations might be fully shared; it was not necessary to be its absolute friend and partisan, but at the same time an enemy might be pursued in common. And in this sense, when Cabanis called the encyclopædists by the somewhat exaggerated expression: "the holy confederation against fanaticism and tyranny," for that age it was an actual historical truth.

THE APPROACH OF WAR (1755 A.D.)

War came now to distract attention from the internal state. The French had betrayed an impatience of what they esteemed the pusillanimity of their government. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was universally stigmatised as inglorious, because it did not add new territories to France. Those in power,

[1755 A.D.]

however, had ample materials for judging how dearly Louis XIV had paid for his conquests, and they were prepared to make great sacrifices to preserve peace. In England the court party entertained the same peaceful sentiments, so wise in their principle. But the opposition, headed by Pitt, and supported by popular clamour, demanded the glories of triumphs and trophies. The great and ignominious sacrifice which France had made to English friendship, the arresting and expelling the pretender Charles Stuart from her dominions, was forgotten. The instances of national collision now taking place abroad were exaggerated with premeditated hostility. Each country accuses its antagonist as the aggressor.

In the East Indies, the rivalry of France and England dated from the preceding war. Dupleix, governor of Pondicherry, an ambitious, turbulent, ostentatious man, never ceased to intrigue with the native powers, and with the court of the Mogul, to extend his country's territories and influence. The English naturally intrigued and armed against him; and war was carried on betwixt him and Clive, whilst the respective nations remained at peace at home. In this instance the French government displayed a spirit of fairness and even backwardness. They disowned and recalled Dupleix, to the indignation of their countrymen, and even of their historians who flatter themselves that, despite their naval inferiority, they might yet have disputed the empire of the East.

In North America arose a more serious cause of quarrel. The French possessed Canada and Louisiana, one commanding the mouth of the St. Lawrence, the other that of the Mississippi. The intervening territory was occupied by the English colonists. The French aimed at possessing themselves of the whole course of those rivers and of the Ohio, which almost joins them; thus enclosing British America within a long frontier line of posts, and, consequently, excluding her from the rest of the continent. Such pretensions were untenable from the nature of things, even if treaties favoured them, which they did not. To draw thus a narrow line across the whole extent of a continent, that line itself unoccupied except by stray forts, and these too, for the most part, in embryo, not in being; to draw this around a vast and peopled region, can only be compared in arrogance to the act of the Roman ambassador, marking around the foreign potentate a line in the sand, and daring him to step beyond its magic circle. The only surprise is, to see the French ministry, so forbearing in Europe, risking war upon such unsupportable claims in America. But the science of political geography was not well understood in these days.

The limits betwixt Canada and Nova Scotia, the latter having been ceded to England by the last treaty, were not accurately defined. The officers of each nation, participating little in the moderation of their governments, proceeded to extremities. A French captain was slain. Reprisals followed. Braddock attacked Fort Duquesne on the Ohio, but was defeated by the French and the Indians, whose alliance they had hired. England, on her side, declared war by capturing all the merchant vessels of her rival.c

England did this as she once attacked Spain without any warning or formal declaration of intent. As Duclos ? said: "An English squadron without declaration of war, without the mention of the least discontent, attacked and took two of our vessels, the Alade and the Lys in June, 1755. This piracy lasted six months before we made reprisals. The English had captured ten thousand sailors before we dreamed of resistance." The conduct of France has some resemblance to that of the United States prior to the War of 1812 with England.a

H. W.- VOL. XII. F

OPENING OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR (1755 A.D.)

[1755-1756 A.D.]

When war was tardily declared, the result was even worse humiliation. In the words of Paul Gaulota: "Victory has never been invariably faithful to any people; but even in the hours of defeat, honour can be saved. It has often been seen in the wars France endured or provoked how fate betrayed her arms, but one has not previously seen a shameful reverse in which the vanquished failed to save, in default of glory, at least the esteem of the victors and the pity of posterity. It is not so with what follows, one of the

most dolorous epochs of history. How degenerate France seemed! She had soldiers, indeed, brave and daring under fire and fatigue, but no one to command them. The list of generals put at their head would seem to have been arranged by the enemies themselves, so well it served their interests to face such adversaries. The Contades, the Clermonts, the Soubises, generals sustained only by royal favour, were so ridiculous that the French, following the precept which Figaro gave later, made haste to laugh to keep from weeping.' They sang.

"Hostilities so badly begun, operations so ill conducted, could have only the most detestable results: grandeur for Prussia and England, ruin for France. Some brave men however did their whole duty and ought not to be enveloped in the condemnation: Montcalm, Bougainville, Vaudreuil, Dieskau and De Lévis defended Canada for four years with 8,500 regulars and 18,000 colonials against 22,000 English and 58,000 militia supported by a formidable fleet. Lally-Tollendal, with 700 men, ruined Pondicherry, resisted the attacks of 20,000 English soldiers and fourteen vessels. There were some glorious pages of history there, but the theatre of these exploits was far away; the French government forgot Montcalm and his companions, and if it remembered Lally it was only to condemn him to death for treason. Twelve years later, it is true, his memory was rehabilitated; this will not be true of the memory of those who judged him."

A FRENCH OFFICER, FIRST Part of Eight-
EENTH CENTURY

To the spectator of the first period of the war none of these disasters was visible. To them France was continuing her path of glory, triumphing on land and sea and in the colonies oversea.a

When the moment at length arrived for the commencement of a struggle, for many months delayed by so many acts of cowardice and folly, there was an immense disparity of naval force. The royal French navy, completely ruined in 1748, had been restored, but in proportion very insufficient in comparison with the formidable number of vessels massed in the harbours of England. The English had one hundred ships-of-the-line, of from 50 to 120

[1756 A.D.]

guns, of which sixteen were three-deckers with 90 to 120 guns, and seventyfour were frigates of from 32 to 46 guns; their building yards and arsenals were in the best condition; those of the French were destitute of wood for building, of rigging, masts, and even of artillery! The French had but sixty ships-of-the-line and thirty-one frigates. Of the sixty ships three were unfit for service; eight were being overhauled; four stood unfinished on the slips; of the forty-five others the greater part needed to be repaired before putting

out to sea.

Even this figure had only been reached because Machault, having been transferred to the navy department in 1754, had caused fifteen vessels to be rapidly constructed or finished in one year. Machault, so criminally complacent or so ill informed in Indian affairs, was roused in the time of need and showed much decision and vigour: a great number of new ships were set on the slips; extraordinary efforts were made to obtain supplies; rewards were offered to privateers; and considerable armaments at Brest and Le Havre and numerous troops collected in the French channel-ports put the English in dread of a descent either on their coasts or on Jersey or Guernsey. A general panic bore witness to the fact that England, so warlike on the ocean, had little of this quality on her own soil; as at the time of the invasion of Charles Edward, the English people were only reassured by the summons of foreign mercenaries, Hanoverians and Hessians: the preceding year George II had concluded a treaty promising to subsidise the landgraf of Hesse-Cassel who had engaged to lend him as many as twelve thousand soldiers if required; the princes of Hesse, descendants of heroes, had become mere merchants of human flesh.

These threats of a descent on England deceived the enemy concerning the true plans of the French government, advised, it is said, by the old duke of Noailles. At the very beginning of the year small squadrons had set sail for the Lesser Antilles, Santo Domingo, and Canada. On the 10th of April twelve other vessels, commanded by La Gallissonière, set out for Toulon, escorting 150 transports freighted with some twelve thousand men under the orders of Marshal Richelieu. On the 17th the expedition descended on the island of Minorca.

The French take Minorca

The point of attack had been well chosen; no blow could be more damaging to England than the loss of this post whence she threatened Toulon and dominated the western basin of the Mediterranean. As an offensive position Port Mahon was more formidable than Gibraltar itself. The choice of the naval leader was not less praiseworthy; La Gallissonière was the best of French sailors. The name of the general was not so welcome to the public. The king's pander, the model corrupter, growing more depraved with increasing years, little faith was placed in his political and military talents. The event did not however justify the apprehensions which his name had excited.

The French seized Ciudadela on the 18th of April and then directed their march to Fort Mahon, the capital of the island. The English evacuated Mahon and concentrated in the fort of St. Philip, a huge citadel which commands the entrance of the arm of the sea which forms the harbour of Mahon. The English government had allowed itself to be surprised: an arrogant confidence in 1755 and, since the threats of descent, an exaggerated fear had prevented it from sending a squadron to winter in the Mediterranean and from reinforcing the garrison of Minorca: if the citadel was strong and well provisioned the garrison was not numerous; there were but

[1756 A.D.] twenty-five hundred men to defend this vast extent of fortifications. When on the 19th of May, a relieving squadron did at last arrive it was already more than eight days since the French cannon had made breaches in the outworks.

The issue of the siege was to depend on the shock of the two squadrons. The English fleet commanded by Admiral Byng was slightly superior to the French; it consisted of thirteen ships against twelve. It attacked on the 20th of May, having the wind behind it. The van of the French which came first into action was roughly handled; but the enemy did not attempt to pursue their advantage; the object was to cut off and overwhelm the rearguard that they might approach the shore by Fort St. Philip. La Gallissonière perceived his adversary's intention and kept his ships in such close order that it was impossible for the English to break through the line. The cannonade was not to their advantage. In firing the French marine artillery had the same superiority over theirs that their infantry had over the French. Their manoeuvres were frustrated and three of their vessels had sprung a leak so that they were in danger of sinking. Admiral Byng, judging that a prolonged battle might lead to the destruction of his fleet, effected his retreat. La Gallissonière, having the wind against him and faithful to his instructions which charged him to subordinate everything to the success of the siege, would not leave the neighbourhood of Port Mahon and allowed the enemy to regain Gibraltar.

To have victoriously sustained the shock of the English on their own element was in itself a considerable success. But the garrison of Fort St. Philip did not lose heart. The labours of the siege were heavy and Richelieu had at first directed them unskilfully, but he made great efforts to win the confidence and keep up the spirit of his soldiers. When signs of disorder showed themselves in the camp and the men began to indulge somewhat too freely in Spanish wines, Richelieu, instead of punishing them, issued an order of the day to the effect that "such as became intoxicated would not have the honour of working in the trenches." The idea was a happy one and there was a general cessation of drinking.

Richelieu ventured on a general assault. It was a rash proceeding and he must have had great confidence in the French soldiers, the first in the world in this kind of fighting. Six or seven weeks of bombardment had scarcely any effect on the masses of rock which served the place as outworks; the ditches had not been filled up; the walls still stood erect. On the night of the 27th-28th of June, whilst a large detachment in boats are endeavouring to force entrance to the harbour, four columns fling themselves into the dry moat; cannon and musketry sweep the front ranks; mines blow up the bottom of the moat with those who are crossing it; dead and wounded are succeeded by crowds of others ready to avenge them; the ladders are too short by several feet; officers and men climb on one another's shoulders, plant bayonets in the interstices of the stones and reach the top of the rampart. At break of day the English are amazed to behold the besiegers masters of three of the forts; though the main defences are intact, the governor decides to capitulate that very day.

The French could scarcely believe in their conquest, when they saw themselves in the midst of all these formidable works which they could never have scaled in cold blood, by daylight and without an enemy. In Paris and throughout France there was a veritable delirium of joy. Richelieu owed to the valour of the French grenadiers a rehabilitation which was more brilliant than lasting. The true hero of the expedition, La Gallissonière,